Dear reader,
Sorry, but we have removed this article at the author’s behest. You may however enjoy one of the following articles:
Four military aircraft myths you shouldn’t believe here.
The most potent fighters of World War Two here
The ten most fighters at the outbreak of War here.
Thanks,
Hush-Kit
Europe’s two middle-weight fighter aircraft, the Typhoon and Rafale, have fought tooth and nail for multi-billion Euro sales across the world. Geographically surrounded on four sides by the Eurofighter nations, the frivolous observer may liken the French Rafale to Asterix and his indomitable friends. The reality is that France’s withdrawal from the Future European Fighter Aircraft in the early 1980s resulted in a vast and unnecessary duplication of time, money and effort to produce two very similar aeroplanes. The relatively subtle differences between these two superbly capable aircraft have inspired a great deal of heated debate, often poisoned by pride and nationalism.
Justin Bronk is a Research Analyst of Military Sciences at the Royal United Services Institute. He recently released a report (which can be read here) on the Typhoon fighter sponsored by Eurofighter (I am keen to mention this to provide a context to any accusations of bias). Despite this, I generally found him an impartial -and particularly well-informed- judge to evaluate the two types, though this is open to debate. The ‘final word’ in the title is journalese on my part, and I appreciate that this discussion will go on for a long time, probably long after both types have been retired.
Design philosophy
The Rafale and Typhoon share common programme roots and as such are fairly similar in design and aerodynamic philosophy. The biggest difference is in the optimisation of the wing aerofoil and camber shapes, as well as the aerodynamically coupled vs uncoupled canards. Aerodynamically coupled/uncoupled canards refer to the interaction between the lift created by the canards and the lift created by the leading edges of the wings. Uncoupled canards -i.e further from the wing- allow greater control authority due to a greater moment from the centre of lift, but cannot be used to improve the high-alpha performance of the wing.
We spoke to a Rafale pilot here.
Essentially Typhoon is aerodynamically designed to maximise manoeuvrability at supersonic speeds and relatively light (i.e. air superiority) load-outs. By contrast, Rafale’s coupled canards and wing shape is optimised for maximum lift generation and ordinance carrying capacity over a wide speed and angle of attack envelope.
Radar
Radar is a sensitive and highly restricted topic for open source discussion… however, in very broad terms CAPTOR-M which is the current radar on Typhoon is the most advanced and capable mechanically scanned fighter radar in service around the world. It loses out to the new RBE2 AESA radar which has entered service with Armee de l’Air Rafales in terms of low-probability of intercept (stealthy emissions) and multiple simultaneous tracking and search capabilities. In the air to air domain, at longer ranges against a small number of conventional threat aircraft, Typhoon might well have the advantage over even the RBE2 due to its impressive range and resolution. However, against large numbers of targets at different ranges/altitudes and certainly in a ground-scanning role, the Rafale is currently ahead on radar capabilities. Once the long-delayed CAPTOR-E AESA radar is integrated onto Typhoon in the early 2020s, however, Typhoon should have the advantage in radar and greater development potential since its radar aperture is much larger, can fit a greater number of T/R modules for its AESA than Rafale and will have a much wider field of regard. The latter capability will allow Typhoon to take particular advantage of the long-range capabilities of the Meteor missile by continuing to provide guidance to the missile whilst maintaining maximum range from an incoming target.
Read more about Captor-E and RBE2 AESA.
Infra-red search and track sensors
The Typhoon’s PIRATE IRST is far and away the most capable fighter-mounted system in operation anywhere in the world. Its phenomenal sensitivity caused problems during the first decade of service due to the sheer number of false positive returns but now that processing power has caught up enough to allow the sensitivity to be properly exploited for extremely long range detection of fighter sized targets, including stealth targets, it is becoming one of Typhoon’s strongest advantages in the air superiority arena. However, at present, the systems integration allowing the radar and IRST to be tasked together in an optimal fashion is still superior on Rafale. This is a core focus of capability upgrades in the P3E software package for Typhoon.
The Death of European fighters, full story here.
Cockpit functionality: Man-machine interface
Both aircraft are fairly close in this regard and both are continually being upgraded with new cockpit functionality streamlining to reduce pilot workload. Both present few problems for a pilot transitioning from any ‘teen’ series fighter as their carefree handling mean that they are actually very easy to physically fly, freeing up mental energy for the formidable task of making the most out of the fighting potential of both aircraft. An RAF Typhoon instructor told me last year that ‘one of the biggest difficulties for pilots from a [Tornado] GR.4 or F.3 background in adjusting to Typhoon is how to best manage the awesomeness’.
A Lightning pilot’s guide to flying and fighting here. Find out the most effective modern fighter aircraft in within-visual and beyond-visual range combat. The greatest fictional aircraft here. An interview with stealth guru Bill Sweetman here. The fashion of aircraft camo here. Interview with a Super Hornet pilot here. Most importantly, a pacifist’s guide to warplanes here. F-35 expose here.
Costs and reliability
The Typhoon’s EJ200 engines are the most reliable military jet engines ever fielded by any airforce. This turbofan originated as Rolls-Royce’s experimental XG-40 project of the 1980s.
Both are twin engine air superiority fighters with extensive multirole capabilities. As such both are fairly expensive to maintain and fly. Operating costs are notoriously difficult to accurately compare given the all sorts of infrastructure, measurement metrics, operating environment and other factors influence even the most objective attempt. Suffice to say that the aircraft are comparable. The Rafale M, as a carrier fighter requiring more maintenance, suffering greater fatigue and saltwater corrosion can safely be assumed to be more expensive than other Rafale or Typhoon variants. Also, the Typhoon’s EJ200 engines are the most reliable military jet engines ever fielded by any air force and their uniquely low maintenance, replacement and bug-fixing requirements help to lower Typhoon’s maintenance costs significantly.
Very amusing review of Eurofighter short film here
Observability
Reduced observability to radar was considered during Rafale’s design. Note that there is restricted line-of-sight to the engine’s compressor face, a key contributor to radar reflections. Rafale also features serrated panel edges across the airframe, a feature originally developed for the SR-71. The gold in Rafale’s canopy also reduces radar reflections.
Low observability is hotly debated and impossible to prove in open source. Both aircraft have some RCS reduction features but both are inherently un-stealthy designs. Of the two, Typhoon makes slightly greater use of RAM and active canard signature management for frontal RCS reduction but this is probably offset in the high-end survivability department by Rafale’s superior SPECTRA electronic warfare system.
Performance
Typhoon is the faster aircraft and has a significantly superior thrust-to-weight ratio which gives it better acceleration at all altitudes. This also allows Typhoon to retain and regain energy faster than Rafale in a horizontal dogfight situation. It also has a significantly higher service ceiling of over 60,000ft which allows it to operate uniquely well alongside the US F-22 Raptors ‘high and fast’ in the air superiority role which is exactly where it was designed to excel. Rafale has a significantly superior load-carrying capability and its manoeuvrability at low speeds and altitudes is also better than Typhoon’s although the margin is slim except where both aircraft are very heavily loaded. In terms of horizontal manoeuvrability, Rafale has the better instantaneous turn rate allowing it to reverse its turns more quickly but Typhoon can sustain higher g’s for longer without bleeding speed. High alpha performance is similar, with both aircraft limited by their air intake placement and lack of thrust vectoring although Typhoon’s intakes can at least ‘gape’ slightly to increase airflow at high Alpha and low speeds. Range is almost identical at around 2000nmi with three drop-tanks in ‘ferry’ configuration but in terms of strike missions, Rafale’s greater payload capacity allows it to carry greater under-wing fuel loads for a given strike payload. The high availability of aerial refuelling in both air force’s standard operating scenarios means the small differences are almost unimportant for overall combat effectiveness.
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The Snecma M88 is probably the most significant weakness of the basic Rafale design – the engine is underpowered for the aircraft and the development potential in terms of extra thrust is low. This was one of the primary reasons the French left the Eurofighter consortium since the M88 would never have been able to develop enough power for what would become the Typhoon, but the French insisted that it be used. The EJ200 is not only phenomenally reliable but it also has very significant thrust growth potential (easily 20-30%) according to Eurojet. The problem for Eurojet who make the engine is that it works so well that there is very little business for them in terms of upgrades or replacement engines. Existing customers are perfectly happy with the EJ200 as it is.
Test pilot reveals Typhoon’s top supercruise speed here
Weaponry
The MICA missile is a compromise that puts Rafale at a disadvantage in both short and medium range air-to-air combat. One advantage it may offer is that potential enemies may have a greater understanding and knowledge of how of how to counter the Typhoon’s AMRAAM.
In terms of weaponry, the Rafale is severely limited at long ranges in the air-to-air arena by having to rely entirely on the MICA which is not credible beyond 20km due to being essentially a short range missile adapted for short-mid range work. Until the Meteor enters frontline service with Rafale operators, the aircraft lacks long range air-to-air punch, certainly compared to the proven and effective AIM-120C AMRAAM load out on Typhoon. Even the ASRAAM used as the short range IR missile by the RAF has greater kinetic energy and manoeuvrability performance at ranges beyond 20km than the MICA. The MICA is a fast and manoeuvrable missile at short ranges with lock-on after launch capabilities. However, it is neither as manoeuvrable as the IRIS-T used by German, Italian and Spanish Typhoon operators, nor as fast and lethal at medium ranges as the ASRAAM. Finally on missiles, whilst the Meteor will give the Rafale much needed long range firepower, the Rafale will only be able to utilise a one-way datalink with the missile when it has been fired, not the two way datalink which Typhoon and Gripen are equipped with – which allows for much more accurate and reliable guidance during very long range engagements whilst the missile is in semi-active mode. In terms of the gun, both aircraft have highly effective aerial guns with heavy explosive shells and good instant firing rates. Rafale has the edge of fire-weight per second but slightly shorter effective range than the BK27 on Typhoon. In terms of air-to-ground munitions, Rafale is currently the clear winner with the full French air-to-ground arsenal integrated including the nuclear strike role. The Hammer AASM has proven highly effective and accurate, with good range for a bomb adaptor kit although it is expensive compared to alternatives. Typhoon in its current tranche 2 and 3 P1Eb configuration as deployed in Cyprus for operations against ISIL can only deliver the excellent Paveway IV laser and gps-guided bomb, guided by a Litening III targeting pod. However, once the Brimstone anti-armour missile and Storm Shadow cruise missiles are added in 2018 and 2016 respectively, Typhoon will be comparable to Rafale in terms of its conventional strike suite. In recce terms, Rafale currently has the edge as the world-beating DB110 RAPTOR pod is only integrated on Tornado and although there are plans to fit it to Typhoon which would close the gap, these are not concrete as yet.
Sensor fusion
Rafale’s sensor fusion in terms of a common picture presented to the pilot is currently slightly ahead of Typhoon although the P3E upgrade being trialled at BAE Warton will close this gap to a significant extent. It is important to remember, however, that both fighters use a post-sensor picture fusing approach to streamline information for the pilot, rather than the much more complex approach being pursued by the F-35 development programme where all sensors feed into a single process which analyses, contrasts and compares them before presenting a single, processed picture to the pilot. Post sensor fusion is where the different sensors are not linked per se but their outputs are combined by an information management system to streamline the displayed data for the pilot.
Defensive systems
The defensive aids suites on both jets comprise of passive (tracking and intelligence gathering) capabilities and active (jamming and other EW) capabilities. In passive terms, Typhoon actually has the edge following the UK-led DASS upgrade programme. However, in terms of active jamming and EW capabilities, the SPECTRA system proved itself in Libya and in multiple NATO exercises and being capable of protecting the Rafale from fairly high-end threats which normally would require complex suppression packages or stealth aircraft to bypass. The French (and Swedes) have long excelled in electronic warfare and jamming and the Typhoon has a way to go yet if it is to catch up with the other two Eurocanards in this area. It is also worth remembering, however, that part of the Rafale’s appearance of being able to go places Typhoon cannot due to SPECTRA is explained by the higher (and admirable) tolerance for risk in the Armee de l’Air compared to the RAF or any other European air forces. Even if Typhoon had SPECTRA, the RAF would not have sent it into Libya before the US air defence suppression had been carried out.
Leaked Swiss evaluation report
The leaked evaluation report from the Swiss fighter contest of 2008/09 put the Rafale ahead of Typhoon in almost every category tested, what do you make of this?
Any fighter evaluation depends on the details of the assessment criteria for each exercise and without seeing those, I cannot possibly speculate. However, one thing which is worth noting is that the Typhoon sent to Switzerland was apparently a tranche 1 and one with problems. Someone involved in the competition told me in person that ‘the Swiss told us [Typhoon] that technically speaking we had brought the finest jet of the bunch, but it was as if we had brought a Mercedes sports car where the door wouldn’t shut properly and the air conditioning was broken’.
Conclusion
In conclusions: both are fantastic fighter aircraft of which European defence communities should be proud. Rafale currently has the edge over Typhoon in terms of ground-attack versatility, radar modernisation and manoeuvrability at high-loads. Equally, Typhoon has the edge in the air-superiority role due to its superior high altitude performance and thrust to weight ratio, as well as long-range armament. The advantages in maturity for Rafale are more to do with failures in the Eurofighter consortium to invest and coordinate upgrades in the way that Dassault and the French government have managed, than any inherent limitation in the Typhoon itself. Indeed, with its larger radar aperture, power generation capabilities, engine power and growth potential Typhoon has more development potential than Rafale – if it can survive in production long enough. A hypothetical air force which operated both types, whilst that would be expensive, would enjoy phenomenal complementary capabilities and would arguably be stronger than a similarly sized force comprised only of one type.
Justin Bronk is a Research Analyst at the Military Sciences at Royal United Services Institute.
Follow him on Twitter: @Justin_Br0nk
Follow my vapour trail on Twitter: @Hush_kit
Thank you for reading Hush-Kit. Our site is absolutely free and we have no advertisements. If you’ve enjoyed an article you can donate here. At the moment our contributors do not receive any payment but we’re hoping to reward them for their fascinating stories in the future.
You may also enjoy top WVR and BVR fighters of today, an interview with a Super Hornet pilot and a Pacifist’s Guide to Warplanes. Want something more bizarre? The Top Ten fictional aircraft is a fascinating read, as is The Strange Story of The Planet Satellite. Fashion Versus Aircraft Camo is also a real cracker.
Follow my vapour trail on Twitter: @Hush_kit
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From the cocaine, blood and flying scarves of World War One dogfighting to the dark arts of modern air combat, here is an enthralling ode to these brutally exciting killing machines.
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FEATURING
The RAF’s primary attack platform is the Tornado GR4. This example is armed with Paveway IV and Brimstone missiles.
Former Republican presidential nominee John McCain said that British military bombing into Syria would amount to “some token aircraft” that would not make “a significant difference”. Justin Bronk from the Royal United Services Institute considers the point and asks whether the RAF’s cited ‘unique capabilities’ should have contributed to the decision to extend the war.
The necessity or otherwise of RAF strikes in Syria needs to be judged on the political arguments, not operational ones. Whilst the RAF has extremely experienced aircrew and Tornado GR.4 and Reaper in particular are also well suited for the mission, there are simply too few to make a military difference to the realities on the ground. Increasing the RAF striking power from 8 Tornados and 10 Reapers to 10 Tornados, 6 Typhoons and the 10 Reapers represents a significantly greater burden on the RAF without making much of an impact on the total coalition firepower available to hit ISIL. Brimstone is a uniquely accurate and low-collateral missile for destroying vehicles but its tactical utility will not change the strategic calculus in Syria. The same is true for Paveway IV in its class as a PGM. The most useful contribution that the RAF makes to the coalition efforts over Syria is in ISR – with E-3D, Sentinel R.1, Reaper and Airseeker (UK Rivet Joint) all having been providing ISR over Syria long before the vote to authorise strikes. The vote, therefore, only made a small difference to the RAF’s critical contribution of ISR to ops over Syria by allowing Tornado to operate over Syria with the wide area surveillance DB110 RAPTOR pod which remains the finest tactical reconnaissance fast jet capability in the world. In summary – RAF strikes in Syria are welcome but are only politically, not operationally, game-changing.
The RAF’s RC-135 Airseeker is a useful aircraft.
In terms of the claim of zero civilian casualties from RAF strikes against ISIL so far – it is impossible to verify for certain but the claim does stand up to fairly detailed scrutiny. This has a great deal to do with RAF target selection since the vast majority of RAF strikes against ISIL have been against armed vehicles, heavy weapons positions and snipers engaged in firefights with friendly forces. These typically have a much lower collateral damage risk factor than strikes against targets such as training camps, IED factories and command centres which the US has been hitting in large numbers and which by nature tend to look like any other buildings from the air, and are also much more often in the middle of densely populated civil areas.
Justin Bronk is a Research Analyst of Military Sciences at Royal United Services Institute.
Follow him on Twitter: @Justin_Br0nk
Follow my vapour trail on Twitter: @Hush_kit
You may also enjoy top WVR and BVR fighters of today, an alternate history of the TSR.2, an interview with a Super Hornet pilot and a Pacifist’s Guide to Warplanes. Want something more bizarre? The Top Ten fictional aircraft is a fascinating read, as is The Strange Story and The Planet Satellite. The Fashion Versus Aircraft Camo is also a real cracker.
The Hush-Kit article charged that the Spitfire was a “war-losing weapon”, and that it was “the wrong aircraft at the wrong time.” I would counter that this is largely revisionist nonsense – and although he makes a handful of good points these are things that are discernible only with the benefit of 20:20 hindsight, and there are an awful lot of charges which do not, in my view, hold water.
It said that: “It’s pretty well accepted these days that the Battle of Britain was won by the Hurricane, and there’s no reason to suspect that more Hurricanes wouldn’t have defeated Goering’s armada just as soundly, if not more so.”
I think he’s wrong on both counts. The Hurricane was undeniably important, and shot down more enemy aircraft than the Spitfire, but that was inevitable, given that there were more of them, often flown by more experienced pilots and squadrons, and that they were often sent against the easier targets – bombers, dive bombers and Bf 110s. And there is little doubt that a Fighter Command exclusively equipped with Spitfires would have done even better.
Mr Willis says that the Spitfire’s narrow-track undercarriage invited accidents. Technically, it did, though in practice, the natural fear of ground looping accidents failed to materialise – perhaps because we were using grass airfields with unlimited runway directions.
Mr Willis says that the Spitfire’s roll rate wasn’t competitive. That’s exaggerated, and fails to account for the fact that its turn rate, turn radius, and rate of onset were class leading, while the Spitfire pilot enjoyed an unrivalled all round view. The Spitfire’s only serious drawbacks were not mentioned by this article– one being the engine’s tendency to cut out under negative g. This is a problem that was easily solved, and which is over-stated by non-pilots. Even if you have fuel injection it’s almost always better to roll inverted and pull hard than to try and push into a steep dive, since you can always sustain more positive g than negative…..
The other Spitfire weakness was its rifle-calibre machine gun armament – but this again was easily solved.
More contentious is the claim that you could have built “two-and-a-half Hurricanes” or “three-and-a-bit Messerschmitt Bf 109s”* for one Spitfire. This seems to based on Correlli Barnett, who also managed to claim that there was no heavy electrical engineering industry in the UK despite the fact that we developed the world’s first synchronous national grid in the 1920s and electrified the Southern Railway in the 1930s. The Spitfire airframe undeniably took more production man hours than the fabric, wood and tubular metal Hurricane – and was less simple to repair as a consequence (though factory repairs to the Spitfire were cheaper). In any case, both types were limited by the production time of their engines, armament, etc.
A Lightning pilot’s guide to flying and fighting here. Find out the most effective modern fighter aircraft in within-visual and beyond-visual range combat. The greatest fictional aircraft here. An interview with stealth guru Bill Sweetman here. The fashion of aircraft camo here. Interview with a Super Hornet pilot here. Most importantly, a pacifist’s guide to warplanes here. F-35 expose here.
Hurricane of fire
Moreover, Mr Willis avoids the fact that while the Hurricane was more damage tolerant to light damage from machine gun ammunition, it also caught fire much more easily (thanks to all the wood, fabric and dope on the rear half of the aircraft, plus two fuel tanks in the wings), and what would often be minor damage to some parts of a Spitfire would be fatal to the same areas on a Hurricane. One of the top plastic surgeons said that he could tell a Hurricane pilot by the severity and type of burns he suffered. The cockpit area on a Hurricane was not well sealed and the airflow would often ‘torch’ burning fuel at the unfortunate pilot.
What were the best fighters at the outbreak of the war? The surprising answer is here.
It is true that Spitfire production lagged behind Hurricane production for the whole of the Battle of Britain period, but we never ran short of aircraft during the Battle – availability of pilots was the critical shortage in 1940!
The article charges that by the end of the Battle Spitfires were being shot down at a faster rate than Hurricanes. This was perhaps inevitable, given that the Spitfire’s job was to tackle the Bf109s, and it’s certainly true that every Luftwaffe victory was claimed to be a Spitfire – since such a claim had more prestige than shooting down a lowly Hurricane or Defiant. The Messerschmitts were there to defend the bombers, i.e. to shoot down the Hurricanes, and it was the Spitfire’s job to stop them doing that. The Spitfires performance in combat was better than that of the Hurricane, and the Spitfire was at least equal (if not better) than the Bf 109E. The Hurricane was not. Replacing Spitfires with more Hurricanes (as the article would have preferred) would not have succeeded in achieving that.
One distinguished former Battle of Britain pilot has said that by the time the Battle began, the Hurricane was already obsolescent, and others have said that sending young pilots out in Hurricanes was tantamount to murder! That may be a bit much, but there is no doubt that the Hurricane was soon pretty much outclassed in the air-to-air role and had no remaining development potential, whereas the Spitfire V and Spitfire IX were decisive developments that proved capable of dealing with the Bf109G and Fw190. The Hurricane could never have been developed to achieve the same performance. Hardly surprising, since it was, in many respects, little more than a monoplane Hawker Fury.
The Spitfire was much better suited to improvement and development, resulting in the succession of Spitfire variants, which allowed the type to be continuously improved, rapidly incorporating lessons from production and combat experience.
This is why they built more than 23,000 Spitfires, which remained viable throughout the war, and afterwards, while the Hurricane effectively left active service as a fighter in 1943, remaining in service only in the ground attack role – in which it was outshone by other types. They built about 14,000 Hurricanes as a consequence.
We come to the crux of Willis’ argument with his statement that: “the priority that was placed on Spitfire production in 1940 (as well as Hurricanes, to be fair) pulled effort from other services, effectively hamstringing the Fleet Air Arm for years and preventing the development of newer designs.”
This sort of stuff always seems to come from someone with a Navy connection. The Fleet Air Arm suffered because it was viewed as being a sideshow – a diversion from the main effort of defending the UK and later of carrying the war to the German homeland. In retrospect, this was probably an entirely sensible prioritisation. But the poor state of the FAA had little to do with the Spitfire.
The over-rated Mustang
Finally, Willis claims that it would have made more sense to switch British production to the Mustang, which he seems to have unqualified regard for.
While it’s true that (once given the Merlin engine) the Mustang did have the legs to take it to Berlin it was actually a remarkably poor air-to-air fighter, ill-suited to fighter-versus-fighter combat. I would draw attention to the excellent work done by the Society of Experimental Test Pilots in their evaluation of the major wartime US fighter types by modern test pilots. The Mustang proved to be a poor gunnery platform, and an aircraft prone to departure when manoeuvred hard. It was rated behind the F6F, P-47 and F4U.
Jon Lake has written many books including, Tornado: the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft and The Battle of Britain.
“In the second paragraph: change ‘for that amount of effort you could have two-and-a-half Hurricanes or three-and-a-bit Messerschmitt Bf 109s’ to ‘for that amount of effort you could have one-and-a-half Hurricanes or three-and-a-bit Messerschmitt Bf 109s’ (bold just to emphasise the change, shouldn’t be bold in the published version)
In the fifth paragraph: change ‘Who knows what might have been achieved with three aircraft produced for every Spitfire?’ to ‘Who knows what might have been achieved with two or three aircraft produced for every Spitfire?’ (as above re bold).
I’ve developed the arguments a fair bit since the original piece was posted, but it wouldn’t be fair to go chopping and changing it now. I stand by everything I wrote apart from the bits above that need correcting.”
You may also enjoy top WVR and BVR fighters of today, an alternate history of the TSR.2, an interview with a Super Hornet pilot and a Pacifist’s Guide to Warplanes. Want something more bizarre? The Top Ten fictional aircraft is a fascinating read, as is the The Strange Story and The Planet Satellite. The Fashion Versus Aircraft Camo is also a real cracker.
A U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor, British Royal Air Force Typhoon, and French air force Rafale fly in formation as part of a Trilateral Exercise held at Langley Air Force Base, Va., Dec. 7, 2015. The exercise simulates a highly-contested, degraded and operationally-limited environment where U.S. and partner pilots and ground crews can test their readiness. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Kayla Newman)
A U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor, British Royal Air Force Typhoon, and French air force Rafale fly in formation as part of a Trilateral Exercise held at Langley Air Force Base, Va., Dec. 7, 2015. The exercise simulates a highly-contested, degraded and operationally-limited environment where U.S. and partner pilots and ground crews can test their readiness. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Kayla Newman)
A British Royal Air Force Typhoon, U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor and French air force Rafale fly in formation as part of a Trilateral Exercise held at Langley Air Force Base, Va., Dec. 7, 2015. The 5th generation aircraft involved in the exercise are the most technologically advanced assets in the world today. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Kayla Newman)
—original article removed at author’s request—
Next year will be the centenary of the formation of the RAF, leading to all kinds of celebrations of the service’s history, no doubt. The Battle of Britain, the dam busters raid, Black Buck…what you probably won’t hear is anyone arguing for the RAF to be disbanded. Which is a shame. Despite all the achievements, the time has definitely come to admit that the ‘indivisibility of air power’ is no longer relevant, if it ever was, and that there’s no reason for the RAF to exist any more – if there ever was.
So why now? The fact is that without a genuinely strategic role that only an independent air force can carry out, having such an independent air force is pointless and wasteful. The RAF currently exists to do a number of jobs – tactical strike on the battlefield, supporting the Navy at sea, carting stuff around, and spying on things. Since it lost the strategic nuclear deterrent role back in the 1960s, there is nothing the RAF does that has to be done by an independent air force.
It’s worth looking at why the RAF was created in the first place. With the First World War gearing up for a final showdown on the Western Front, most of the UK’s air power was focussed on that theatre. The Royal Naval Air Service had done so well with its resources that it had been roped in to support the Royal Flying Corps – whose job was largely to support the Army on the ground. The RNAS had developed air power arguably more innovatively and completely than the RAF – the RNAS was the first British air arm to develop strategic bombing with large, multi-engined aircraft, and many of the best British designs for engines and aeroplanes (such as the Sopwith Pup, Triplane and Camel, the Airco DH4 and the Bentley BR1 rotary) originated from Admiralty requirements. In the context of the climax of the land war in Europe, it made sense to combine these forces and put them under single command.
But this was only supposed to be a temporary arrangement, and with the end of the war and drastic reductions to forces, there was no reason other than politics to retain the single air force. Lord Trenchard, the RAF’s main cheerleader in government (who had only been offered the post as the result of a political spat between Lord Rothermere and Field Marshal Haig) quickly sought to find a way to make the RAF indispensible. He came up with ‘air control’ – a method of policing the far-flung territories of the British Empire from the air. This was initially thought to be effective (in reality it just tended to push trouble from one place to another, and created simmering resentment among people being bombed and strafed as well we exploited) but the main advantage was that it was much cheaper than using the Army. Trenchard fought off an effort in the early 1920s to give the Navy control of its own aviation, so withered had it already become under RAF control. Had this been successful, the Army would likely have also been given command of land based forces, and the RAF wound up. Unfortunately, Trenchard had the politicians’ ears still.
Ever since, the RAF’s greatest success has been its continual ability to magic up jobs that only it can do, and persuade politicians of its unique ability to do them. The fact that it has had to do this at the expense of military aviation in other areas is constantly overlooked. By the beginning of WW2, Army Co-operation was eroded from the huge, complex operation of WW1 into a few squadrons of ridiculous Westland Lysanders which were shot to bits over France, and it took the rest of the war to build up a truly effective tactical air force that would have made more sense being under Army command in any case.
Even now the Army has had to put up with arbitrary limitations on the size of the helicopters it can operate because the RAF has persuaded Whitehall that anything bigger than a Lynx should be under its management. No other country has to work with this pointless and ludicrous division, and the UK should not have to any longer. It was long ago accepted that both the Army and the Navy need their own aviation divisions, in itself rendering much of the argument for an independent air force null and void.
The RAF has repeatedly knocked down naval aviation, leaving the Royal Navy to endlessly re-learn old lessons and make do on a shoestring, effectively killing or hamstringing naval air arms repeatedly since the First World War. The decision to kill the Harrier – conveniently the only fast jet that could operate from the Navy’s carriers – instead of the Tornado, and the Nimrod instead of the A400M in 2010 were merely the latest manifestations of this, and rumours abound that the RAF’s malign influence in the MoD continues to hamper the ailing CVF/Joint Combat Aircraft programme.
There are undoubtedly things the current RAF does well, such as tactical airlift. This is not an argument for retaining the RAF, merely for retaining the skills, personnel and organisation that currently make the function work. It could just as easily be transferred to the Army, as could the land-based fast jet force. The transfer of all the Merlin Mk.3 fleet to the Royal Navy shows that it is perfectly possible to divest the RAF of parts of its portfolio without harming effectiveness – so why not do so with the whole RAF? There is nothing the RAF currently does that would not be done as well or better under Army or Navy control, and it would end at a stroke the 100 years of politicking that has compromised UK forces too much. RAF – RIP.
— Mark Taunton
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Twice as heavy and with more than twice the power of the Spitfire- the Hawker Typhoon was a fighter-bomber of Brobdingnagian proportions. After prolonged technical problems, the type served with distinction as both a low-level interceptor and fighter-bomber from 1941-1945. Today, Project Typhoon RB396 is restoring a veteran airframe to airworthy condition. We spoke to them, to find out how ‘Britain’s Butcher Bird’ faced up to the best of the Luftwaffe.
Typhoon versus Focke-Wulf Fw 190
When the new Fw 190As appeared over England in 1941, the RAF was caught with its pants down. The Fw 190 was extremely fast and agile, and the Spitfires and Hurricanes were simply unable to keep up. Only the Hawker Typhoon possessed the speed to catch it. The Typhoon could overtake the Fw 190 in level flight, could outturn it below 10,000ft and packed as much punch in terms of armament. Both types had restricted visibility, however, the Typhoon became superior in this respect with the introduction of the bubble canopy (early machines had ‘car door’ style transparencies). The two aircraft were very evenly matched, with only pilot skill and luck determining the outcome in a dogfight. The ‘tip and run’ raids by the Fw 190 were instrumental in saving the Typhoon programme.
Typhoon versus Messerschmitt Bf 109
Compared to the tiny Bf 109, the Typhoon was a brute. The number of Bf 109s produced (in excess of 33,000) indicates that the basic design was extremely sound. Highly maneuverable at all altitudes- the ‘109 could out-turn the Typhoon at higher altitudes, where the thick chord of the British type reduced its effectiveness. Like the Bf 109, as mentioned above the early Typhoons had restricted visibility from the cockpit. Both were backed up by formidable firepower -but the Typhoon had a far more robust airframe; the cannon of the Typhoon could chop a ‘109 to pieces very quickly. The Achilles heel of the ‘109 was its restricted endurance, a result of its tiny size. More often than not, the Luftwaffe’s ‘109s would turn and run because they did not have the fuel for a prolonged dogfight.
Typhoon versus Messerschmitt Me 262
It is extremely difficult to compare the Me 262 to the Typhoon. The Luftwaffe employed the ‘262s primarily as bombers, under orders from Hitler, and so the Typhoons were rarely caught in a dogfight with them. However, there were a few instances where Typhoons shot down ‘262s in combat. The Canadian Typhoon pilot, Flight Officer A.H Fraser, downed a ‘262 on Valentine’s Day 1945. The ‘262s outstripped any opponent for speed, and they were ferociously well armed- often with four 30-mm cannon. If they saw Typhoons they simply had to put their foot down and could disengage at will if outnumbered. Once in combat, the ‘262 was particularly vulnerable to damage. The Typhoon had a huge advantage in combat maintenance. She was a huge rugged aircraft that could take a lot of damage. Much of the damage that Typhoons received could be repaired at squadron level rather than having to be sent away for repair. An example was a Typhoon that was completely cut in half by another on landing, four days later it was back in operational service! It received a replacement fuselage and tail from the squadron stores. The Typhoon’s main advantage over the ‘262 was its endurance.
The Fw 190 and Typhoon were extremely closely matched, simply put, only the pilots made the difference between the two machines. Against the ‘190 the Typhoon could hold its own, and more often than not exceed the qualities of the 109. Against the ‘262 there is not enough evidence to draw a conclusion, but the Typhoons, with their tough structure, excellent top speed and armament would have been less vulnerable than other piston-engined fighters.
Fighter-bomber role
But it was in the fighter-bomber role that the Typhoon really shone. It was far superior to the Spitfire IX: it had twice the amount of cannon, twice the bombload and over twice the range. A barrage from its eight 60-Ib rockets was equivalent in destructive power to a broadside from a Royal Navy Destroyer. As has been described above, it was an exceptionally rugged design and was able to take a great deal more battle damage than the dainty Spitfire.
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It was in support of the D-Day operations that the Typhoon would cement its place in history. Like the Harrier in the Falklands, the Typhoon was absolutely right for that one unusual circumstance: providing close air support and tank-busting in an extremely high threat environment. After proving itself so dramatically, come May 1945, the RAF couldn’t wait to get rid of it. It was considered over-specialized and dangerous (the problem of carbon monoxide pouring into the cockpit was never adequately solved) and in the air-to-air role it was inferior to the Tempest and late-mark Spitfires. There were no more tanks to destroy, and the jet age had begun. Despite an anguished adolescence, the Typhoon had done what was asked of it with distinction and for that it deserves to be remembered. An airworthy Typhoon would serve as a visceral and thrilling reminder of the extremely courageous tasks carried out over four horrific years by the air and ground-crews that supported this impressive machine.
To support the Typhoon to the skies project have a look at their website here, or on Facebook and Twitter: @project_typhoon
You should also enjoy some more of our articles: There’s a whole feast of features, including the 10 Best fighters of World War II , top WVR and BVR fighters of today, an interview with a Super Hornet pilot and a Pacifist’s Guide to Warplanes. Was the Spitfire overrated? Want something more bizarre? The Top Ten fictional aircraft is a fascinating read, as is The Strange Story and The Planet Satellite. The Fashion Versus Aircraft Camo is also a real cracker. Those interested in the Cold Way should read A pilot’s guide to flying and fighting in the Lightning. Those feeling less belligerent may enjoy A pilot’s farewell to the Airbus A340. Looking for something more humourous? Have a look at this F-35 satire and ‘Werner Herzog’s Guide to pusher bi-planes. In the mood for something more offensive? Try the NSFW 10 best looking American airplanes, or the same but for Canadians.
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Image source: The Aviationist
Justin Bronk is a Research Analyst of Military Sciences at Royal United Services Institute. Here is his analysis of today’s Su-24 shootdown.
What do we know about the Su-24 shootdown? What will be the consequences of it?
We know that it was shot down by Turkish F-16s after allegedly crossing the border and violating Turkey’s airspace in Hatay province. According to the Turkish letter to the UN the Su-24 was one of a flight of two which ignored ten warnings over a period of five minutes and entered Turkish airspace. A missile was fired at one which impacted and caused it to crash on the Syrian side of the border. The consequences, besides an obvious collapse of Russian-Turkish relations, depend very much on the proof Turkey and NATO can provide that the airspace violation did take place – contrary to Russian claims – and the extent to which Mr Putin feels he has to retaliate diplomatically, asymmetrically and potentially militarily.
How does the Russian and Western story vary? What is the truth? What are the motives for the varying stories?
The Turkish government claims the Su-24 violated Turkish airspace after ignoring repeated warnings and was then shot down, crashing on the Syrian side of the border. Russia claims its aircraft never entered Turkish airspace and that the attack was unprovoked. Russia also claims the Su-24 was involved in strikes against Islamic State at the time. The motives are fairly clear – both sides are saying that the other is in the wrong and the Russians do not want to be seen as being aggressors who got punished. The truth is likely to be that the Russian jet did indeed violate Turkish airspace after ignoring warnings, but for a very brief period and without any intention to threaten Turkey beyond the annoyance of another incursion. Russia has repeatedly violated Turkish airspace, along with other NATO members such as Estonia over the past two years.
Is Turkey actually scared of air attack, or just sick of having its airspace penetrated?
There is no suggestion from the Turkish side that the Su-24 was attempting to attack Turkey. However, deliberate violation of sovereign airspace by foreign military aircraft is taken very seriously by almost every country in the world. Since the Russian Air Force repeatedly probed Turkish airspace in early October and Turkey warned that any more violations would result in dangerous results, it seems fairly clear that the decision was made at a very high level in Turkey that this violation would be fired upon.
Are Russian and other air forces attacking Syria coordinated?
No, Russian forces are not directly coordinating their activities in Syria with members of the US-led coalition. The only regular interaction is basic attempts at deconfliction to reduce the chances of a mid-air collision in the crowded airspace above Syria. Aside from security concerns, this is primarily because the US-led coalition and Russia have different geopolitical objectives and, therefore, different targets. Whilst the coalition is attempting to destroy ISIL in Syria and Iraq, Russia’s primary objective appears to be providing air support to President Assad’s forces on the ground against all opposition groups. There are few places where the regime’s forces have direct contact with ISIL so most of Russia’s strikes have targeted moderate rebel groups and the Al-Qaeda affiliated Islamist group Jabhat al-Nusra. The notable exception to this pattern has been in the aftermath of the Paris and Metrojet terror attacks which have led both France and Russia to focus attacks on the ISIL power-base in Raqqa. However, even these attacks have been carried out with only limited deconfliction cooperation.
Was the Spitfire overrated? Full story here. A Lightning pilot’s guide to flying and fighting here. Find out the most effective modern fighter aircraft in within-visual and beyond-visual range combat. The greatest fictional aircraft here. An interview with stealth guru Bill Sweetman here. The fashion of aircraft camo here. Interview with a Super Hornet pilot here. Most importantly, a pacifist’s guide to warplanes here. F-35 expose here.
How easy would it be to co-ordinate Russian air assets with those of other nations? What would be the obstacle to this?
Language might be a barrier. With ICAO rules on English as the international language of the air, Russian aircrew could probably understand most of what was said to them and get by speaking back though. However, the main issue is political – with Russia treating NATO very much as an adversary in Europe, it is not wise to let them know more than we have to about the ins and outs of NATO air operations and capabilities. Furthermore, Russian systems have software and hardware interoperability issues internally that make Western whole-force integration look positively glorious. This is a result of the Russian practice of keeping multiple arms companies such as Mikoyan and Sukhoi in business by ordering a huge variety of equipment models in small batches over long periods of time. Standardization is not their strong suit. Given how challenging NATO air forces find full interoperability within coalitions even whilst operating similar aircraft with standardized equipment, tactics and practices, proper integration of Russian forces would likely be a nightmare.
Is true that the Russian air force causes more civilian deaths than other air forces, if so why?
The Russian Air Force in Syria is causing far more civilian deaths than Western air forces (although not nearly as many as the Syrian Air Force barrel bombing campaign). This is primarily due to their reliance on large numbers of unguided ‘dumb’ bombs and rockets to attack targets. These invariably cause far more collateral damage than selective use of Western precision guided munitions due to their lower accuracy, higher blast yield and required ‘area’ attack tactics. Russian forces have also been reportedly using cluster munitions and thermobaric weapons which are by nature indiscriminate and imprecise.
There is talk of the UK starting air strikes in Syria- are more air assets actually needed? Would it be purely political?
The results of UK participation in kinetic strikes against targets in Syria would likely be almost purely political. There has so far been no talk about committing more assets, just allowing the eight Tornado GR.4s and ten MQ-9 Reapers currently committed in Iraq to extend their missions to Syria. Within the context of the wider US and coalition effort in Syria, this is a small force to add and certainly cannot produce anything more than marginal tactical gains. What is really in short supply in Syria is ISR platforms and UK Reapers, Sentinel and other ISR platforms are already conducting ISR operations over Syria as well as Iraq.
Follow him on Twitter: @Justin_Br0nk
Follow my vapour trail on Twitter: @Hush_kit
You should also enjoy some more of our articles: There’s a whole feast of features, including the top WVR and BVR fighters of today, an alternate history of the TSR.2, an interview with a Super Hornet pilot and a Pacifist’s Guide to Warplanes. Want something more bizarre? The Top Ten fictional aircraft is a fascinating read, as is the The Strange Story and The Planet Satellite. The Fashion Versus Aircraft Camo is also a real cracker.
Hush-Kit asked Brian Clegg, author of Inflight Science, those aviation questions we all want answered (but felt we should know already).
If this article interests you, support Hush-Kit.net with a donation (buttons above and below). If this goes well we’ll be able to give you much more! Recommended donation £11. Many thanks for helping to keep us impartial and independent.
What are contrails, and what causes them?”
The word ‘contrail’ is just a contraction of ‘condensation trail’ – it’s what we usually call a vapour trail in the UK, but condensation trail is more accurate. In effect they’re long thin artificial clouds. A cloud is just a collection of tiny water droplets and one of the waste products of burning aircraft fuel is water. There’s a jet of water vapour emerging from the back of a jet engine. Initially it’s invisible – you can see water when it’s a gas – but the air around it is very cold and it quickly condenses into droplets of water (or even ice crystals if it’s cold enough), just like a cloud. If contrails are forming you’ll get one from each engine, but because they aren’t visible until they are a little way behind the plane, and they soon merge, we often just see one. But only the plane is high enough. The reason we get those high ribbons of white, but nothing near an airport is that the air gets colder as you go higher, and you need to be over around 10,000 feet before it’s cool enough for a contrail to form.
I understand that there are conflicting views on the basic principle of how a wing works, what are they?”
At a basic level, there’s no problem. A wing works by redirecting the flow of air that goes past it as it cuts through the sky. But it gets complicated when you look at detail, because the physics of fluid flow (and air is just as much a fluid as is, say, water) is horribly messy. We’re usually taught that the lift that a wing gets, holding the plane up is due to something called the Bernoulli effect. The argument is something like this: the wing is shaped so it is further over the top surface than the bottom, which means that the air over the top has to go significantly faster to keep up with the air going over the bottom. Because the air is moving faster it thins out, reducing pressure above the wing compared with the pressure underneath – so the wing feels a pull upwards. The Bernoulli effect does exist, but this explanation of the lift being caused by the air going faster to keep up is rubbish – the air has no way of knowing what it needs to do to keep up. The reality is significantly more complex, and a much simpler way of looking at it is Newton’s third law that ever action has an equal and opposite reaction. The shape of the wing deflects the flow of the air in a downward direction. As it’s pushing down on the air, the air pushes up on the wing, producing lift.
Was the Spitfire overrated? Full story here. A Lightning pilot’s guide to flying and fighting here. Find out the most effective modern fighter aircraft in within-visual and beyond-visual range combat. The greatest fictional aircraft here. An interview with stealth guru Bill Sweetman here. The fashion of aircraft camo here. Interview with a Super Hornet pilot here. Most importantly, a pacifist’s guide to warplanes here. F-35 expose here.
The X-29 in flight.
What are the advantages of a forward-swept wing and why have they not caught on?”
It’s primarily a manoeuvrability versus stability argument. An aircraft with forward swept wings is more able to cut through the air efficiently, making it able to make sharper sudden turns. It also gives increased lift for the same area. But you pay for this with more instability on turns, as well as a tendency to bend the wing more than is the case with a conventional shape, which becomes more significant with large aircraft wings. What that has meant in practice is that forward-swept wings have been limited to fighter jets where manoeuvrability is arguably more important than stability, and even there, the relatively small benefits have often not been considered sufficient to balance out the downside.
What are the biggest misconceptions about aircraft?”
You’d need a whole book for that – my Inflight Science covers a whole range, whether it’s things we get wrong or that are just an unexpected surprise. One would be what’s going on if an announcement is made about the crew putting the doors to automatic. This isn’t, as many think, engaging a lock. In fact, most of the time aircraft doors don’t need a lock. They open inwards first, and once the there is a significant difference between the cabin pressure and the outside air, it would be pretty much impossible to open the door against that pressure. Strictly speaking the announcement should be ‘chutes to automatic’ as what is being switched on is the automatic deployment of evacuation chutes. Another aspect of aircraft that is often misunderstood is why a tug is used to pull the aircraft away from the stand, rather than using the aircraft engines. It would be perfectly possible to manoeuvre on engines alone – aircraft usually do on landing. But to reverse away from the terminal would mean sending the jet blast straight towards all that plate glass, carrying with it any debris, which would be distinctly dangerous. Using a tug does also save on fuel, and Virgin Atlantic did plan some time ago to use tugs for the whole trip from terminal to runway. Unfortunately there were two problems with this. One was that airports typically didn’t have space at the end of the runway for detaching tugs and getting them out of the way. But more significantly, towing reduces the lifespan of the undercarriage and manufacturers made it clear that more towing would mean more expensive replacement schedules for the airlines.
Airliners have essentially looked the same since the Boeing 707, when will the next configuration become popular and what do you expect it to be?”
It’s not quite as straightforward as that. Certainly the narrow bodied aircraft have continued with a basic that is similar to the first hugely successful long range jet airliner, but wide bodied aircraft like the Boeing 747 and the Airbus A380 with their distinctive double decks do present a considerably different configuration. And we shouldn’t forget the entirely different Concorde, which failed for political reasons rather than commercial ones. For the future, there is no reason why basic, workaday aircraft would not continue with essentially similar formats. Significant change is liable to come with technological transformation. I’d suggest this is likely to have two possible directions. One is a return to supersonic flight. This may never happen, but if it does, looking at, for instance, the Airbus concept plans filed this August, we’d see a radically different design both in wing shape and body format, partly to help reduce the noise levels that plagued Concorde. The other is the move to low carbon flight. Aircraft fuel is a very efficient way to store energy and at the moment it would be impossible to have a battery powered airliner. In the future, though, we could be looking at designs to massively reduce fuel consumption in exchange, perhaps for slower flights – perhaps even a new generation of airships.
Conventional helicopters seem to struggle to get above 200mph, why is that?”
A traditional helicopter relies on tipping forwards to get forward momentum – but its rotors are still at an inefficient angle to get a huge amount of forward thrust, and the engines are always putting a lot of effort into keeping the aircraft up as there is limited lift available. The other problem is that as the aircraft moves forward there is more lift on the rotor blades when they are at the front of the aircraft and moving into the wind than there is at the rear, where they are moving away from the wind. The faster the helicopter goes, the more opportunity there is for ‘retreating blade stall’ where the helicopter rolls towards the blade that’s heading backwards. The main potential to get around this is either by rotating the rotors through 90 degrees, as in a VTOL aircraft, or to have a pair of rotors on the same axis rotating in opposite directions. This would work in theory, but is extremely difficult to manage in practice.
What are the most promising aeronautical technologies now in development?”
At their most visible, I think these are primarily approaches to deal with the two issues mentioned above: flying faster and flying greener. Perhaps the most dramatic flying faster development is a British one in the Skylon space plane, which is a plane that can be used to reach low Earth orbit. The key to its potential success is the radically different Sabre engines, which are air breathing as long as it is possible to do so before switching to rocket mode. This is a remarkable achievement, as the engines have have to drastically cool the air then compress it to an immense pressure all in a fraction of a second to be able work with the liquid hydrogen fuel. The benefit is to lose an equivalent conventional rocket’s need to carry around 250 tonnes more oxygen than Skylon. Flying greener will come both from greater efficiency and an eventual move to alternative fuels – the ideal would be a major battery breakthrough, which would require batteries to store at least 100 times as much energy per unit weight. And we are seeing some remarkable developments in battery technology. Finally I would stress the less obvious software side. Aircraft are immensely complex devices and the increasing computerisation and software capabilities could lead to anything from significantly reduced fuel consumption to more effective autopilots and transformed passenger communication capabilities.
China has announced development of a smart stealth skin that counter radars of any wavelength what are your thought on this?”
Stealth is a combination of technologies designed to minimize the ability of an enemy to detect the presence of a piece of military hardware. This is both about confusing radar signals and reducing the emissions that the plane makes, for example the heat from its engines. Usually stealth is a pragmatic technology. If it’s not possible to make something entirely invisible, then the idea is to modify its appearance. So, for instance, stealth technology has been tested on tanks that makes them look like an ordinary car, and similarly on aircraft, when it’s not possible to be entirely invisible the aim is to look like a flight of birds. The radar can be fooled passively by either absorbing or scattering the radar waves, or actively by generating a confusing signal. To try get around existing stealth technology, extremely high frequency radar, which has better resolution but less range, is used. The new Chinese material is better at absorbing these frequencies than existing stealth absorbers. But this is only an incremental improvement, not a total breakthrough.
Where is the safest place to sit on an airliner?
Safety on an airliner is about two things – ability to survive and ability to get out. Making sure your seat has easy access to a fire exit is one obvious step – apart from the main doors there will be window emergency exits with wider seat spacing. Crew, when travelling as passengers, sometimes count the number rows to the exit row, so they can feel their way to it if the cabin is dark or smoke filled. On location, in analyses of crashes the safest seats are those behind the wing, then those over the wing, and worst right up the front. The safest seats of all aren’t generally available though – they are the crew seats. They have the key advantage of facing backwards, which makes survival in a crash significantly more likely. Airlines would love to have all the seats facing backwards, but when they have been available (the old Trident, for instance, had some backward-facing seats), passengers are reluctant to use them.
What happened to Flight MH370?”
If an aircraft crashes – what are the hallmarks that it was downed by an onboard bomb?”
The recent disaster that befell the Russian Metrojet flight 9268 from Sharm el Sheikh to St Petersburg is now thought to have been caused by a bomb on board. There a number of indicators that investigators will use to discover the causes of a crash. An explosion will often result in mid-air break up of the fuselage, which would result in the debris being spread over a significantly greater area than a crash in which the plane was mostly intact before impact. There can also be identifiable damage to and traces of unburnt explosive on parts of the aircraft or passenger belongings that were situated near to the explosive charge, while the flight recorder can pick up distinctive sounds of the explosion before ceasing to function.
If this article interests you, support Hush-Kit.net with a donation (buttons above and below). If this goes well we’ll be able to give you much more! Recommended donation £11. Many thanks for helping to keep us impartial and independent.
Follow my vapour trail on Twitter: @Hush_kit
You should also enjoy some more of our articles: There’s a whole feast of features, including the top WVR and BVR fighters of today, an alternate history of the TSR.2, an interview with a Super Hornet pilot and a Pacifist’s Guide to Warplanes. Want something more bizarre? The Top Ten fictional aircraft is a fascinating read, as is the The Strange Story and The Planet Satellite. The Fashion Versus Aircraft Camo is also a real cracker.
In the mid-1970s, the British company Hawker Siddeley developed a concept for a medium-weight fighter for the Royal Air Force strongly influenced by the US’ F-16. This series of ‘P.1200’ concepts came from the company’s Kingston division. Though considerably larger than the F-16, most of the P.1200 designs featured a similar air intake, canopy, leading-edge root extensions, and general wing configuration. The vertical and horizontal tail surfaces on the other hand, were entirely different.
Strangely the P.1202 design was offered with either two RB.199s or a single RB.431. The RB.199 was then in development for the Tornado, but as experience would show with the ADV, it was not a suitable fighter engine; it was tailor-made for the low-level regime and was a poor performer at the medium and high altitudes that an air superiority fighter needs to operate in. The RB.431 study was essentially a Pegasus with reheat and no vectored thrust nozzles, though powerful it again seems an odd choice for a supersonic fighter.
The initial design, from November 1975, featured a canard layout with square shoulder-mounted intakes, similar to the later Saab Gripen. Further designs utilized a conventional tail and dorsal intakes. Internal armament for the early P.1200 designs was two 27-mm Mauser cannon. Air-to-air armament was expected to be AIM-9 Sidewinders and SkyFlash medium-range missiles. In the secondary air-to-ground role it could have carried four bombs in a low-drag recess.
By 1977 the aircraft had become even more strongly influenced by the F-16. Both single and twin vertical fin configurations were tested. The twin-tailed P.1202 pictured above, would have had superior high alpha performance to the F-16, and given a suitable engine, would have made a formidable dogfighter.
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