Top 10 multi-role fighters 2020
Modern fighters are ‘multi-role’, meaning they can attack aerial or surface targets. They can carry the same weight of anti-surface munition as a World War II bomber, yet are also capable of performing the air superiority mission which demands extremely high performance. The ‘swing’ or ‘omni’ mission is one in which both air and ground targets are attacked in the same sortie.
In 2020, fighter-bombers dominate, with only the US and Russia rich enough to produce and field single-role fighters and attack aircraft. Here we assess and rank the ten most capable multi-role combat aircraft in service in 2020.
Before we reveal our top 10 for 2020, Jim Smith, who took an active role in in the development of many British warplanes, shares an analysis of what ‘multi-role’ means.
Note: The introduction section is by Jim Smith, the top 10 section is by Hush-Kit (with a section from Justin Bronk) with recommendations from Jim, but does not reflect his opinions.
Why do air arms select multi-role aircraft?
“When considering the qualities of particular systems, or classes of capability, it is always good practice to start with an examination of what objectives might drive their selection.
In the case of multi-role aircraft, having been peripherally involved with Tornado, and fairly deeply involved with both the Typhoon and JSF projects, I can well remember the much rehearsed argument ‘Another Jack of All Trades, and Master of None’ directed against the Multi-Role solution as opposed to separate Air Combat and Strike platforms.
I can also remember the German Government attitude to Typhoon (when it was still EFA) ‘Not a Deutsche Mark for air-to-surface’*. And the Treasury coming in with “As it’s multi-role, I assume you’ll be taking at least two types out of Service when it comes in” – bye-bye Jaguar and Harrier …

So those are the rather glib messages suggesting multi-role aircraft might not be the way to go. But what are the counter arguments? And where might a multi-role solution be just the thing. Well, there are two obvious drivers – force structure constraints, and the economy. For the first, consider maritime air power, specifically carrier-based operations.
You need to be able to provide fighter aircraft – as a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) screen to deter attacking forces, defeat threat anti-shipping and air combat capabilities, and protect other assets, such as airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, tankers and electronic warfare (EW) platforms. But you also need a strike aircraft, capable of projecting power from the ship – otherwise what’s the point of being there? And you only have limited space on the ship to store and maintain your aircraft.
Hence even the US select multi-role aircraft for naval air, most notably the F-4 Phantom II and more recently the F/A-18F Super Hornet. Not to say they don’t also have some single role aircraft, but these two excellent aircraft give the lie to the “… Master of None” gibe.

A Navy chase F-4 Phantom II assists with flight tests of an Hornet development aircraft. The Hornet is taking on fuel from a KA-3.
In addition, in smaller air arms, and in smaller economies, it may be neither necessary or affordable to maintain separate strike and fighter capabilities. The development of air combat aircraft has been increasing in both cost and time as more and more capability is both sought and delivered. This trend has placed relentless pressure on forces to reduce the number of different types in the inventory, partly because of the continuing increase in development cost and time of such systems, but also because of the operational costs in maintaining, and in training air and ground crew for multiple different systems. As an example, in the UK, we can see a fairly near-term future in which a mix of Typhoon and Lightning II will provide the core air power for the nation, excepting long-range precision strike by cruise missile.

The pressure to reduce the number of types in the inventory has also driven some innovative and successful solutions, where different variants of aircraft have been produced optimised for the Fighter and Strike roles, the most notable Western examples being the F-15C and F-15E, and the Tornado GR and F3 aircraft. These aircraft have differing avionics, and some significant airframe differences, yet still manage to retain significant commonality in propulsion and other, not directly role-specific, systems. However, these aircraft are not truly multi-role, as they are specialised variants of a near-common platform, rather than truly able to be used in many roles.

The third reason to adopt a multi-role approach is simply the flexibility in defence planning which it enables. Many recent conflicts have not involved a contest for air dominance. In general, although fighter aircraft have been used to escort high value targets, the air threat in (say) Afghanistan, Mali or Yemen, has been minimal, and the ability of air combat aircraft like Typhoon or Rafale to ‘Swing Role’ and deliver strike missions has been invaluable. The F-16 also provides a good example of a fighter that has spent most, though definitely not all, of its life operating as a strike asset.
What makes a good multi-role combat aircraft?

Let’s start with a brief indication of the capabilities we might expect such an aircraft to have. A multi-role combat aircraft is one that is used to perform many different types of mission.
Examples might include the delivery of precision guided bombs; the delivery of long-range stand-off weapons; the suppression of enemy defences, perhaps through the use of anti-radar missiles in support of other aircraft; carriage of tactical reconnaissance systems; and the ability to both defend itself against air threats, and, when necessary, escort other aircraft.
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In some cases, possibly many cases, a swing-role capability may be desirable. This means the ability to switch from one mission to another if required, for example, the carriage of mixed weapons so that alternative targets can be addressed. Carriage of both laser-guided bombs to allow direct attack, and anti-radiation missiles to allow defence suppression, for example. Fighter aircraft may carry a full air-to-air load out as well as air-to-surface weapons, allowing them to retain an air combat capability once the air-to-surface stores have been released. As a capability, ‘swing role’ may be particularly important in delivering Close Air Support (CAS), where precision is required due to the proximity of friendly troops, but the nature and location of the target will be unknown until an airborne taking is received.

Pic credit: Sławek @hesyja Krajniewski
Delivering this flexible capability is going to drive a number of aspects of our aircraft. To be effective in air combat, it is going to need a radar, an infra-red seeker tracker (IRST), if it has aspirations to either be somewhat stealthy or tackle stealthy targets, and ideally both Long-range or Medium-range and Short-range air-to-air missiles (L/MRAAM and SRAAM). To survive, it’s also going to need the defensive aids that support air combat – a towed decoy; defensive aids system, chaff, flares, missile launch and approach warner, for example.
Beyond this, our aircraft is going to need to be effective, at a minimum, as a tactical strike aircraft. This means having the payload-range to deliver its weapons to their targets. Precise requirements will depend on the targets to be engaged, as this will drive the nature of the weapons to be carried, and the sensors needed to support them. A basic precision-guided bomb delivery capability will require either a podded or internal laser designation system, and the necessary weapons stations and pylons to carry and release the weapons. A JTIDS (Joint Tactical Information Distribution System) or other equivalent datalink capability will also be essential to enable situational awareness, and to receive in-mission target tasking and authorisation.
If the targets are heavily defended by anti-air systems, or are hardened, then it is likely that the ability to deliver weapons with significant stand-off capability will be needed. Because of the need for these weapons to make a powered fly out to their targets, they will be larger and heavier than unpowered bombs or glide-bombs. Similarly, the use of larger and more complex warheads against hardened targets will also drive up weapon size and weight.

Unless a stealthy multi-role system is available, the stores are likely to be mainly carried externally, which compromises radar signature, and increases drag very significantly. To achieve a useful mission radius on a strike mission, it is likely that increased fuel will be required, either through the use of external fuel tanks (e.g. Rafale, Typhoon), fuselage saddle tanks (e.g. F-15E, Late-model F-16) or increased platform size (e.g. Su-32, J-20).

It is important to note that having plenty of pylons available to carry weapons is necessary, but not sufficient. For a multi-role aircraft to be an effective strike platform, the weapons it carries must be integrated with the aircraft system. Aircraft sensors have to be able to cue weapons; the weapon capability envelopes have to be displayed to the pilot; the appropriate carriage and release envelopes must be known and respected; and pilots and maintainers have to be trained in the use and the maintenance of the various systems.
Low Observable Systems
What of stealth? By this I mean systems that are hard to detect by surface and air-based sensors of all types, but generally at least radar and infra-red sensors. One impact of seeking to avoid detection is that when this is necessary, no external stores can be carried. The effect of this is to require stores to be carried in internal bays, which limits the size and number of weapons that can be carried, impacting on both fighter and particularly strike capability.

This has driven the development of specialised stores such as the Small-Diameter Bomb (SDB), but use of internal weapons bays for air-to-surface stores will generally be at the expense of carriage of MRAAM. The inability to carry external tanks or stores without compromising the aircraft stealth capability will reduce both strike range and mission flexibility. That said, the low signature of these aircraft does allow greater utility in high threat environments (sometimes described as the ‘first day of the war’ capability).
A related issue is that while internal stores carriage also means that (generally) there is plenty of space for internal fuel, the resulting configuration can also have higher wave drag. This tends to result in less combat radius or combat persistence than might be expected, and can also result in less energy manoeuvrability.
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Are the F-22 and F-35 multi-role? Well, they do have both fighter and strike capabilities, but will be constrained by weapons bay size if they are relying on stealth to survive. Certainly, the Royal Navy and Royal Australian Air Force will be seeking to use their Lightning IIs for both air defence and strike. Some other air arms will rely on a force mix approach, using their Lightnings mainly as a strike asset, supported when required by air superiority fighters.
The F-22 is effectively optimised for the fighter role, and JSF for strike. In service, F-22 is likely to be used primarily an air superiority fighter, even though it is capable of carrying a mix of JDAM and SRAAM to deliver a strike capability, largely because it is available in limited numbers. Arguably, the F-22 is better employed to achieve air superiority, enabling other aircraft and systems to deliver the strike missions.
Conversely, at least in high-threat environments, the F-35 might best be considered as a strike aircraft with a self defence capability, or perhaps as an air defence aircraft without an effective strike capability. Of course, both air combat and strike effects can still be achieved, using aircraft with a mix of strike and air combat load outs – effectively functioning as ‘bombers and escorts’.
Is a stealthy multi-role aircraft possible? Certainly, but such an aircraft may need to have a larger weapons bay than the F-22 or F-35 to accommodate the variety and size of weapons required for strike missions. Inevitably such a design would be large and expensive, and an exemplar perhaps already exists in the Chinese J-20.
Mission Support

Much depends on the target set, and particularly whether moving targets as well as fixed targets are to be addressed. If targets are fixed, pre-planned strikes are possible and may be conducted with ‘fire and forget’ systems such as cruise missiles and other stand-off weapons. If targets are moving, or are re-locatable, and are thus uncertain in position, a more flexible approach will be necessary.
A variety of approaches are possible, the simplest being laser designation from the aircraft, with the laser being enabled to track the target. This approach, however, relies on a line of sight being available to the target, and hence results in relatively short-range engagements, which may not be feasible against some targets. Alternatively, an active seeker on the weapon may be used, for example using a millimetric wave radar or an infra-red sensor to track and guide to the target.
Importantly, appropriate operational doctrine and command and control systems need to be in place to enable swing role, close air support and dynamic in-mission planning to allow targets of opportunity, or urgent tasking requests, to be addressed. Avoiding casualties to friendly forces or civilians, ensuring the validity of targets and the suitability of the weapons carried, coordinating actions with coalition ground forces, and ensuring the safety of air operations in a complex environment, will all require secure, high confidence datalink communications, and a system for receiving, processing and approving taskings.
While what is described has a Western and Coalition perspective, it is clear that any multi-role, dynamically planned short-notice operation is unlikely to be possible unless some process is in place for issuing and accepting valid taskings in a dynamic environment.
Features enabling a multi-role capability – a reprise
A summary list of good attributes for a multi-role combat aircraft might be (in no particular order):
- A suitable integrated suite of air-to-air weapons for self defence and escort capability. Likely to be a minimum of 4 MRAAM and 2 SRAAM
- A suitable integrated suite of air-to surface weapons.
- Precise capabilities will depend on the target set, but likely to include precision guided bombs, anti-armour and/or anti-shipping weapons, stand-off weapons and cruise missiles, anti-radiation weapons.
- Appropriate sensors to detect targets and provide necessary weapons guidance. Likely to include Air-to-air and air-to-surface radar, IR Tracker, laser designator and capability to carry other systems such as a tactical reconnaissance package.
- Sufficient internal fuel to deliver required mission radius, enhanced when necessary by additional external fuel, and ability to receive air-to-air refuelling.
- Defensive aids including chaff, flares, active radar and IR jamming capability. Ideally a towed radar decoy, or other means of electronic attack
- Datalink communication to off-board assets such as AEW&C aircraft; ability to receive and pass on target information and authorisation; necessary datalink support to weapons, and desirably ability to provide third-party targeting and weapons support.
- Air vehicle performance sufficient to deliver Beyond visual range (BVR) air combat, and desirably to survive WVR air combat.
- An affordable and supportable airframe and weapons systems.
- If stealthy, a sufficiently large internal weapons bay, or bays, to be able to carry both MRAAM and air to surface weapons simultaneously.
- An appropriate command, control and doctrinal environment to allow dynamic in-flight mission targeting.
–– Jim Smith
Aircraft discounted from the list
Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor
An unmatched air superiority aircraft –but a waste of capability to use as a strike aircraft.
Chengdu J-20
I see this as air superiority, but with an anti-access edge. If armed with a hypersonic air-to-air weapon it would have to be a concern for US AWACS and AAR assets. If capable of fielding a similar anti-ship weapon it might also be a concern for the USN.
Sukhoi Su-57 Felon
Impressive looking beast, which could well be a good future multi-role platform.
Mikoyan MiG-35
Should become a decent all-rounder but is currently immature.
Top 10 multi-role fighters 2020
10. McDonnell Douglas F/A-18C Hornet (APG-79v4)

The number ten slot is the most contested, with each potential candidate bringing something to the table: the JF-17 has a state-of-the-art cockpit, a stand-off ground attack capability and a potent EW suite; the Mirage 2000 is a proven and well equipped platform; the Tejas is tiny, with a good sensor package and the best carefree handling system of any fighter. But it can only go to one aircraft, so by a slim margin we are handing the number 10 slot to the upgraded FA-18Cs of the USMC. Though they may lack endurance, they may be ancient, they are currently been given a new lease of life with the retrofitting of the APG-79v4, a baby version of the Super Hornet’s AESA radar. This results in excellent situational awareness in an engine/airframe combination already loved for its reliability and legendary manoeuvrability, and one cleared to deploy a wide-range of modern munitions. The Hornet has been combat proven for over 30 years and earned its spurs itself in the heartbreaking wars of the Middle East, Afghanistan and Libya. Back in the early 1980s the legacy Hornet led the way, demonstrating how an electronic cockpit and a decent multi-mission radar was the way forward. In 2020 it can still hold its own and it will continue to serve for some time.

9. Chengdu J-10C

Observers tend to be cautious of heaping praise on Chinese hardware, which (other than engine technology) may be a position more rooted in historical prejudice than fact. Judging an aircraft that has not been exported is tricky, but it is noteworthy that Pakistan cancelled their 2009 order for the type in 2011 to concentrate on improved JF-17 variants in the short term, followed by a likely commitment to the J-31. This may point to the aircraft’s capability edge over the JF-17 being too marginal to merit the cost, but this is pure speculation. What is more certain is that this is modern design that is being rapidly updated.
The Chinese J-10 is in service in large, and growing, numbers. The latest version, the J-10C, is a formidable machine. We spoke to Justin Bronk, Research Fellow for Airpower and Technology at the RUSI think-tank to find out more.
No nation has more new aircraft programmes than China, and the progress it has made in the twenty years has been spectacular. In the field of fighter aircraft much media attention has been paid to the rather spectacular J-20, a monstrous stealthy combat aircraft comparable in some respects to the US’ F-22, while less has been paid to the J-10.

The J-10 entered service in 2006 and since than around 350 have been built, more than the number of French Rafale, or Swedish Gripen and very close to the number of F-35s. With an estimated empty weight of 8850 kg and maximum weight of 19277 kg it is comparable to the F-16, as is its reheated thrust of around 130kN. The latest version, the J-10C, is the most potent – with a modern AESA radar and the ability to carry the PL-15 long range air-to-air missile, a formidable weapon in the same class as Europe’s much lauded Meteor. We asked Justin Bronk how the aircraft would fare against the F-16, the most widely used modern fighter aircraft.

“On J-10C in Beyond Visual Range combat; kinematically, it is likely to be somewhere close to a later Block F-16; the original J-10A’s thrust-weight ratio most likely having degraded due to weight growth as more advanced sensors, stores and kit such as HMS have been added.” — the J-10C’s thrust-to-weight, an important measure for how ‘energetic’ the aircraft is, remains decent- above 1.1 -1 in a typical combat configuration. “With a light airframe, relaxed stability, decent (although not stellar) thrust to weight ratio and large canards, the J-10C is very agile in airshow configuration and the option for thrust vectoring only increases this capability at low speeds. However, the light airframe and small size relative to fighters like the J-20, Typhoon or F-15 mean that external stores and fuel tanks will have a more serious impact on both performance and agility than on larger fighters.”
China has long struggled with aero-engine technology, so how good are the J-10C’s WS10s? “The WS-10 series has suffered from persistent problems with engine life, mean time between failures and throttle-spool response time. Whilst it has improved sufficiently to enter quantity production for later J-10Bs and J-11s, the Russian AL-31FN Series 3 developed for the J-10B is still a superior engine on almost all metrics aside from cost. Chinese military turbofan engines are improving rapidly but are at best only at par with Russian equivalents and are not yet in a position to compete directly with European or American designs.”
The PL-15 missile is something of a bogeyman to US planners, as if fully operational and as good as the Chinese say it condemns AMRAAM-armed legacy platforms to a position of vulnerability.

Bronk believes the Pl-15 is not yet fully operational, “The PL-15 is certainly being shown off on carriage flights with a number of different PLAAF types, so being somewhere around what we in the West would term Initial Operating Capability but not near Full Operational Clearance is probably a decent bet. There is a fair bit of concern in the US fighter community about the PL-15; its size and design should allow it to technically outrange the AIM-120 series and a proper active radar seeker head gives a lot more tactical options than older semi-active Russian and Chinese ‘sticks’.”
Though mechanically scanned radars are considered a technologically of the past, they remain the most common fighter sensor in the West. The J-10C has an Active Electronically Scanning Array radar, “Finally, its AESA radar should give the J-10C a significant advantage over older Mech-Scan equipped F-16s in the BVR arena; although having a great deal more experience in the technology, American fighter AESA sets are likely to remain superior where fitted especially in terms of advanced low-probability of intercept/detection (LPI/LPD) scanning modes.” In summary, Bronk firmly places the J-10C in Generation 4.5* “All in all, the J-10C is a significant leap into true ‘4.5th Generation’ capability for the PLAAF compared to the earlier variants of this distinctive bird.
*something he defines as including “low-observability to radar; the ability to supercruise (fly at supersonic speed without using afterburners); and extreme manoeuvrability at all speeds.”.
8. Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II

In the scenario of war against Russia or China, the F-35 should be able to operate on Day One. If the US doesn’t want go to war with Russia or China, and just fancies bombing poor people, then the F-35 offers a great deal of over-capability (as do all the aircraft on this list). As a Rafale pilot recently noted in an interview, a weaponised C-130 or 737 would be able to do everything currently expected of a frontline fast jet in real-world operations.
The F-35C lacks maturity, and the F-35B has a short range. In time, the C variant would perhaps be the best multi-role one, with its bigger wing, then the A. The F-35B has significantly less range. As discussed above, I wouldn’t see this delivering a swing role very well. It has the advantage of stealth, and good data-links within F-35 to F-35, but would be unlikely to fare well in WVR combat.
7. Lockheed Martin F-16 Block 70

It would be easy to dismiss the F-16 as it is so old, but the latest versions have very little in common with the aircraft that flew 46 years ago.
The F-16’s traditional dominance in the WVR regime is dependent on a relatively clean configuration. Whereas the eurocanards carry their vital EW kit internally, the F-16 will in any real-life situation go into battle with a very draggy 600-pound pod. Above 25,000 feet and at higher speeds it is dominated by the eurocanards in air-to-air combat.

The latest F-16s carry AESA radar, an impressive weapon load of modern weapons and some avionics and systems superior to even those of the F-35. The cockpit of the block 70 is excellent and future variants are likely to benefit from Lockheed Martin’s experience of wide-screen displays.
The F-16 has seen as much combat as any US aircraft type, and has demonstrated itself for 40 years. It remains an aircraft to be respected.

(Note: Mitsubishi F-2 is included as an F-16 variant for our listing)
6. Saab JAS 39C Gripen

The Gripen has a good mix of external stores, fuel capability and good connectivity, but is a single-engine and smaller design and hence has less range with a useful load. Its air combat capability, with the superlative Meteor long range missile, is likely to be better than the F-16. The Gripen pilot is imbued with excellent situation awareness and protected by an exceptional electronic warfare system.
The Gripen is also the cheapest aircraft to operate on this list, the least fuel thirsty and the smallest. Its small size, combined with high off-boresight missiles and a helmet cueing system make it a particularly nasty opponent in within visual range combat.
5. Boeing F-15SA/QA Eagle

Though the USAF’s F-15E force is old, it is unmatched in the strike role. But it is is also rarely used in a dedicated air combat role, which raises questions about it being counted in this category. Self defence certainly, but given the F-22 and F-15Cs, in service it’s not really a multi-role aircraft. It is however a multi-role aircraft for some of the export operators of the type. The latest members of the Strike Eagle family, (the SA and QA) are lavishly equipped with all the latest sensors and systems. The SA is ferociously capable as will the QAs when they reach a greater stage of maturity.
HK notes
Personally I would have placed the F-15SA or QA higher in this list. In payload performance, sensor suite and modernity of systems it ranks very highly. Depends whether we give more importance to the ground attack or air role. At the risk of committing to the Turkey at Christmas argument I would argue that the former has dominated the last two decades of air operations.
4. Sukhoi Su-35/Su-30M series

Deciding which ‘Flanker’ to include is challenging. It would be tempting to include the Chinese J-15 on the grounds that carrier fighters must be multi-role but the J-15 currently shares many of the limitations of the Su-33 (which are described here) — is not optimised for air-to-ground and lacks a meaningful load-out when carrier deployed.
The Sukhoi Su-35 is generally better equipped than the Su-30M series though lacks the situational awareness and workload benefits of the M’s backseat WSO, but does benefit from the very capable Russian defensive electronic warfare system. The vast sums that the Indian Air Force is willing to pump into Rafale procurement does not boost confidence in the similar vintage Su-30M (the Russian type having entered Indian service only five years before Rafale entered French service). The Su-34 is more of a medium bomber than a multirole fighter. The Su-35 has a very powerful radar, excellent kinematic performance and an exceptional un-refuelled radius of action. It should be able to give a decent account of itself in air combat with any type short of the F-22 or Su-57. Another contender is the Chinese J-16, a twin-seat multi-role Flanker.

The Russian Su-35 and related aircraft have high payload range, a very good range of weapons carriage options, including large numbers of pylons and high internal fuel. They also have large radars and are fitted with IRST. They might not do too well against stealthy fighters, but in a permissive environment, or against non-stealthy opponents, would be a capable multi-role aircraft in at least the F-15E class.
3. Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet

The Super Hornet is very well equipped, and needs to be. Whereas the air force can rely on a mixed force of F-15C/Es, F-16s, F-35As, A-10s etc, the Super Hornet has to do pretty much everything (at least until the F-35C is more mature). The range of weapons it can carry is impressive, ranging from the stealthy AGM-158 JASSM (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile) to the AGM-88 for anti-radar attacks, the JDAM series and the AGM-84 Harpoon anti-shipping missile. Air-to-air weaponry is decent but typical of the current US lag behind Europe. Though the AIM-120D is highly regarded, it is an enhanced range AIM-120 rather than the new breed of long-range air-to-air missiles.

It is much slower than the European canards, and the extremely draggy manner in which the fuel and weapons are carried further compounds this disadvantage. The aerodynamic configuration is optimised for low-speed handling. The most notable omission equipment-wise, an IRST, will be solved with a combination sensor/fuel pod carried on the centreline. This inelegant solution will have a deleterious effect on the Rhino’s already lacklustre performance. Boeing had earlier proposed an internal IRST at the expense of the aircraft’s gun, but this was rejected by the Navy.
I have placed this ahead of the F-15E because I think it achieves a better balance between both roles. The F-15E is a very capable strike aircraft, but I’m suggesting less emphasis is likely to be given to air combat missions (at least in US hands) because of the availability of other assets. At present the F/A-18E is the primary strike and air combat asset for the US Navy.
2. Eurofighter Typhoon

Cynics might note that the Eurofighter nations have spent a great deal of time and money on turning the Typhoon into a Rafale, i.e. converting it from a fighter to a fighter-bomber (this idea would have been taken further if the rather silly idea of a carrier Sea Typhoon had actually happened). Today’s Typhoon, especially the British examples, are a very different beast from the fighter-intercepter that entered service in 200

The long road to AESA seemed to be finally reaching a happy conclusion but has recently split into a complicated mess of different nations and different radar. Still when Kuwait receives their Typhoon’s this year they should have a functional AESA in the Captor-E Radar 0.

Like Rafale, it has demonstrated capability in both the air-to-air and air-to-ground role, and likely exceeds Rafale in the former domain due to greater energy manoeuvrability.
1. Dassault Rafale

Other than low observability the Rafale has almost everything. The most notable absence, a helmet mounted display/cueing system has, with the introduction of the type into Qatari service, been addressed (though no photos have yet been released to support this). It also lacks a towed radar decoy though it is believed this will enter service with the Indian Air Force in the near future. There is some question regarding whether all Rafale’s have an IRST, though it was a certainly a part of the original internal sensor set.
It edges out Typhoon due to better strike optimisation and greater number of ‘wet’ pylons, giving a broader range of weapons fit options and potentially greater range.
Future Capabilities – By Jim Smith
“What of the future? Well, who would dare to predict anything in the world of 2020? However, if the material out there in US and European future air power projections is to be believed, a system of systems approach is likely to be the key to future air power.
It seems likely that, at least from a US and European perspective, autonomous, cooperating systems of systems will form the basis of future air power. To implement this, it is likely that we would see a return to a variety of specialised platforms, rather than the current move towards fewer multi-role systems.
The driver for this is likely to be survivability. Wherever possible, systems will be unmanned and either autonomous or operated remotely. If this approach is to be believed, future manned platforms will largely be limited to a manned multi-role system such as Tempest or Future Combat Aircraft System (or their US equivalents), accompanied by a series of unmanned co-operating systems, which could include a ‘wingman’, a Neuron or Taranis platform to augment air combat capability or provide a strike platform. Other functions, such as refuelling, Electronic Attack, Electronic Intelligence, Target Detection and Geolocation, and Communications Relay, would all be delivered by specialist autonomous or remotely operated vehicles.

Manned platforms would be limited to, perhaps, Airborne Early Warning & Control platforms, and the manned fighter aircraft, operating principally as a fighter and weapons director, controlling cooperating unmanned weapons carriers. All elements of the system would be stealthy, and linked by secure data-links, with the intent of separating command and control, sensor and weapons delivery elements.
Is this plausible? Well, technically this might be an endpoint of a road-map, and individual elements of such a system are likely to be achievable in the relatively near term.
A better question might be ‘Is such a system affordable?’ Separating the functions across 7 or 8 specialised platforms would certainly increase costs, as each would need to be designed, developed and integrated. It would also be unlikely to reduce manpower costs all that much, as experience seems to show that unmanned and autonomous systems still need to be maintained and ‘crewed’, even if the crew is not actually in the aircraft.
Among the most powerful drivers against the implementation of such a system would be its vulnerability to cyber attack through interference with communication links. Its most effective opponents are, however, likely to be the accountants in Treasury departments, who may not be swayed by survivability arguments when asked to disaggregate the functions of one multi-role platform to two, three or four specialist, stealthy and autonomous platforms.
In any case, it is perhaps a safe bet that this route will not be affordable outside the Super-Powers – China, Russia and the USA. The EU, and the UK, would, in my view, not be able to take on this approach without cooperation, and in the current climate, that seems a big ask. Maybe the first integration should be between the Tempest and Neuron or FCAS and Taranis if a European approach is to be sought.
It is also not clear how a carrier task group could accommodate such a proliferation of platforms, and it is also clear that this type of solution will not be available without very significant expenditure. So – for the UK and EU, it would be best to design FCAS and Tempest with capability growth in mind. Build growth avionics capacity and some extra volume into the initial aircraft, because more sensors, more functionality, and more roles are likely to be required. And I would not expect the USN to adopt the same solutions as the USAF – the (big) carriers might not be big enough to accommodate the system of systems approach.
Multi-role systems are likely to be of continuing value to Air Arms and countries that are not seeking world domination, but need to address local defence issues, and to deter external aggressors.”
––– Jim Smith

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From the cocaine, blood and flying scarves of World War One dogfighting to the dark arts of modern air combat, here is an enthralling ode to these brutally exciting killing machines.
The Hush-Kit Book of Warplanes is a beautifully designed, highly visual, collection of the best articles from the fascinating world of military aviation –hand-picked from the highly acclaimed Hush-kit online magazine (and mixed with a heavy punch of new exclusive material). It is packed with a feast of material, ranging from interviews with fighter pilots (including the English Electric Lightning, stealthy F-35B and Mach 3 MiG-25 ‘Foxbat’), to wicked satire, expert historical analysis, top 10s and all manner of things aeronautical, from the site described as:
“the thinking-man’s Top Gear… but for planes”.
The solid well-researched information about aeroplanes is brilliantly combined with an irreverent attitude and real insight into the dangerous romantic world of combat aircraft.
FEATURING
- Interviews with pilots of the F-14 Tomcat, Mirage, Typhoon, MiG-25, MiG-27, English Electric Lighting, Harrier, F-15, B-52 and many more.
- Engaging Top (and bottom) 10s including: Greatest fighter aircraft of World War II, Worst British aircraft, Worst Soviet aircraft and many more insanely specific ones.
- Expert analysis of weapons, tactics and technology.
- A look into art and culture’s love affair with the aeroplane.
- Bizarre moments in aviation history.
- Fascinating insights into exceptionally obscure warplanes.

The book will be a stunning object: an essential addition to the library of anyone with even a passing interest in the high-flying world of warplanes, and featuring first-rate photography and a wealth of new world-class illustrations.



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The Mk IX Spitfire, with its two-stage supercharged engine, is lauded for having rescued the RAF from the clutches of the Focke-Wulf 190. Given the new Spitfire’s effectiveness did the Focke-Wulf rapidly counter it with a similarly equipped fighter? No. Germany only fielded a couple of fighter types with two-stage superchargers and both entered service far later, very close to the end of the War. They were the Fw 190D-11 and Ta 152, powered by the Jumo 213E/F. The Jumo 213E had a system like the Merlin, but only appeared in tiny numbers a few months before the collapse of Germany. German failure to develop a two-stage supercharged fighter is widely regarded as one of their great technical failures in high-altitude flight. However, this was as much an organisational failure as anything else, as Daimler-Benz had been running two-stage supercharged DB601 engines since around 1936 in their test cells in Stuttgart Untertürkheim. Focke-Wulf master designer Kurt Tank told incredulous American engineers that the notion of a two-stage supercharged fighter had been quashed by German military bureaucrats before it could take full form. The Luftwaffe was regarded at the time as purely a tactical force, designed to support ground operations. They saw the ability of fighters to attain very high altitudes as an anathema to this strategic concept, and cancelled all such projects. They did have their own equivalent to the Spitfire Mk IX’s engine, but wasted the opportunity with sheer ineptitude.
2. Britain needed fuel from the US to survive?
Germany is well known for its successful synthetic aviation fuel programme in the Second World War, which created fuel from coal and hydrogen, mixed under high pressure and temperatures. However, Britain had embarked on a programme to do the same thing. This began as early as 1932 and received strong Air Ministry support from about 1936 onwards. Not as outlandish as it sounds, Britain was at the time the third largest producer of coal in the world, and could therefore, have waged war against Germany even if no fuel from America had ever arrived. When, later in the war it became imperative to increase the performance of fighters stationed in Britain to combat the German pulse-jet powered V1 flying bombs, it was the British synthetic fuel programme which helped yield ingredients for the 150 Grade fuel that was needed. This fuel was also made in the U.S.A., but the process was pioneered at I.C.I. Billingham in the laboratory of Ronald Holroyd.
3. Radio gagger
After the ascension of Nazis into power, all amateur radio activity and associated clubs and component development was banned. The paranoia of the Nazi state couldn’t allow the thought of young Germans freely communicating with long distance HAM radio, or listening to remote foreign broadcasting stations. This had a catastrophic impact on German radar and electronic warfare development a decade later. Dr Wolfgang Martini, in charge of all German radio technological development was fired by Göring not long after Martini admitted that he had no countermeasures to British jamming devices. Erhard Milch dryly reminded Göring that having no enthusiastic young radio fanatics to help had likely been a direct result of their earlier policy on banning youth radio.



5. Why did the Germans really put a german engine on a Spitfire?
The now well-known ‘
Messerschmitt, furious with being blamed for the poor performance of German fighters compared to the latest Allied types in 1943, told Erhard Milch that this was no surprise to him, because he was forced to fit water radiators twice the size of those the Spitfire used, per horsepower delivered. Erhard Milch, astonished, turned to the head of German Engine Development Wolfram Eisenlohr and asked him:
“How have our designers not noticed this?”
Germany, had failed to develop high-pressure-high-temperature water cooling. This meant that their radiators had to be significantly larger in section than the Allied fighters used, adding to their drag values. They estimated this was costing German fighters at least 15mph in top speed, enough to turn a performance edge into mere equality.
6. Speer’s fake miracle
Albert Speer is credited with the miracle of German fighter production in 1944, where vast numbers of fighters were built. However when Allied investigators interrogated Speer and started adding up the numbers in his departments production figures they discovered an incredible secret. Eight thousand German single engine fighters in the ledgers, didn’t exist. Further investigation revealed that although Speer had managed to dramatically increase the number of fighters produced, he had also cooked the books to gain favour with Hitler. American engineers discovered that Speer had done it by having all aircraft being repaired, or refitted re-allocated to the ‘new aircraft’ ledger. Thus, giving a dramatically over inflated impression of his achievements. That was not all, German engine designers told Allied engineers that the impressive final boost levels released by Daimler for the Bf 109 of +2.1 and even +2.3 atmospheres manifold pressure, where in fact needed just to get the 109 to meet its basic service specifications. Speer’s ‘miracle’ had created fighters of such incredibly poor build quality that the Daimler-Benz engine designers told the Allies that the fighters reaching the front line were on average an incredible 25mph slower than their claimed performance (over 6%). The allies had faced hordes of ‘ghost fighters’, those which were not figments of Speers ledgers were in performance terms, shadows of their potential.
8. Why the chaos?
There is strong evidence to suggest that German aviation production planning was thrown into the ruinously bad state of organisation which plagued it during the Second World War as early as 1936. One of Germany’s most renowned aviation designers Dr Robert Lusser (who had worked for Messerschmitt and Heinkel) wrote to the Secretary of State for Air, Erhard Milch on 15th January 1942 to inform him that German aviation was being destroyed by the application of badly thought out plans to accelerate production of new types.
Figure 4: Dr Robert Lusser, German aviation designer.
Lusser explained how up to 1936, the path from aviation development to mass production had taken (in planning) at least 4 years. This began with design, then testing, production simplifications and prototype building over the course of the middle 2 years, with mass production beginning in the 3rd year.
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Figure 5: Lusser`s chart of how production was planned up until 1936 in Germany.
At a certain stage, due to the pressures from above, planning had attempted to be ‘compressed’ by one year, to allow mass production (Gross Serie) to begin after just two years. This involved both testing (Erprobung), production simplifications (Serieneinfachung) and prototype build (Null-Serie) all occurring at once, over the course of just one year.
To make this (in theory) a possibility, demands were also made that design and testing resources might have to be drafted in from other firms who were being under utilized in some particular capacity at the time.
Figure 6: The same chart modified to show how it was altered post-1936.
The process was in fact, according to Lusser, a disaster. It resulted in several aircraft of appalling quality being made, and the changes needed to rectify the faults ended up putting on far more time than would have been taken to just stick to the original, (proven) time plan.
Lusser, regarding these compressed plans told Milch:
“Diese Glaube hat sich als eine schwere illusion!”
(“These beliefs [that production can be accelerated] are nothing more than a fantasy!”)
9. Willy’s Frölich?
The
The German reports were produced by Dietrich Schwenke, who was the head of German aviation technical intelligence. What follows is a page showing the equivalent projections on possible British developments with the Spitfire. This was part of a mammoth 60-odd page report, the illustrations for which must have taken weeks to prepare.
Figure 8: One of the well-illustrated pages from Schwenke’s huge pamphlet on Allied aviation developments
We can conclude from this only that the German report was not written to provide a timely and useful memo for German engineers, but was written to show superiors an impressive looking publication to convince them what a thorough job they were doing. It would have taken so long to prepare that by the time it was released much of the utility of the information was lost.
This concentration of appearance over substance is representative of much of the failure which resulted in the German defeat in the air over Germany in 1943 and 1944.
In conclusion, it was not in fact the Allied engineer who struggled against all odds to succeed but the German. Whist Allied policies and choices are full of incompetence and failure, the German story simply has even more disastrous strategic errors, and so reached the event horizon of defeat.






































The most beautiful machines in sporting history were the unforgiving brutes designed to win the Schneider Cup for seaplane racing. Dangerous, glamorous and with international pride at stake, the racers were fire-breathing monsters operating at the absolute limits of what was technologically possible. In the ten years from 1921, the Schneider record speed doubled, from 205mph to 470mph. The final figure of 470mph was also a staggering ten times faster than the first race winner of 1913.
The world of racing seaplanes is a very limited one so when I was asked to put together a piece about the top 10, the first thing I did was bend the rules and include flying boats. Even so, this really only leaves Schneider Trophy (more properly ‘Schneider Cup’) contestants, with an oddball excursion thrown in for variety. First held in 1913, Schneider’s intent for his eponymous trophy was that it should encourage the development of reliable, safe, waterborne aircraft. This being seen as a more practical proposition in those early days of sparsely distributed random muddy airstrips for land-borne planes. The First World War arrived a year later immediately rendered the concept anachronistic, with surviving members of the air forces emerging from those dark days educated with all they needed for setting up a more formal land based aviation network, equipped by an industry that had developed from inspired geniuses and lunatics into fully mature and generally competent businesses. However, the Schneider Trophy carried on, and it developed into an arena for government funded racers. It was finally won in perpetuity by Great Britain in 1931. The selection of aircraft for this list could have simply been made based on the number of wins and increase in performance over previous winners, but where’s the fun in that? Instead I have made my selection based on historical significance, success, flair and aesthetics.
10. Savoia S21
This is a fictional aircraft but please bear with me. Porco Rosso is a film from that doyen of anime, Studio Ghibli, and although an animated fairytale of sorts it is multi-layered and well regarded by those who know about this sort of thing. The plot is based around 1930s ‘air pirates’ in a pseudo-Mediterranean setting with some of the aircraft being clearly based on Schneider Trophy competitors (in particular those of the two main protagonists). There are fictional aspects to suit the storyline but, even so, the aircraft maintain a close visual relationship to the source material. Porco Rosso’s S21 is obviously inspired by the Macchi M33 of 1924 and arch villain Donald Curtis flies a Curtiss R2C-2. As the hero’s mount it has to be the ‘S21’ that gets the vote for inclusion here. This film introduces this extremely appealing subject to a wider audience in a colourful and entertaining way. It’s clear that whoever drew these has a real love of the aircraft and as such it cannot help but encourage interest in this period of aviation history, and the Schneider Trophy in particular. If I’ve learnt anything about anime fans it’s that they can be a tad obsessive, so you can guarantee a fair number will dig deeper into what lies behind the designs. It’s the education of a wider public – almost through subterfuge – that earns this aircraft a place on the list and, if nothing else, it’s the best porcine aviation based animation you may never have seen!
9. Macchi M.39
America had shown the old countries the way with regard to what was required to win the Schneider Trophy in its later years, with the CR-3 in 1923. In 1926, the USA was on the cusp of winning it forever. The Italians retorted by showed how they had learned from the American success with the Macchi M.39. As the Curtiss had set the model for success before it, the M.39 refined this further and introduced the basic aircraft configuration that would be followed by all subsequent winners. Castoldi had studied the entrants in 1925 and applied what he’d learned to his new design, concentrating on attention to detail around the streamlining and packaging. The other aspect embraced was government backing; Il Duce’s regime funding it and creating the Reparto Alta Velocita (High Speed Unit) as the team to uphold Italy’s honour. The M.39, with its Fiat AS2 engine, was the first to hold the fuel in the floats and crystallised the classic late 20’s design (albeit as an all-wood construction)
The key features were a faired in cockpit with minimal height screen, low monoplane wing, surface radiators and minimal external bracing. There were problems at the start with the aircraft being difficult to handle, both on the water and in the air, but the initial development programme at least got these to a point where they were manageable. There were also problems with the inlet duct causing a reduction in engine power, something that would reoccur with a number of later aircraft as the limits of testing and knowledge were pushed further. In this case it was solved whilst out in America for the race where the M.39 was finally able to show its class and grab the win, vanquishing the biplane as victor to the history books forever.
8. Piaggio Pegna PC7
The Piaggio Pegna PC7 manages to clamber so far up the list simply by being so inherently audacious and, given it was such an ambitious design, having come so close to flying. Pegna had been creating various wild schemes for some time and in 1928 his persistence was rewarded with a contract from the Italian government for two examples of the PC7. Sadly there were too many novelties and too little time to develop them, but the PC7 wasn’t simply a madcap scheme. The overall driver for the design stems from the use of hydroplanes instead of floats or a conventional hull, an approach which required with numerous additional, and very complex, features. Pegna had been actively researching hydroplanes during the First World War and returned to them as a way of reducing weight and drag. The problem of creating a ‘vane design’ that would work well when on the water and in flight occupied quite a bit of time. There was also the matter of how you deal with the low lying propeller at the front. This was solved by installing a clutched variable pitch water propeller in the back and a clutched drive to the main prop up front. The latter also had a cunning device to ensure that when stopped it would always be with the propeller blades across the aircraft (the position shown in the photograph above).
All of which allowed for a slim, low-sitting, fuselage-hull without wing tip floats. The nose was extraordinarily long and the pilot located pilot well back toward the fin. Both PC7s were completed but an inherent instability during take-off, and the passing of the race itself, meant they never actually flew. Instead they simply became beautiful, visionary, and utterly glorious cul-de-sacs.
7. Gloster Napier VI
The Gloster Napier VI only came about because of the decision to change the Schneider Trophy into a biennial event after 1927. At the time, Gloster were shaping up to develop their series of good but not quite good enough biplane racers a little further. Meanwhile, the aero-engine manufacturer Napier were reconciled to the Lion engine finally being outclassed. However, an additional year of preparatory time was enough to spur both airframe and engine designers to greater ambition. The result was VI with its supercharged version of the W-12 engine. Two aircraft were built and, with their gold painted fuselages, the type soon became known as the ‘Golden Arrow.’ If nothing else the looks promised much. Even by Schneider Trophy standards, the new type had a small fuselage and highly polished finish. In fact many still view this as the most handsome aircraft ever to be built in pursuit of the trophy. The slim wings (with their hint of the elliptical) had a ‘kick up’ at the root to provide an aerodynamically efficient junction with the fuselage revealing the extreme care with which the type was designed. The supercharger, designed under contract by British Thomson-Houston, was fed by three carburettors which in turn were fed by air from three separate intakes. It is here that the key to the VI’s failure lay: the engines could not be made to run consistently under race conditions, a problem generally attributed to the related inlet ducting. The tendency to cut out during high speed turns was especially dangerous in the racing environment. The Gloster VI may never have competed because of this, but N249 momentarily snatched glory in 1929 when it set the world speed record at 336.3mph. Sadly for Gloster, the Supermarine S6 topped this a mere two days later, but at least it had earned its brief place in the sun – and validated Henry Folland’s masterly, but flawed, design.
6. Supermarine Sea Lion II
Supermarine first entered the Schneider Trophy in 1919 with the Sea Lion and, truth be told, it hadn’t gone at all well. They returned with the Sea Lion II in 1922 and this time they were far more successful, taking the win in Naples. Sea Lions I and II are related but its not quite so simple as one being a development of the other.
Supermarine had built and supplied three aircraft to the government in support of a bid to supply single-seat fighter flying boats during World War I. After the cessation of hostilities they bought them back, possibly with a view to selling them onto wealthy individuals for ‘sports’ flying. What two of them actually ended up being used for was forming the basis for the racers, the small single-seat hull being an ideal starting point. The Sea Lion II had the more convoluted evolution of the two, passing through an intermediate phase before emerging as the aircraft that would finally race. New wings and a new tail got it match fit, while swapping the engine for a development of the Napier Lion W-12 didn’t do any harm for its chances of success either. Whereas the Sea Lion looks a little ‘
The first Schneider Trophy was held in 1913 and the Deperdussin earns its place in the top 10 by being the first winner. However, the reason for inclusion does go a little deeper.
The intent of the race was to promote the reliability of seaplanes and flying boats, thereby improving the breed. This is why, right up to the end, competing aircraft still had to carry out sea worthiness and taxiing trials. It was never simply an outright speed contest. Deperdussin entered a number of slightly different aircraft in the inaugural competition although only one made it to the start line. With a wood ply monocoque forward fuselage to which were attached just the single set of wings, this was an aircraft far removed from the Wright Flyer of only a decade before. Up against a Morane-Saulnier and a couple of Nieuports, the surviving Deperdussin came in first due to various problems befalling the other competitors. 1914 saw a near doubling of the winning speed and a similar level of attrition before the clouds of war halted flying for sport (other than blood) in Europe for the following four years. By the time the contest resumed in 1919, the sustained – desperate – military funded development of aviation had brought a relatively high level of reliability with it.
Italy well and truly established the way forward in 1926, and R. J. Mitchell, who would later create the Spitfire, responded with the audaciously sleek S5, designed for the 1927 Schneider Trophy contest in Venice. The gentle waters of Venice would reverberate to the fire-breathing majesty of the fastest and most beautiful machines in existence.
Conforming to the new norm for success, this was a design both supported by the government and benefiting from extensive testing in government funded institutions. In addition the RAF formed its own High Speed Flight to provide the team that would enter on Britain’s behalf. The S5 though took the principle of reducing drag to obsessive levels of detail. The radiators were of the surface-type mounted on the wings and the fuel was held in one of the floats, removing the need to find room for it in the fuselage. The oil was also cooled by surface radiators but this time mounted on the fuselage sides. Although this basic architecture had been a feature of the M.39, Mitchell saw beyond that design and realised it unlocked a potential for dropping the cross sectional area to minuscule proportions. Napier helped by cleaning up the Lion, and Mitchell packaged it so tightly that the cam covers formed the external surfaces of the aircraft. The fuselage behind this was tiny, the pilot only being able to get into it by half turning until his shoulders were below the cockpit edge. The overall result was that the S5 had a clear advantage over its opponents even before the propellers turned. The S5 seemed to fly well with no particular indication of vices but despite this Flight Lieutenant Kinkead lost his life while attempting to set a speed record in 1928. The S5 succeeded in 1927 and was so good that two years later it only lost second place to Italy’s M.52R by a trifling two mph.
Up to 1923 the development of racing water-borne aircraft had followed a process that veered between seaplanes and flying boats, but which was still a recognisably evolutionary path (excepting the leap forward in technology that came with WWI). The Curtiss CR-3 that won in 1923 indicated a step change from this and became the pattern for how people went about winning the Schneider Trophy from then until the competition’s conclusion in 1931. It is apparent from photos of the CR-3, when compared with its peers and predecessors, that it was a very clean design, reduced to what at the time must have seemed to be the smallest overall package. The others are obviously racing aircraft in that they are small with a large engine but this has the look of every aspect having been reviewed and pared down individually. The major mechanical components were similarly optimised in support of this. The engine, Curtiss’ own D-12, was superlative. Later, even Italy went on to source examples to power its own racers, and the Reed patent metal propeller also became the default fitment for serious contenders. It was the perfect storm to be faced by its fellow competitors.
The other key change the CR-3 brought with it was less obvious but equally important, it was ordered by the U.S. Navy to enter into the contest. This was now essentially a government backed endeavour and from here on a private venture would no longer have the money or resources to win the competition alone. It could be argued that up to this point companies had entered to promote themselves and also, perhaps, to fly the flag for their country. Now it was a straightforward matter of national prestige with all the hopes and pressures that brought with it.
2. Macchi-Castoldi M.C.72
Although conceived to contest the 1931 Schneider Trophy, the M.C.72 ruled itself out by being too late however it did go on to set an outright speed record that stood for five years. The journey to success wasn’t easy though, with Fiat’s A.S.6 24 cylinder engine being the main culprit. The A.S.6 is one of those pieces of engineering that seems half inspired and half insane: take two highly strung V12 race engines and bolt them back to back, having one drive one element of a contra-rotating prop and the other drive the second, with no direct link between the separate throttles for each half of the combined engine. Surprisingly, all this wasn’t the main source of the problem but rather it was the inlet tract, all the way from the carburettor inlets to the cylinder ports. The way the problem generally manifested itself was through backfires and these caused a number of failures which included the splitting of the supercharger casing. Ultimately this caused the deaths of two pilots, Monti and Bellini, and led to the M.C.72 being a no-show at the 1931 event. A protracted development programme, aided by advice on fuel mixtures by Britain’s Rod Banks, eventually brought just enough reliability to allow record attempts to be made. An ultimate speed of 440.68mph was set in 1933, only being bettered in 1939 (by a German landplane), and it’s still the case that no piston-engined seaplane has travelled faster. The proportions dictated by the long engine made it a magnificent looking aircraft. It may have failed in its original aim but the M.C.72 is a worthy runner -up.
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1. Supermarine S6 Series
R.J. Mitchell realised that the S5, along with the Napier Lion, would not be competitive in the race of ’29. The replacement S6 was late to the starting gate, being delivered on August 5th with the competition starting on September 6th. This was partly down to prevarication by the government and RAF, something that would also blight the 1931 attempt, but mainly it was the difficulty in getting the new Rolls Royce R type engine to run reliably. Despite this, it stormed to victory in a 1929. When the S6 followed this with a second win in 1931 Britain got to keep the Trophy forever.
In a further flourish of glory, it achieved an ultimate speed record of 407.5 mph shortly thereafter. Admittedly there were no other competitors in 1931 – but before the race it was decided that a minimum increase in speed had to be met for a win. This was never simply a case of turning up and claiming the prize. There’s also the minor matter that when you enter a race you need to ensure you’re there at the start, having something faster later rather misses the point. Two wins, numerous records and a speed increase of 80mph over its short life are reason enough for the S6 to claim the top spot, but take a moment to look at it as well. There is a lean beauty that comes with the pursuit of aerodynamic cleanliness, the aeronautical equivalent of high cheekbones and in this case it’s perfectly accentuated by the blue and silver paint scheme. The legacy is rather important too, lessons from the S6 and R were applied to the Spitfire and Merlin. Simply sublime on all counts.
By A























Who? English aircraft designer, William Edward Willoughby ‘Teddy’ Petter



The J 29 prototype featured full span ailerons but these produced an excessive rate of roll of 180 degrees per second. They were superseded by ailerons of around 65% span with the remaining inboard section replaced by flaps.
From March 1953, the J 29B became the standard Tunnan version. The major change was the installation of internal wing tanks that added 154 Imperial gallons (700 litres) of fuel taking the internal total to 462 Imperial gallons (2,100 litres), a 50% increase. Twin 99 Imperial gallon (450 litre) drop tanks could also be carried so offering a total load of 660 Imperial gallons (3,000 litres). The tanks were fitted at roughly mid-span on the outer of the two main pylons with the inboard hardpoints retained for weapons. The original Gripen uses a 242 Imperial gallon (1,100 litres) drop tank that can be fitted on the centreline and inboard underwing pylons. With three tanks in place, total fuel carried is 1,386 Imp gallons (6,300 litres); the internal load being 660 Imp gallons (3,000 litres).
The Tunnan’s wing was shoulder mounted, meeting the fuselage somewhat above the centreline. The wing was a one-piece structure and ran straight through the capacious fuselage passing just behind the cockpit rear pressure bulkhead and above the intake duct. Gripen also has a shoulder-mounted wing, which is set roughly at the centreline of the slim fuselage. This is slightly below the level of the canards that in turn are mounted just below the upper surface of the intakes. Fuel tanks are fitted in the upper part of the fuselage middle section with the intake duct(s) and main undercarriage bays placed below.
A one-piece wing could have been mounted level with the fuselage upper or lower surfaces as per the Jaguar and Phantom respectively. A low mounted wing on the diminutive Gripen would have offered insufficient ground clearance for loading underwing stores without a longer and heavier undercarriage. To achieve favourable interaction, the canards have to be set above the level of the mainplanes. Lack of suitable alternative mounting points for the canards would rule out the high wing location option. Furthermore, in order to reduce drag, it is best to avoid forming acute angles at wing-fuselage fairings. A mid wing configuration arguably offers the best overall solution in this and the other respects; it is therefore an entirely reasonable design choice.
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The Tunnan was of monocoque structure built from aluminium alloy. High strength and stiffness were required to withstand the loadings imposed by transonic flight and a very fine standard of surface finish was also achieved in order to reduce skin drag. In structural terms, the Gripen marked a major change for Saab with composite materials (carbon fibre, glass fibre and Aramid) accounting for 20% of the structure by weight. Fatigue life consumption is reduced by a gust alleviation system. Aircraft disturbance is sensed by the flight control system, which prompts control surface reaction to alleviate the loads imposed.
The most obvious difference between these aircraft is in their lifting and control surfaces. Although radical at its inception for its swept wing and flying tail, the J 29 was standard in being longitudinally stable with a conventionally sited tailplane. Such tailplanes apply a download to balance the mainplane’s lift (the mainplane’s centre of pressure being behind the centre of gravity). In turn, the mainplane must generate additional lift to counter the tail’s down force and as a result lift-induced drag is increased. The Tunnan’s primary flying controls were the tailplane for pitch and the ailerons for roll. By contrast, the Gripen controls pitch by the canard while the inboard and outboard elevons on the delta wing act in both pitch and roll. The canard applies a lifting force to balance the mainplane and this co-operative interaction reduces the overall lift-induced drag.
Saab originally reversed the traditional arrangement with the Viggen and adopted a tail-first or canard design although it retained natural longitudinal stability. With the JAS 39, the full potential of the canard was realised. Full time, full authority, digital, fly by wire flight control system (FCS) allowed the adoption of artificial stability in pitch with attendant gains in agility and aerodynamic efficiency. At supersonic speeds the centre of lift on all wings moves aft promoting a nose down moment. A conventional aircraft trims this by increasing the tailplane download whereas the opposite applies with the canard, a more efficient solution. An unstable canard design offers more lift during take-off and landing, better supersonic turning performance and lower supersonic drag. The FCS keeps the Gripen’s instability in check and allows the full envelope to be exploited without the risk of overstress or departure from controlled flight. This carefree handling facility enables the pilot to concentrate on the mission while the FCS controls the load factor, AOA, angle of sideslip and roll rate. Another function unavailable to the Tunnan is CG control. The fuel control system not only monitors the fuel remaining but also balances the amounts drawn from the various tanks to keep the CG within limits.
Weapons and Systems
The early swept wing combat aircraft were designed as gun-fighters and the Tunnan was no exception. Its original standard armament was a battery of four 20 mm Hispano cannons with 180 rounds per gun. Stemming from an original design of the early 1930s, the Hispano weighed 84 lb (34 kg) and fired a 4.88 oz (138 gram) round with a muzzle velocity of 2,880 ft/sec (878 m/sec). The muzzles were spaced circumferentially on the underside of the nose, a short distance back from the intake. Some jet fighters (eg the Hunter F.1 with its axial Rolls Royce Avon 100 series) experienced considerable engine problems through the ingestion of the shock waves of their cannon shells. A centrifugal compressor may be broader than its axial flow equivalent but it is inherently more tolerant of disturbed airflow. Cannon blast ingestion was inevitable on the Tunnan but no engine surge problems appear to have been experienced.
Two factors combined to make cannons alone an insufficient armament for air combat. The speed of jet fighters made for only fleeting firing opportunities while their stronger structures (for the high aerodynamic loads) could withstand cannon shell damage – up to a point. Cannons therefore required both a high rate of fire and a heavy high velocity round but these features tended to oppose each other. The more powerful cannons had a slow rate of fire and the faster models had less punch. One attempted solution to this problem was to fit fighters with batteries of unguided air-to-air rockets that would be fired in a barrage of a dozen or more in the hope of at least one hitting a fighter target or several hitting a bomber. The Tunnan was fitted with twenty-four 75 mm (2.95 in) diameter rockets carried in vertical stacks of four on three close-set hardpoints inboard of each wing drop tank. In the event, such rockets were to prove a blind alley and although adopted by several air forces they were superseded by guided missiles. From 1963, the J 29E could carry a pair of Sidewinder air-to-air missiles (AAM) termed Rb 24 in the Flygvapnet inventory. This addition helped keep the Tunnan viable until it went out of service in May 1967, the Saab Draken having progressively taken over the fighter role from 1959.
Proving to be a fine weapons platform during testing, the Tunnan J 29B was applied to the ground attack role with the new designation A 29B. The four Hispanos were retained and either fourteen 14.5 cm (5.7 in) anti-armour rockets or four 18 cm (7.1 in) rockets for hard, fixed targets could be carried. As mentioned above, the drop tanks were fitted to the outboard main pylons where they would have helped relieve the wing bending moment. Inboard of the tanks, there were up to four hardpoints under each wing. The 14.5 cm rockets were carried in six vertical pairs plus a single rocket on the furthest inboard position to avoid a clash with the undercarriage door. The 18 cm rockets had individual pylon mountings. All the Tunnan’s weapons bar the Rb 24 Sidewinder were unguided whereas the opposite obtains with the majority of the Gripen’s armament. Although guided weapon unit cost is greater than the ballistic equivalent, their higher accuracy makes for better cost-effectiveness. As fewer rounds and aircraft sorties are needed to destroy a target, the result is a lower overall cost in weapons plus likely lower aircraft and aircrew losses.






















































