The bravery and ferocity of the Ukrainian resistance to a brutal Russian invasion has stirred the world. Ukrainian air power consists of veteran Soviet types fortified with modern unmanned aircraft. Against the odds their air force still flies and still fights. These are 10 types operated by the Ukrainian armed forces in 2022. 

10. Leleka-100

The Leleka-100 is a small multi-role UAV operated by the Ukrainian Armed Forces since 2015, largely in the battlefield reconnaissance role. Its inertial navigation system is vital for reliable operations in GPS-denied environments. It can carry the usual electro-optical and infra-red gimballed sensors. It is one of the most used drones of its class in the Ukrainian Army and has the most flight hours of any Ukrainian UAV. 

9. Antonov An-30

A Beriev-led development of the An-24, the Antonov An-30 was produced in Kyiv. The type has proved useful for longer-ranged reconnaissance missions. 

8. Sukhoi Su-24

Whereas the F-111 and (non-German) Tornado have all but gone, the Soviet equivalent, the Su-24 lingers on. Fast, long-ranged and with a large bombload it remains a credible attack aircraft.

7. Tupolev Tu-141/143

A fighter-sized Soviet drone rocket-launched from a ramp, the Tu-141 and 143 are jet-propelled reconnaissance aircraft bought back into service following the 2014 invasion. Originally, they parachute-landed whereupon recorded intelligence footage was harvested from tapes, but they have been locally upgraded by university students to provide real-time video. Last week a rogue Tu-141 crashed in Croatia, reports that it may have had an attached bomb may be correct or may just be misidentified boost rocket launcher fuel residue and structural elements of the booster itself. 

6. UA Dynamics Punisher/Spectre

Working in a hunter/killer relationship, the Spectre/Punisher drones are compact yet able to reach a relatively long distance to deliver a disproportionate effect against invading forces and their supply line. As in much modern warfare, unmanned aircraft have provided a flexible form of harassment attack at little cost in money and little risk of human loss to its operators. 

5. Mil Mi-24

The Mi-24 suffered heavier losses than any other Ukrainian type in the 2014 Russian invasion. Since 2014, the type’s survivability and night-fighting capabilities have been improved. 

4. Sukhoi Su-25

The stalwart of both sides in the Ukraino-Russian War, the Su-25 is a tough battlefield support aircraft born of the Soviet era. Ukraine held on to over 90 Su-25s following the break-up of the Soviet Union. Ukrainian Su-25 development has gone its own way since around 2003, with MiGremont in Zaporizhzhia (at the time of writing Zaporizhzhia was under attack from Russia; earlier Russian attacks had caused a fire at the nuclear power plant). MiGremont upgraded and refurbished Su-25s, the resultant Su-25M1K and -UM1Ks featured enhanced navigation and weapon aiming aids as well as new defensive countermeasures. Following the high loss rate of Ukrainian Su-25s in the Russian 2014 invasion of the Crimean Peninsula, countermeasures were further enhanced with the addition of new chaff and flare dispensers scabbed onto the top of the rear engine nacelles. 

3. Sukhoi Su-27

The most capable air superiority platform in Ukrainian service is the Su-27. Its larger range and weapon load than the MiG-29 grants the ‘Flanker’ significantly more combat persistence. Ukraine had almost 70 ‘Flanker’s at the nation’s birth. The current variant, the Su-27P1M and Su-27UB1M contains some equipment unique to Ukrainian ‘Flankers’. In the air-to-air role aircraft it is armed with a 30-mm cannon, as well as up to ten R-27 and R-73 missiles. 

2. Baykar Bayraktar TB2

The Bayrakter TB2 armed drone was the inspiration for the song of the same name, a patriotic pop song that celebrates the success of the Turkish-built aircraft and mocks the Russian invaders. Ukraine has between 12-25 TB-2s and it has proved extremely effective against armoured vechicles.

1. Mikoyan MiG-29

A survivor of the Soviet era, much of the MiG-29‘s use is the exact type of mission it was designed for (if not with the intended opponent) – the short-range defensive tactical fighter role. In this role in 2022 it has gained a semi-mythical status as ‘The Ghost of Kyiv‘, a MiG-29 said to have shot down multiple Russian aircraft.

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It may seem ghoulish to use the metric of total ‘kills’ (enemy aircraft destroyed) to determine the most successful squadron of the Second World War, and though in that world of blood and fire it is a meaningful determinant, Eddie Rippeth has also considered other factors. As with any top 10, this is a discussion starter rather than a definitive answer. The squadrons mentioned here certainly displayed extraordinary bravery and skill, and were also in the right time and place to accrue heavy losses on the enemy.

Which fighter squadrons were most successful for the allies? This top ten started as an attempt to list the top squadrons by numbers of kills. However, that would mean six of the top seven scorers would be RAF, and would squeeze out US squadrons, which of course fought a shorter war. In addition, most of the information available on the USAAF is at fighter group level. Fighter groups contained three squadrons, so in order to compare like with like, the top ten includes the best individual squadrons within US Fighter Groups. With at least five USAAF fighter groups exceeding 600 victories, logic suggests that there’s a lot of USAAF squadrons hidden in the 200-250 kill range. So our three chosen USAAF squadrons are representative of a number of high-scoring squadrons, and are chosen partly out of interest, similarly with the inclusion of Polish and Canadian RAF squadrons.

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So this isn’t strictly a top ten by scoring alone. All of the squadrons mentioned had a significant strategic impact and are worthy of consideration for that reason alone. And of course, a caveat must always be made for the ‘confirmed’ victories assigned to each squadron. Over-claiming happened, but the numbers here assume this wasn’t a particular problem with any of the squadrons. And of course, the numbers matter less than the fact that they all helped achieve real strategic success.

The Soviet Air Force is unfortunately not represented, simply due to the lack of information available. That said, honorary mention should be made for the Red air force’s Normandie fighter wing, where exiled Free French pilots flew Yaks with great success from 1942 onwards. An honorary mention also goes to one of the most iconic fighter units of all, the American Volunteer Group, the Flying Tigers. The Flying Tigers were subsumed into the USAAF’s 23rd Fighter Group, but it’s very difficult to track the continuity of a single squadron in such a situation. And a final honorary mention to 332nd Fighter Group – the Red-Tails, whose successful formation and operational achievements marked a great step in the US civil rights movement. All three of these units merit a place on a list about fighting units, but with the information available, it’s difficult to make a case for one of their constituent squadrons. But I’d be happy to be corrected on this score.
So the rundown, from number 10:

10. RCAF 401 Squadron – 186.5 kills

401 Squadron was the top Canadian outfit, which arrived in England as Number 1 squadron in June 1940. It saw some action in the Battle of Britain, although its first kills were Bristol Blenheims in a friendly fire incident. Nonetheless, it ended the battle with 30 kills. The squadron was renumbered 401 in 1941 and was heavily involved in Channel sweeps, with occasional heavy losses, including on one occasion being bounced by Adolf Galland’s Staffel, losing five aircraft. However, the conversion to the Spitfire IX meant an uptick in 401’s fortunes and saw this squadron through to the end of the war. As part of the Canadian Fighter Wing (commanded by Johnny Johnson), it was heavily involved in clearing the skies above Normandy in June, and the squadron would prove to be the highest-scoring RAF and RCAF squadron in the campaign, with 112 kills, including one bag of three Arado Ar234 jets shot down over their airfield. The squadron’s top scorers were William Kersley (14.5 kills) and John McKay (12).

9. No. 303 ‘Warsaw’ Squadron, RAF

Like the Tuskegee Red Tails, 303 Squadron has recently been immortalised on celluloid with the movie Hurricane, following a short cameo in the 1969 film Battle of Britain. The squadron was formed in early August by assembling Polish veterans who’d escaped after the 1939 invasion under the leadership of Durham-born Squadron Leader Ronald Kellett. 303 famously got off the mark on August 30th when a training flight led by Kellett encountered some Luftwaffe bombers, with Ludwig Paszkiewicz shooting one down (actually a Bf 110 heavy fighter). They were made officially operational the following day, when they scored four more victories. Highly motivated, skilful and aggressive, 303’s Hurricanes tore into Luftwaffe formations day after day, with several aces emerging in the battle – led by Czech Josef Frantisek (17 victories), Witold Urbanowitz (14), Jan Zumbach, Zdzislaw Henneburg and Eugeniusz Szaposznikow (8 apiece). On both 15th and 27th September, the squadron claimed 15 kills, although it would suffer the loss of its top scorer, Frantisek in a flying accident on 8th October shortly before it was rested. In its 42 days of action, 303 had achieved 126 kills, highest scoring squadron in the battle. 303 remained in England as part of the Home Defence, switching to Spitfires and taking part in circuses and rhubarbs and air cover for the disastrous Dieppe raids. It had several new aces in this period, such as Boleslaw Drobinski and Miecyzslaw Adamek, and ended the war flying Mustangs as bomber escorts. The squadron achieved 204 kills, by some way the highest-scoring Polish squadron in the RAF.

8. USMC VMF121 ‘The Green Knights’

The US Marine Corps had as early as 1912 begun experimenting with aviation as an essential part of the Marines’ armoury, and their raison d’etre of amphibious and maritime assault. The first great test of this aviation arm came at Guadalcanal, with the establishment of the so-called ‘Cactus air force’ at Henderson Field in August 1942 (alas, the evocative name owes its origins to a code-name not the tropical vegetation surrounding Henderson). VMF-121 and its F4F Wildcats joined the fray in October 1942, having been catapulted off the decks of escort carriers from 350 miles away. The Green Knights immediately joined battle with Japanese army pilots and aircraft at their peak, with Joe Foss emerged as a leading ace as Marine pilots gradually got the upper hand. Foss would go on to be the first American to match Eddie Rickenbacker’s WW1 score of 26 kills (and got sent home). VMF121 fought in many of the Marines’ great Pacific island-hopping campaigns, ending the war at Peleliu flying Corsairs. The squadron totalled 208 kills in the war, with Foss leading 13 other aces, with Bill ‘Guts’ Marontate next (13 victories).

7. USAAF 431 Fighter Squadron – 212 kills

The premier P-38 Lightning squadron in the Pacific, the 431st was part of the 475th Fighter Group, set up in Queensland Australia in May 1943 to support the campaign in western New Guinea, at the time teaming with Japanese army aircraft. After several uneventful escort missions that month, the ‘Twin-tailed devils’ ravaged a Japanese formation, claiming its first 12 victories. This was the first of a number of engagements with large Japanese formations in which the Lightnings scored highly, and this trend continued as action moved to New Britain and Bougainville.
Within 431st squadron, two pilots emerged as leading aces – the squadron commander, Thomas B. Maguire and Charles F. McDonald. During August 1944, the group hosted celebrated aviator Charles Lindbergh, who asked MacDonald if he could join a ‘milk run’ mission with 431st. Unfortunately their formation was attacked and Lindbergh ended up nearly colliding with an Oscar, which then crashed. Poor MacDonald got the rap for endangering the national hero, and a one-month grounding. In October 1944, the Group moved to Morotai to take part in the invasion of the Philippines, where once again they scored highly, with Maguire becoming the second leading US ace of all time (behind Richard Bong of the 49th Fighter Group). Tragically Maguire was killed executing a low level combat manoeuvre in action in January 1945, with 38 kills. The 431st served out the remainder of the war in the Philippines, with MacDonald reaching 27 kills, all with the squadron.

6. USAAF 61st Pursuit Squadron, ‘Zemke’s Wolfpack’ – 232 kills

The first US fighter group to start bossing the Luftwaffe around over Occupied Europe was 56 Group, with the huge and rugged P47 Thunderbolts. The group would prosper under the brilliant leadership of Hubert Zemke, and of its three squadrons, the most successful was the 61st Pursuit, whose members included the two top US aces in the European Theatre, Robert S.Johnson and the squadron’s leader, Polish-American Francis Gabreski. Flying out of Debden in Suffolk, its first missions were fighter-bomber sweeps along the lines of the generally ineffective Circus and Rhubarb missions, and escorting the earlier 8th Air Force raids as far as Belgium.

An early shock was the first meeting with Fw190s, with heavy losses but Zemke’s influence would quickly reverse this, and by the end of 1943, 56 Group was by far the highest scorer in the 8th Air Force. Uniquely, Zemke and his pilots refused the opportunity in the New Year to switch to P51s. Escort duties continued, thanks to new fuel tanks, but following D-Day, more and more emphasis was given to ‘targets of opportunity’ on the ground, and the group’s P47s ran up an impressive total of vehicles, trains and aircraft strafed to destruction – a task for which the tough and hefty ‘Jug’ was very well suited – but not invincible. On 5 July, and Gabreski was brought down by flak while strafing, and he spent the rest of the war in Stalag Luft I. With Johnson already dispatched home to sell war bonds after grabbing his 27th kill, both Group and squadron’s prodigious rate of scoring aerial kills slowed a little, although by the end of the war, the 61st Pursuit Squadron had managed 232 of 56 Group’s 665 kills.

5. USAAF 487th Pursuit Squadron – 235 kills

The 487th Squadron was the top USAAF Mustang squadron, and part of the US 352nd Fighter Group of the US 8th Air Force. They were soon nicknamed the ‘Blue-Nosed Bastards of Bodney’, after the tiny, unassuming hamlet in Norfolk where they were based from July 1943. Initially flying P47s, the first kill for the 487th came in November for John C.Meyer, who would become the squadron’s commander and one of its two outstanding aces. The squadron and group operated mainly in providing escort for the growing 8th Air Force bombing campaign, being heavily involved in the pivotal Big Week in March 1944.

It was after this that the squadron switched to Mustangs, and scores really started to mount, notably for John C.Meyer and a recent arrival from the 49th Fighter Group in the Pacific, George E.Preddy, who would score six kills in a day on August 6th. Preddy was rewarded with command of the 328th Fighter Squadron, and was killed when shot down by friendly anti-aircraft on Christmas Day. In the meantime, the whole group had said goodbye to Bodney and been moved to Asche in Belgium in time for the Battle of the Bulge. On New Year’s Day 1945, the 487th had its day of days, after John C.Meyer managed to get his squadron in the air to tackle the huge Luftwaffe surprise attack on Asche air base (part of Operation Bodenplatte). While the group’s other Mustangs were being bombed, the 487th had shot down 24 of their assailants and was awarded a Distinguished Unit citation. 487th squadron flew its last mission on May 3, 1945 with Preddy and Meyer classed as the two top Mustang aces, with 26.83 and 25.5 kills respectively (Meyer’s all with the 487th).

4. No. 85 Squadron RAF – 278 kills – Nocto Diuque Venamur
(“We hunt by day and night”)

The RAF’s 85 Squadron had a remarkable record both in daylight and after dark. It began the war as one of the BEF squadrons based in France, flying Hurricanes with South African ace Albert Lewis top-scoring before being thrown into the Battle of Britain, with new Squadron Leader Peter Townsend, later of Princess Margaret fame. With pilots exhausted and Townsend injured, the squadron was withdrawn for conversion to night fighting. In short order, it used Hurricanes, Defiants and even boasted the only Douglas Havoc ace, Canadian Gordon Raphael, in fighting the Night Blitz of early 1941.

However, it would be the conversion to Mosquitos that would bring the squadron its greatest successes. This occurred as the Luftwaffe mounted a series of short night bombing offensives in 1942 and 1943, with the great nightfighter ace John ‘Cats Eyes’ Cunningham in command during this period. In early 1944, 85 played a key role in the defeat of the final German (piloted) bomber campaign – Operation Steinbock, helping to decimate the remaining Luftwaffe bomber fleet. They then turned to night intruder missions, supporting RAF bombing raids for the remainder of the war. Branse Burbridge dispatched no fewer than 16 Luftwaffe ‘nachtjagers’, including an incredible four in one night over Bonn in November; partly as a consequence, RAF Bomber Command losses would tumble in late 1944. Burbridge managed 21 kills in total and was by some way 85 Squadron’s top scorer – he was also the top allied night-fighter ace, just pipping Cunningham. Among 85’s numerous other aces were Alan Owen (9 kills in Mosquito night-fighters) and the top German-born RAF ace, Manfred von Czernin, who scored 5 of his 15 kills with 85 Squadron during the fall of France.

3. US Navy VF15 Squadron – 315 kills (‘Fighting Aces’)

The US Navy’s remarkable VF15 Fighter Squadron was in being for scarcely two years in its entirety, being formed in September 1943 and disbanded in October 1945. Almost all of its action took place within a six-month period from May 1944, after being assigned to operations on board USS Essex. Its commander at inception, David McCampbell, was a 33-year-old pilot who had been serving as a signals officer on the USS Wasp – where he’d have waved off Spitfires heading to Malta during Operation Bowery, and had survived its sinking just five months later. In February 1944, McCampbell was given command of a whole air wing – the so-called ‘Fabled Fifteenth’, including torpedo and dive bombers. Nonetheless, he kept flying his Hellcat, the US Navy’s brutally effective new fighter to extraordinary effect.

VF15’s first operations were over Saipan and Wake Island, with several pilots, including McCampbell, opening their accounts in early June. However, the June 19th clash with the Japanese at the Battle of the Philippine Sea, saw VF-15 fully involved in perhaps the greatest air battle in the Pacific, with the squadron racking up an incredible 68.5 victories in a single day (US Navy fighters claimed 388 kills that day). The legend of the ‘Great San Marianas Turkey Shoot’ was born. Very much at the heart of this was McCampbell, who shot down five ‘Judy’ dive bombers in his first sortie of the day, and rounded off with two Zeros. Two other VF15 pilots, George R.Carr and the squadron leader, Charles Brewer, shot down five each, although in Brewer’s case he was one of the few US casualties of the day. The IJN would be crippled by the losses inflicted on the day, but further opportunities for the men of VF-15 arose over the next couple of months over Guam and the Philippines. McCampbell’s score reaching 19 by the end of September, and James Rigg and George Duncan both achieving ace status. October saw the great sea battle at Leyte Gulf and VF-15’s Hellcats blitzed the remnants of the IJN’s air force, with McCampbell destroying 9 Japanese fighters (the highest total in a day by any US fighter pilot) and his wingman Roy Rushing getting six. The air battle continued in the Philippines for several more weeks, before moving to Iwo Jima, Okinawa and finally off the coast of Japan in the last months of the war. By this time, Japanese aircraft were far less numerous – but more deadly in the form of kamikazes, one of which struck the Essex on November 25th, removing VF15 from action for a month while it was repaired. A result of this was more emphasis on strafing attacks on Japanese airfields, which VF15 proved adept at. The appropriately nick-named ‘Fighting Aces’ ended the war with 315 victories, with McCampbell (34 kills) heading 28 aces, including Rushing (13.5), Duncan and Wendell van Twelves on 13.

2. No. 92 Squadron RAF – 317.5 kills

Aut pugna aut morere
(Latin for ‘Either fight or die‘)

How does a squadron which began the war with Bristol Blenheims end up as second-highest score of all? The answer is to quickly switch to Spitfires – which was done in May 1940, and they stuck with them throughout the war, except for one short period in the desert. After a very quiet Phoney War, the war came to life with 92 Squadron on May 23, 1940 with its first two patrols near Dunkirk. The squadron was bounced twice, losing four aircraft, including its squadron leader Roger Bushell, who would find immortality as ‘The Big X’ of The Great Escape fame. Nonetheless, this was a squadron blessed with talented pilots, including Robert Stanford Tuck, Brian Kingcome and Tony Bartley (continuing the Hollywood theme, Bartley became a film producer who would later marry actress Deborah Kerr). As a result, they emerged from Dunkirk with an impressive record, not least on the final day of the evacuation where they mauled a formation of Heinkel 111s, claiming 11 victories.

The Battle of Britain saw them continue as one of the RAF’s best fighter squadrons, with the arrival of another great ace, Donald Kingaby, and by the end of 1940, the squadron had amassed well over 100 victories for the year. 92 Squadron spent 1941 flying circuses and rhubarbs over the Channel, a time of pointless losses and questionable victory claims. In April 1942 the squadron was posted to Egypt – although their Spitfire VBs only followed about three months later, and their initial ops were flown in Hurricanes. Once reunited, 92 Squadron was the most effective of the 244 Desert Fighter Wing’s squadrons, with Jeff Wedgewood the leading ace until his death in December. Wedgewood had been on board a Halifax en route home for leave and a new posting, which crashed near Malta in December. The desert ace Neville Duke arrived in January as a flight commander, and he and the squadron scored heavily in the final battles over Tunisia, taking part in the ‘Palm Sunday massacre’ of Luftwaffe transports over Cap Bon. 92 then fought all the way through Sicily and the Italian campaign, and counted 17 aces and 317.5 kills by the end of the war, with Kingaby (an aggregated 17.16 victories) edging Neville Duke (16) as top scorer.

1. RAF 249 Squadron – 320 kills

Motto: Latin: Pugnis et calcibus – With fists and heels.

All of the squadrons listed here made exceptional contributions to winning the war. Our winner, 249 Squadron, might just have been the single squadron that made the difference at the pivotal time and place when the war (at least in Europe) turned in the allies’ favour. 249 Squadron was created in a hurry in May 1940, initially being equipped with Hurris, then slated for Spitfires, and finally Hurricanes in time to play a role in the Battle of Britain. The squadron had an intense baptism of fire during the Battle of Britain, where it was one of the most effective Hurricane squadrons, with Tom Neil and Robert Barton leading scoring. One of its pilots, James Nicholson would win Fighter Command’s only Victoria Cross when despite his aircraft being in flames, he pressed home his attack to destroy a Me 110. Another outstanding effort came from Albert Lewis, fresh from 85 Squadron, who shot down six Luftwaffe aircraft in a single day on September 27th. Unfortunately, like Nicholson, Lewis’s battle was ended a few days later after suffering severe burns when shot down. The squadron then took part in some of the early Circuses in 1941, but in April was given a posting to Malta, which had been suffering the attentions of the Luftwaffe as well as the Regia Aeronautica since the turn of the year. To get there, 249 Squadron’s Hurricanes were shipped to Gibraltar, where they were transferred to the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, and flown off to Malta, without losses. For the first few months, things were relatively quiet, as the Luftwaffe withdrew its squadrons to fight in the Balkans, Greece and then the Soviet campaign.
However, the Luftwaffe returned with a vengeance at the turn of the year. A more welcome arrival was 249’s new Squadron Leader, Canadian Stan Turner, whose withering assessment ‘either we get Spitfires here within days, not weeks, or we’re done,’ contributed to Sholto Douglas finally releasing Spitfires for overseas usage. Spitfires were flown in several batches from carriers Eagle and Wasp from March onwards. The Spitfires arrived in time to counter three massed Luftwaffe offensives against the island, with the first in April and May, in which 249’s aces included Kiwi Raymond Hesselyn, Australian Adrian Goldsmith and Greek-Rhodesian John Plagis. The next few weeks saw two significant new arrivals, a young Pilot Officer, George Beurling, joining 249 and a new AOC for Malta, Keith Park, just as the Luftwaffe campaign was ratcheting up again. Both had an immediate impact – Beurling scoring 15 kills in the month of July, while Park implemented a thorough shake-up in fighter tactics from 25th July which caused such losses that Kesselring gave up the bombing campaign just six days later. It wasn’t the last of the Luftwaffe – they would launch a last gasp major offensive in October, which once again was beaten back with heavy losses by 249 and the other Spitfire squadrons. Beurling and two more Canadian pilots, McElroy and ‘Timber’ Woods all scored heavily in these later air battles. As a result, Malta was saved, Rommel’s supply lines were cut, leading to German and Italian defeat in North Africa.

One inevitability in such an intensive environment where air battles were interspersed with bombardment day and night on the ground was the need to rest and replace pilots every three or four months during the height of the siege in 1942. Hence the aces of Spring, like Hesselyn and Goldsmith gave way to a new cast of aces for the July and October offensives, like Beurling and McElroy. However, flying out pilots on leave on large transport aircraft from the besieged island was fraught with risk – and on 31st October, a number of pilots and ground crew were killed when their B24 Liberator crashed on take-off from Gibraltar, with George Beurling one of the few survivors. 249 Squadron continued to fly from Malta into 1943, with pilots like Californian John Lynch, who led the way in helping decimate Junkers Ju52 transports evacuating Tripoli, and who scored the RAF’s 1000th victory from Malta. Thereafter the Squadron fought over Sicilly, before being posted to Brindisi in southern Italy, flying ops over the Yugoslav coast – a much quieter sector, although one which saw the loss of ‘Timber’ Woods at the end of 1943. The squadron ended the war with over 320 victories, and 21 aces altogether, led by Buerling (27.33), Tom Neil (12.58) and Ray Hesselyn (12).

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Sources: Aces High Christopher Shore / Clive Williams (Grub Street); American Fighter Aces Association website; Stephen Sherman’s Acepilots.com; Aces of WW2.com; Wikipedia; Air Battle over Dunkirk, Norman F.Franks; 475 Fighter Group website; John Foreman RAF Fighter Command Claims 1939-40; 1941-42..

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Andrew Cranfield started his aviation career in free-fall parachuting and designing (with his brother) his own, highly dodgy, hang glider. Having survived that experience, he set a number of unofficial hang gliding records and became an instructor. He was sponsored by Westland Helicopters Ltd (WHL) through his engineering degree. During his time at WHL, He designed and built a Human Power Helicopter and in his spare time flew early, rather unstable, foot-launched microlights. After being awarded a Fellowship at Cranfield University, he left WHL and his subsequent management career has included working at Optica Aircraft, Lucas Aerospace  (on the Osprey V22 project) and running P&M Aviation (The only flexwing designer and manufacturer in the world with UK CAA A1 approval)- an experience that left him seriously out of pocket. He has held senior management positions in other, more profitable, high technology businesses. He currently works as a Non-Executive Director and, amongst other activities, is involved in supporting the Waterbird project (a replica of the UK’s first-ever seaplane) and contributing to an initiative to enhance the skills of UK flexwing microlight pilot.

How on earth do you build a human-powered helicopter and how far did it travel?

I had a massive interest in Human Powered Aircraft and was, at the time, on the RAeS HPA committee. So I was delighted to have the opportunity, in 1980, to build a HPH when I was a graduate apprentice at Westland Helicopters Ltd (WH). The idea was to win the American Helicopter Society $100,000 prize (a huge sum at the time) for the first HPH to fly for a minute, reach a height of 3m (momentarily) and stay within a 10m x 10m square. The pilot was also not allowed to rotate. I spent 5 years designing and building Vertigo, as I called it. I was very fortunate, in that as it was a company-sponsored project, I had access to highly experienced stress people and other capabilities such as the machine shop and composites dept. We tried to model the aerodynamics on the WHL mainframe, but it crashed as it could not cope with the very low Reynolds numbers! I ended up using a Southampton University programme developed programme specifically for contra-rotating rotors. The design we settled on was a single-seat machine with contra-rotating co-axial two-bladed rotors with the pilot mounted above the rotors. It was primarily made of Carbon Fibre (CF) and lightweight foam with the rotors covered in mylar plastic film. Key dimensions and weight were:-

Rotor Diameter 24.56m

Blade Chord 1.5m

Design Rotor Speed 6 r.p.m

Empty Weight 42.41Kg

The transmission had the pitch and coning built into alloy hubs with CF drive shafts driven by steel bevel gears which, in turn, were powered by a chain-driven pinion gear. The undercarriage comprised of 1m length CF tubes with moulded foam feet.

The key to success was the utilisation of ground effect. Without it, it is not physically possible for a human to fly vertically. As it was, we got it skipping around inside the flight shed at Yeovil but it never actually flew. The person who took it over claimed he got it to fly inside the airship hangers at Cardington but I don’t think anyone ever saw any evidence of that. Bits of Vertigo are now in the Helicopter Museum at Weston-Super-Mare.

It was interesting that some heavyweight and eminent members of the RAeS told me, in no uncertain terms, that I was wasting my time as it was simply not feasible. However, I was very gratified to be vindicated some 28 years later by the Atlas HPH winning the prize. They were kind enough to write and thank me for my pioneering work all those years earlier, which was very kind of them and made me feel it was worth the effort.

Does it fall to earth if you stop pedalling? Yes!

What was special about the Optica, and what are your feelings about it today? I worked at Optica as the Materials Manager after it was brought out from receivership. I remember in some offices, it was like walking into the Marie Celeste, as day books were still lying open with pens resting on them. It was like people had just popped out for lunch – quite surreal. The influence of John Edgley was certainly felt all over the place. Interestingly, l didn’t actually meet John until many years later, through my involvement in Human Powered Aircraft. My feeling was that the failure was not so much in the aircraft concept/viability but more in the business model in trying to sell to govt depts such as the MoD and Police. Where there is no specification, there cannot be a budget. So it takes years for a company to persuade the MoD to come up with a specification. Then it is a few more years before it is included in the equipment budget. Also MoD staff officers rotate every three years, so you are always trying to educate people who then disappear to another posting, so it is an uphill struggle. Any equipment budget is, of course, highly competitive so unless it is an Urgent Operational Requirement (in MoD terms) it is always probably going to be at the bottom of the pile. The original company suffered very bad luck when a low time PPL holding policeman crashed and killed himself in one of the early aircraft through point fixation (banking harder and harder to keep the object in sight at slow speed and low altitude-not something to be recommended) which probably put potential sales back a few years. Sadly, I didn’t get to fly in one, but we had about 10 complete aircraft, if memory serves me correctly, in the hangar but no buyers. I was made redundant on a Friday with one hours’ notice and no money after that. I was told that I didn’t have to work the last hour and could leave there and then. It was also the day that my post-dated cheque was cashed for the microlight I had just brought, with a view of flying to work from a field near my house. When I got home walked through the door, somewhat despondent, my wife asked “Did you have a good day at work?”. However, I did enjoy flying the microlight for a good number of years. A few weeks later, the 10 aircraft were destroyed in what was clearly an arson attack – the wing fuel tank drain taps were left open, and material soaked in petrol carefully laid out as fire paths interconnecting each aircraft. The heat was so intense that all that was left was piles of ash in the shape of an aircraft – even the engines were barely recognisable. Because the roof was timber construction (WW1 hangars) they burnt away without pulling in the walls but enabling a ferocious firestorm to be created. Subsequently, all the ex-employees, including yours truly, were interviewed by the Hampshire police. They, of course, asked me if I did it. When I asked what reason they thought I had, they replied that it might be because I believed that the company would need to re-employ me to rebuild them all! The fact there was no money in the company somehow seemed to escape their notice… However, a few years ago I visited John Edgley to talk about his efforts to resurrect the project, as he had brought back all the drawings and some part built aircraft and bits. However, I am not certain where he has got to with it.

What is the Waterbird project? This is a replica of Britain’s first successful seaplane which operated out of the RN’s first Naval Air Station on Lake Windermere in 1911. My role is purely a helper on the flying side and working as groundcrew, as there are many people involved in the hydrodynamics (the area needing improvement at present) and water operations. Edwardian aircraft like this, are not massively dissimilar to the very first canard two seat microlight aircraft I used to instruct on, so it is very interesting project and I like to think I can add value. The aircraft has done short hops as a landplane but has not yet flown from the water. For the historical background on the aircraft and the establishment of naval aviation, please refer to the Waterbird website.

What is your favourite helicopter type and why?

I have two. The Gazelle because it was the aerial equivalent of the original Golf GTI. I first flew in the type when a trainee flight test engineer at WHL. Once, with a WHL test pilot, the late and great Don Farquharson (who wore a monocle), we had an amazing flight from Yeovil to London. He discovered that I flew hang gliders, we decided to loosen off our straps and we then flew most of the way to Battersea heliport by weight shifting the aircraft as we trundled through a very stable inversion layer. I also did some very low level and fast-flying in Army Air Corp Gazelles, during exercises over Salisbury plain, which was also fantastic. I don’t think you will find a pilot who has a bad word to say about the Gazelle. The Agusta 109, on the other hand, was the Ferrari of the sky. Tremendously fast and with a very smooth ride at high speed (unlike the Lynx). The WHL comms flight example also had a panic button in the middle of the dash. If the pilot lost it (suffered vertigo, for example) you could hit it and the aircraft would stabilise itself and then climb out at 50kts forward speed and something like 500 fpm. I felt, at the time, that was quite an innovative safety feature, although the guys at Hereford thought it was just for wimps.

What would you say to those who say the V-22 is not necessary? You have to understand the rationale behind the design. As far as I could make out, the original Statement of Requirement was entirely based around rescuing US hostages from Tehran type missions. The failure of the original rescue seemed to have left a massive scar on the mentality of US Special Operations Command. That failure seemed to dominate the requirements capability all the way through the programme. Only the Americans had sufficient will, money and technology to have developed such a massively complex helicopter successfully, so hats off to them. However, you now have an aircraft which is well suited for certain long-range missions but not so much for other roles, such as traditional SAR work. The key element of this work is being able to hover quite low, while winching people up. Due to the massively high downwash velocities from the extremely highly loaded rotors, this isn’t a really viable operation. That is one example and there are others. But you do have a world-beating aircraft for a relatively small number of tasks that play to its strengths.

What is the biggest myth about helicopters?

That the first generation of commercial helicopters was unreliable and unsafe. This simply wasn’t the case. For example, the Bell 47 (Sioux to the UK Army Air Corps) was, by March 1954, was being operated in forty countries and had logged well over one million hours’ flying time. One American operator, Helicopter Air Service, carried nine million pounds of mail over a total distance of one million miles during three years of operations, using six Bell 47s. Working on three circular routes of between 90 and 100 miles in length, and serving fifty-five suburban communities in the Chicago area, they made 160,000 landings and take-offs without incident, 40,000 of them from a heliport on the roof of the main Chicago post office, 238 feet above ground level! Quite a remarkable achievement.

What should I have asked you – and what is the answer?

Who was responsible for suggesting a prize for the first crossing of the channel by a Human Powered Aircraft? After the Kremer figure of eight prize was won by the Gossamer Condor. We sat around the table at the RAeS and talked about a really stretching, but physically feasible target, for the next competition. I think I said “What about a channel crossing? That should excite everybody. Of course, no one is going to actually achieve it for a very long time”. We all sagely agreed that was a wonderful idea and that indeed it would not happen in the foreseeable future. Within 2 years of Paul MacCready and his team did it with Gossamer Albatross…..

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the site

Wiring work proceeds on the wings of a wooden test model for a large, four-engine flying boat in 1946 at what would become NASA’s Langley Research Center.  Sure, the finished product will be noisy and exciting and get all the attention.  Behind the scenes, though, this is exactly the quiet, patient work that advances engineering and science and that women are great at.    

– Stephen Caulfield

A speculative discussion

Dr Ron Smith joined the British helicopter company Westland in 1975, working in Research Aerodynamics, remotely piloted helicopters, before becoming Head of Future Projects. He had a strong influence on the design of the NH90, and was involved in the assessment of the Apache for Britain. He also explored a variety of exotic future technologies for Westland. Here Ron looks at the role of helicopters in the attempted invasion of Ukraine.

1) General list of helicopter roles in the land battle

• Reconnaissance (enemy locations and apparent intent, location of air defences, command & control centres, logistics)
• Insertion of ground troops, including special forces
• Anti-armour operations, destruction of point and hardened targets
• Suppression of dispersed and soft-skinned targets (typically by rocket or cannon fire)
• Suppression of enemy air defence systems
• Attack of enemy command and control centres
• Electronic intelligence and jamming
• Casualty evacuation

2) Conjectural approach of attacking forces (Russian)

Assumptions – significant superiority of numbers, but faced with general resistance of both trained forces and population in general. The key objectives are to gain control of key cities, particularly Kiev, as the centre of political power.

Currently large bodies of Russian ground forces appear to be largely operating on roads. The expectation is that the defending forces will be preparing defensive positions and (potentially) destroying bridges to further restrict freedom of movement (e.g. across River Dnieper). It is not known whether defensive forces will deploy mines and or IEDs on major routes – not least because of the risk to refugee civil population.

Russia has the capability to deploy helicopters in all of the roles listed in Section 1, above. These reflect a generic approach to combined arms operations in relatively open country. There will, however, be additional challenges as the fight moves into urban environments.

During the approach, bombardment using long range artillery will be used to destroy key administrative buildings, infrastructure and any military installations, as well as to damage the morale of opposition forces and the population, in general. Cruise missiles (and/or special forces – potentially helicopter-inserted)  will be deployed against specific command centres and operating bases / airfields.

With Ukrainian forces being largely on the defensive, I’d anticipate that use of UAVs (armed or not) would be favoured by the Russians for reconnaissance, with helicopters providing a stand-off attack capability against any hardened defensive positions identified. Attack could be by laser-guided missile (potentially with UAVs or special forces providing laser designation) allowing the targets to be engaged from 3 – 5 km range (or more).

Rockets and/or cannon would be used against dispersed or less well-protected targets, particularly if air defence systems have already been suppressed. This mix, with ground infantry moving house to house, would probably be more effective than the use of heavy armour in an urban environment. Routes approaching (and within) cities are ‘canalised’, heavily constraining freedom of movement. In these areas, the destruction of lead units hampers the mobility of the rest of a heavy armour force.

Transport helicopters can be used to increase tempo and mobility, by dispersing troops to encircle locations, although the transports would need to maintain a certain distance and/or have had local air defence systems suppressed first. Also, any Western MANPADS of NLAW type systems (in direct attack mode) could represent a considerable threat, if available. Once on the ground, the troops would still need IFVs to support infantry operations and to suppress resistance.

3) Conjectural approach of defending forces (Ukranian)

The critical concern here will depend on the degree to which an operational helicopter fleet remains available by the time that the Russian net starts to close around the cities. A Russian objective would surely be to achieve significant attrition of Ukranian air assets (including helicopters) before beginning urban operations.

It may well be that helicopter operations would be more effective in the earlier approach phase when there are significant masses of enemy armour and logistic vehicles occupying main routes and suffering from restricted movement. Both armed UAVs and helicopter-launched ATGWs would be effective, subject to the considerable constraints of the large number of enemy vehicles, and the (likely) limited resources of the defensive forces.

Constraining enemy mobility by destroying river crossings and laying explosive charges under approach roads might be attempted with a view to attacking armoured columns at predetermined locations on the city approaches. Any NLAW equipped units might be used in these ambush efforts.

Transport helicopters might be deployed to insert special forces into the enemy rear areas to attack (for example) command and control centres and logistic support formations.

Similarly, NLAW or MANPADS squads could be moved around between locations allowing hit-and-run tactics to be used, with the helicopters acting as a ‘force multiplier’. The fact that both attackers and defenders operate the same types of helicopters may be advantageous in this instance.

Hush-Kit asked me for some thoughts on how a smaller nation should best organise its air defences when confronted with aggression from a numerically superior force. The issue was clearly raised in the context of the ongoing attempted invasion of Ukraine by Russia, but, for several reasons, I will not address the specifics of that conflict. Firstly, the situation is too fluid. Secondly, any discussion of ongoing operations without detailed knowledge of the dispositions and capabilities of respective forces would be foolish. And thirdly, any such discussion, with such knowledge, would risk breaching operational security and relevant security laws.

In my case, I don’t have the detailed knowledge required, and I don’t wish to inadvertently contribute to the ongoing information warfare around the Russia-Ukraine situation.

However, the question can still be considered in the abstract, but using real-world examples to illustrate the possible courses of action, and this piece will consider broader aspects than just air defence. I have identified five distinct possibilities, which I will identify as:

1. The Stand-alone model
2. The Strong Alliance model
3. The Weak Alliance model
4. The Non-military Deterrence model; and
5. The Hunker Down, Endure and Resist model

This article will provide an insight into the realities of these models, or more accurately, those realities as I perceive them. Along the way, I expect to upset pretty much everyone, and just in case I haven’t, I might also end this piece by considering Great Power approaches to Defence.

The Stand-alone Model

The model here is essentially derived, and extended from, the air defence of Great Britain, in the period from June 1940 – the retreat from Dunkirk, to December 1941, the entry of the USA into World War II.

In this period, the RAF faced a numerically superior Luftwaffe, with broadly similar technical capabilities. A mix of aircraft was available to the RAF, with a greater number of Hurricanes than Spitfires, and these faced a mix of bomber aircraft, and Messerschmitt 109 and 110 fighters and bomber escorts. Again, in general terms, the Spitfires were a match to the Bf 109s, and the Hurricanes could deal with the bombers and the Messerschmitt 110s.

The critical needs, for the out-numbered British, was to prevent invasion by retaining air superiority, while husbanding their resources of aircraft and pilots. The following precepts of the stand-alone air defence model reflect this:

1. Launch your aircraft only when you need to;
2. Alert your aircraft so that they can be positioned to meet the threat, preferably at a tactically advantageous altitude;
3. Seek to match aircraft against threats they can deal with – in our exemplar, Spitfires against fighters and Hurricanes against bombers;
4. Where possible recover and repair damaged aircraft, and rescue and return pilots to the fight.

The combined use of radar, ground observers, and telephone and radio reports enabled all this. Critically, information on enemy raids and RAF responses was brought together as time-stamped tracks in Fighter Control Centres, enabling a real-time appreciation to be gained of the ongoing air picture. This in turn allowed commanders to position fighters to respond directly to specific raids, as well as providing coordination with other assets such as ground-based anti-aircraft defences. This avoided wasted effort in random patrolling, and conserved airframes, engines and pilots, reserving these precious resources for air combat.

Today, we might refer to this approach as an integrated air Defence system, and we would add other components if possible. In particular, ground-based radars would be supplemented by Airborne Early Warning and Control systems; communications would be shared in real-time between AEW assets, fighters and ground systems using secure datalinks; and our fighter aircraft would carry a mix of long-range radar-guided missiles and shorter-range imaging infra-red weapons. In addition, and if possible, we would disperse our aircraft to hidden hardened positions, and, if possible, provide support for refuelling, re-arming and servicing in those hardened locations.

As an example of such an approach today, Sweden operates this type of integrated air defence system, using the relatively small and agile Gripen fighter, out-ranging potential adversaries with the Meteor Missile, and using the IRIS-T for any within visual range engagements. Independently developed technical solutions are available for AEW systems and ground-based radars, datalinks, and electronic combat systems, and this is important because reliance on third-party support systems in time of ongoing combat is never a good look. This approach is carried across into other branches of the Defence Forces, reducing external dependencies wherever possible.

The UK used to aspire to this capability, and, in an architectural sense, still achieves this for air defence. However, it does not have the same degree of self-sufficiency in the air domain as Sweden, or, perhaps France, and has not for many years. Almost all equipment is either co-produced across a number of Nations or sourced from overseas, including critical capabilities such as AEW&C, fighter and strike aircraft, and many other sensors and systems.

The Strong Alliance Model

Strong alliances are often cited as of great importance by the weaker parties in such alliances. Truly strong alliances, which are regarded as important by the stronger party, and where resources are committed and, perhaps, bloodshed for others, are, in my view, rather rare. But examples do exist. I suggest the relationship between the United States and Israel is such an alliance, even though it shares some asymmetric features which appear to be somewhat common to the other strong alliances I can identify, those between the US and several Pacific Nations, but excluding Taiwan.

What does the US get out of the relationship with Israel? An ability to shape affairs in the Middle East through a surrogate Nation representing democracy and a ‘rules-based’ order. Well, also having influence and presence in a region which has been a critical source of oil resources. The US also enjoys certain secondary advantages in domestic politics; Israel gets equipment, technology and a partner that appears willingly unquestioning about the treatment of Palestinians. So, it is not simply a military relationship, it is also deeply political.

But there is no doubt, that if you can swing it, being able to share in US technology, to be re-equipped in time of tension, to receive (some) US Intelligence products and so on is a great way of bolstering your defences if you are feeling edgy about your neighbours, and if you can position yourself as much more acceptable to the US than they are.

The US alliances in the Pacific are interesting. Essentially, they all follow the same model, and provide mutual Defence guarantees between the US and Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and Korea intended to ensure that should any of those Nations be attacked, the US will provide defence assistance, and should the US be attacked, the other parties would do their best to assist.

The price for this is the right for the US to maintain US defence facilities in those nations. There are clear benefits to the US in so doing, as this enables them to maintain a Defence presence and logistic chain across and around the Pacific, and there are significant benefits to the participating Nations, not just in the mutual Defence provisions, but also (at the time of their agreement) a greater sense of security from possible future Japanese expansionism.

Fast forward to today, and the concerns are about Chinese expansionism, the South China Sea and Taiwan. I have identified this as a strong alliance, but the recent Trumpist adventure in the US, combined with a historical reluctance from Democrat governments to get embroiled in foreign conflicts, is perhaps now causing some countries to question the willingness of the US to come to the party should aggression occur.

In a strong alliance model, the defence approach is essential to maintain enough capability, through your own assets, and your ally, assuming they have an ongoing Defence presence, to first deter, and then hold off any aggression until the US (or other strong ally) appears over the horizon with defence support. Would this work? Well, it has for Israel, but these relationships have not been tested in the Pacific.

The Weak Alliance Model

Continuing my theme of upsetting everyone, we will start with Taiwan. Taiwan used to be recognised as China by the US, but world realities have now changed, and the US recognised the People’s Republic of China, and has its diplomatic representation in Beijing. Along with this, it has abandoned the notion of ‘Two Chinas’, and maintains a deliberate diplomatic state of ambiguity regarding Taiwan. In reading this, readers should note the Chinese position that Taiwan remains a PRC province, albeit a recalcitrant one.

This certainly precludes the type of mutual defence agreement in place with other Pacific nations, but does not preclude the US from being the principal source of Defence materiel for Taiwan. Despite edginess regarding China’s stated intention to integrate Taiwan fully within the PRC, and despite assurances of support, provision of military equipment, and so on, there is no way this could be considered anything other than a weak alliance.

How do you defend Taiwan against the PRC, should they wish to fully integrate Taiwan into China? In my view, you have three assets, two of which are rather weak. The first resembles that of Britain in the stand-alone phase of the Second World War. As an island, defence against invasion must be a priority. Surface and sub-surface naval forces and coastal defences, supplemented by well-integrated Air Defence systems to deter, and prevent, or delay for as long as possible, airborne assault. And then hope for assistance from your friends – the US, and their friends, as the US would certainly look to Australia (who would actually have little to offer). You would also be looking, probably in vain, for assistance from the UN. Which would not be forthcoming, as China and Russia would veto any Resolutions calling for action to support Taiwan.

My second weak alliance is NATO. Current events are showing the impotence of NATO in taking meaningful action outside the boundaries of its member Nations. Partly, this is because the mutual defence provisions of NATO do not extend to the defence of non-NATO Nations. But partly, there is also a recognition that should NATO get involved, for example in seeking to enforce a no-fly zone, or even to try to stabilize an evacuation route for civilians, such acts would be interpreted as hostile by Russia.

This would then lead to a situation not unlike the First World War, where alliances between smaller Nations and the Great Powers transformed a regional conflict into a World-wide War. Suppose NATO, or possibly a single NATO member country, assists Ukraine – Russia is likely to declare this a hostile act and perhaps conduct a strike against one NATO country – then the whole of NATO, including the US, may be drawn in by mutual Defence provisions in Article 5 of the NATO Charter – and the apocalypse awaits.

In practice, any participation by the US would be dependent on Congressional approval and is thus not automatic. In addition, while an attack on one NATO member is considered an attack on them all, each member has the right to decide on its own course of action in response. While these provisions are appropriate, they do weaken the alliance somewhat, as the scale and scope of a NATO response is indeterminate and dependent on each Nation’s view of the situation.

A third weakened alliance is the position in which the UK now finds itself. Decades of collaborative defence programmes with EU countries, and a strong contribution to NATO, have encouraged a mutually cooperative approach, where UK defence capabilities are strongly dependent on systems and support coming from the US and across Europe, and the once strong UK defence industry is but a partner in major projects, rather than the lead.

However, Brexit has undoubtedly complicated both relationships and supply chains. I don’t propose to press this point further, because any crisis involving NATO would undoubtedly draw on the strong defence bonds between NATO countries.

Britain does have advantages and advanced capabilities in intelligence, and through those capabilities, is likely to have better access to US intelligence assets than most. It also has highly professional armed forces, although these have been under tight budgetary constraints for many years. I do wonder what freedom of action remains for the UK operating outside of a NATO or US-led coalition.

Defence in these circumstances? Start with Diplomacy. Maintain old friendships. Cultivate new ones. Deter, delay, obstruct and confuse. If conflict erupts, do the best you can with what you have, and seek support from your allies.

The Non-military Deterrence model

This is a very successful strategy, employed by two Nations, Switzerland, and the Cayman Islands.

It may be otherwise expressed as “Don’t touch us – we’ve got your money”.

The Hunker Down, Endure and Resist Model

This is an unpalatable option of last resort. But if you are unable to successfully counter foreign invasion, it is a proven strategy whereby even the most powerful Nations can eventually be persuaded to go away, through a mix of passive and active resistance.

Successful examples include Afghanistan, which has repeatedly forced the British to withdraw. And the Russians. And the Americans, complete with a large ‘coalition of the willing’.

This approach has also been successfully employed in Vietnam and in Iraq.

The US, Russia and China

The recent rapprochement between Russia and China has created a new dynamic.

The US approach of setting up alliances across strategic areas of interest, so that should conflict erupt, it will at least not touch on the US homeland, has been remarkably successful, but paradoxically is leading to a sense of disconnection and isolation. After all, if all military adventures are foreign adventures, why are we risking our boys’ lives?

Russia now appears to be entering on the full Resurgent Russia scenario, with the added bonus of having secured its South-Eastern boundary with China. Should the Ukraine adventure succeed, there is the possibility that Russia would then look to many of the states that were formerly part of the USSR. However, most of these are now NATO members. Recent events are likely to have greatly stiffened NATO resolve. They may be impotent in Ukraine, but any attack on a NATO state is likely to bring a rapid response. One can only hope that there would be no conflict, and no use of nuclear capabilities.

China is biding its time. When the dust settles on Ukraine, and perhaps particularly if tension keeps the focus on Europe for a bit, a move on Taiwan, and on the disputed areas of the South China Sea can be expected. The technical capability of Chinese forces is rising extremely rapidly, and China will be watching the US closely over the next decade.

China is also pursuing its Belt and Road initiative, a mechanism for strengthening commercial, diplomatic and industrial ties with many Nations, not just in the Pacific.

What about Australia?

As I am writing this in Australia, I should not miss the opportunity to cast doubt on the current Australian position. In the approach to an election, the least competent Australian administration in decades is playing the National Security card in an attempt to impress its electoral base. The focus will be to further constrain migration from unacceptable countries (those with non-white skins, because they might be terrorists), and to continue the process of offending our largest trading partner, China.

The AUKUS partnership around the provision of nuclear submarines to Australia is at least 20 years too late to have the desired effect, which is presumably to make China pay attention to Australia as a possible threat. Had AUKUS been implemented 20 years ago, such submarines might just about be in Service. But implemented now, the probable result will be a Chinese attempt to further damage the Australian economy over the next 20 years, by seeking alternate sources for its iron ore and coal.

From a Chinese perspective, with a bit of luck, ongoing climate change, and the loss of resources from a one-horse economy, will then ensure the Australian Defence force remains an insignificant player on the world stage.

The Australian Government, however, imagines AUKUS as an enduring means of strengthening ties with the US and the UK, perhaps not noticing that when Australia has lost markets in China, they have generally been replaced as suppliers by the US.

– Jim Smith

The best fighter of the Second World War started life as an insurance policy. In late 1940 Grumman was asked to develop an upgrade of the F4-F Wildcat with a 1600hp Twin Cyclone engine as an interim measure due to ‘issues’ with Vought’s XF4U-1 that would require considerable work to resolve. Instead, Bob Hall proposed a new design using knowledge gained from talking to pilots who had fought in the Battle of Britain. This would become the F6F Hellcat, or Gannet if you’re in the niche of Fleet Air Arm pilots to fly it before the beginning of 1944 when sanity prevailed. The USN gave approval for work to start on 30 June 1941, the first prototype flew just under a year later with a 1600hp Wright Cyclone, the first aircraft equipped with a 2000hp Pratt & Whitney Double Wasp flew a month later and demonstrated a 30mph speed advantage over a recently captured Mitsubishi Zero. The first production F6F-3 flew in October of 1942 with deliveries commencing shortly afterwards. In the next two years, 11,000 of a final total of 12,275 Hellcats were built by Grumman’s Bethpage factory. [1] As an indication of quite how right the Hellcat’s design was there were only two production versions, the -3 and the -5 which featured another 200hp, a flat windscreen integrating the armoured glass, and a few other minor modifications. In fact, only two airframes seem to have not been built as -3 or -5s. Which makes Supermarine look like they didn’t know what they were doing with their twenty-odd attempts at getting the Spitfire ‘right’.

As a fighter the Hellcat’s main opponent was the aforementioned Zero, against which it was faster, better armed, and better armoured. The majority of Hellcats had six 0.50 calibre machine guns with 400 rounds per gun providing a balance of bullet mass with rate of fire. A more elegant solution than the mix of small calibre guns and large calibre cannon used by many European fighters it also had the advantage of simplifying the logistics tail. This is an important consideration for any aircraft, but especially one that’s going to be operating half a world away while being supplied by a chain of ships. The six guns allowed the Hellcat to achieve a borderline terrifying kill rate against aircraft of the Japanese Navy and Army with claims as high as 13:1 against the Mitsubishi Zero. Nor did it fair badly in the European theatre shooting down two Me-109s, two He-115, and an FW-190 for one loss with the FAA while the USN’s Hellcats also managed to shoot down three He-111s, three Ju-52, a Ju-88, and a Do-217 during the invasion of Southern France. In the latter case while operating off tiny Escort Carriers and calling fall of shot for naval gunfire. [2] A further 5215 aircraft fell to the Hellcat in the Indian and Pacific theatres.

In addition to operating as a fighter the -5 Hellcats could carry six 5” rockets or up to 4000lb of bombs enabling it to carry out attack operations, with an equivalent payload to the Curtiss Helldiver making the latter somewhat redundant. Which was probably a relief to the Helldiver crews. Both Marks of Hellcat also saw service as Night Fighters fitted with the AN/APS-4 or -6 radar in a pod on the starboard outer wing. A reconnaissance version of the F6F-5 was produced by the simple expedient of placing windows on the port and starboard sides of the fuselage just aft of the wing root. If that’s not multi-role enough for you the East Indies Fleet also used Hellcats in a mine-hunting role off Penang. Aircraft being directed by their carrier’s fighter controllers to conduct visual sweeps of set areas. [3] Try doing that in a Bf 109 or, well pretty much anything with an inline engine if you want to actually see the mines.

Grumman’s factory gained a reputation as the ‘Ironworks’ due to the strength of its aircraft. In an attempt to demonstrate why this moniker was deserved an F6F-5P of VF-8 flying from the Bunker Hill carrier was tasked to obtain photos of a headquarters and training base in the Marianas Islands. After being hit by radar laid anti-aircraft fire at 4000’ the Hellcat was missing rudder trim and the port stabiliser and elevator. Ignoring these minor flesh wounds, the pilot, Lt Edward ‘Whitey’ Feightner, flew down the bases’ runway at low-level to get photos of the guns that had just hit him. Taking umbrage, they managed to hit his aircraft in the port wing as he was making his egress. After the smoke, flames, and a small explosion cleared our intrepid aviator discovered his port wing was missing from the wing fold outwards aft of the main spar. The Hellcat was still controllable though if the speed was kept between 90 and 105kts. With the Bunker Hill visible about 40 miles ahead and with nothing better to do he headed towards it. Although the port main gear was, understandably, absent the rest of the undercarriage was available and after being given the option to land on ‘Whitey’ took it, mindful of the hard-earned photo-intelligence he’d acquired. Not only was no further damage incurred during the landing but the aircraft itself was repaired and within 10 days was back on the flight schedule. [4] Try doing that in a P-51.

Importantly for a naval fighter the Hellcat was relatively easy to land on a carrier. This was due to the large wing, which allowed it to outturn a Bf-109, and the well-placed cockpit raised up above the fuselage fuel tank. Which explains its much better landing accident record than say the Corsair or Seafire which helpfully had the pilot so far back he was unable to see the ship on finals. As an illustration during Operation ICEBERG II off the island of Sakishima Gun to the carriers of the British Pacific Fleet lost 7% of their original allocation of Hellcats to landing accidents, versus 21% of the Corsairs, and a trifling 70% of the Seafires. [5] It probably helped that Grumman designed the big cat to be literally dropped onto the deck from 20’. General competence at landing may not be the kind of thing that gets the pulse racing, but to be a great fighter it’s useful if you can make more than a handful of sorties before being written off. It’s also worth pointing out that although the similarly engined Corsair is frequently cited as being faster than the Hellcat by around 20 knots when Grumman were loaned one of Vought’s aircraft to study this turned-out not to be the case. Test pilot Corky Meyer flew multiple runs in formation with the Corsair, both aircraft using the same engine settings. Above 5000’ they were broadly stabilised against each other and maintained formation. The Corsair however indicated it was going 20 knots faster. After a bit of work on the pitot static system so did the Hellcat. [6]

When it comes to the point of a fighter, shooting down enemy aircraft, the Hellcat was clearly superior to the Corsair with 5223 kills to 2140. Some may claim the Spitfire as the highest-scoring Allied fighter of WW2, but then they built 20000 odd of them in a desperate attempt to stay relevant. In fact, the Hellcat scored 0.42 kills per airframe built while the Spitfire only managed 0.31 less than the oft-forgot Hurricane.

Aircraft Built-Kills Ratio

Hellcats then were more likely to have shot something down, better at surviving damage, better at landing, and more versatile than any other fighter of WW2. At the same time this was all achieved with only two basic Marks all of which were built in one factory. Like all great performers, Grumman also knew to leave them wanting more so as the war drew to a close so did Hellcat production

[1] Aeroplane Database – Grumman F6F Hellcat, Thomas Cleaver, Aeroplane Dec 2021
[2] “When Hellcats Took the Fight to the Luftwaffe.” Historynet – Accessed 2/28/2022. https://www.historynet.com/when-hellcats-took-the-fight-to-the-luftwaffe/
[3] WO 203/4782, Report of Proceedings – Operation Livery, The National Archives, 1945
[4] Wings of Gold, R Adm Feightner, Summer 2005
[5] The Forgotten Fleet, John Winton, 1969
[6] Hellcat vs Corsair, Corky Meyer, Flight Journal, Annual 2020

Bing Chandler is a former Lynx Observer and current Wildcat Air Safety Officer. He has a Red Bubble store riddled with aircraft. It will shortly include a Hellcat once the tricky colouring-in stage is finished.

The Spitfire was the greatest fighter of the Second World War, and indeed ever.

By Edward Rippeth

The case is simple. It was born a winner back in 1936, and kept winning, even when all else was going wrong, and winning and winning. Dunkirk, Battle of Britain, Malta, North Africa, Australia, Burma, Sicily, Italy, Normandy, the crumbling Reich, even the final days over Japan, all ended up with the Spitfire triumphant.

At Dunkirk, with Britain facing absolute disaster, Spitfires were deployed in significant numbers for the first time. Despite facing the greatest air force ever seen at that time, hell-bent on destroying our army, navy (and our pleasure cruisers), Spitfires faced them down and shot them down, doing enough to enable the ‘miracle’ of evacuating 338,000 men – in the hands of legends like Al Deere, Bob Stanford Tuck and Sailor Malan.

Just around the corner was the Battle of Britain. Yes, there was radar, and yes, there were Hurricanes, but when the Luftwaffe wondered what was going wrong, Spitfires were uppermost in their thoughts. Yes, Hurricanes were more numerous and shot down more planes, but it was the Spitfire they really feared – because it abused the Luftwaffe pilot’s sense of entitlement, knocked them off their perch, and showed they could be beaten. It led to Spitfire snobbery with pilots refusing to accept the lesser Hurricane had shot them down, and sparked a trend for massive overclaiming of Spitfires by Luftwaffe pilots – by a factor of four or five in the first three years of the war. In the greatest and most consequential air battle of all time, the Spitfire was the star.

The flipside, of course, was that when the Spitfire wasn’t there, Britain tended to lose. France, Greece, Crete, Malaya, Singapore, Burma, the early desert campaign – all bravely contested by Hurricanes, Gladiators, P-40s, not to mention Brewster Buffalos, Blochs, Moranes, Curtiss Hawks etc etc. One disaster after another as the Bf 109s, Zeros and Oscars reigned supreme. It needed a very special fighter to turn this around. And that fighter was the Spitfire, brilliantly in Malta, then North Africa, then even in Burma. After two years of hideous beatings at the hands of an apparently invincible Japanese foe, General Slim worked out the tactics of victory involved his troops standing fast during encirclement, and airdrops. The only problem being that the Japanese still dominated the skies, with Nakajima Oscars running circles around the RAF’s Hurricanes and Buffaloes. Two newly introduced squadrons of the new Mark VIIIs and several Mark Vs took just three days to maul and remove the IJA from the skies during the battle of the Admin Box. Victory followed as Dakotas were able to make their supply drops unhindered. The course of the war in the East was irrevocably turned.

Ah, but it didn’t get as many kills as the P-51 Mustang or the Hellcat? Actually, it did. It’s just nobody counted them – until now. But it was too short-ranged? Indeed it was, for a fighter escort. But range and big fuel capacity was of no use in times of enemy air superiority – it needed to be up to altitude, manoeuvrable and fast, which is why it was the only fighter in the world in 1942 which could have saved Malta. But the Focke-Wulf Fw1 90 was better? For several months yes it was, but along came the Spitfire IX and the Spitfire was back on top, and thereafter it was a fully competitive front-line fighter until the war’s end. The constant ability to develop the Spitfire’s airframe and upgrade with more powerful versions of the Merlin engine and ultimately the Griffon through the war meant the last aces of the war in Europe, such as Ian Ponsford (who scored six kills in the last eleven days of April 1945), were piloting the superb Mark XIV.

But it wasn’t very good at ground attack? The Spitfire did a decent and underrated job, but that’s not the main point of a fighter.

But the Seafire? Certainly, it had a lot of problems landing on heaving decks with the narrow and fragile undercarriage, but it was able to get among kamikazes like no other aircraft, and ended up grabbing seven kills in the last dogfight of the war on August 15^th – and if the war had gone on, it had the performance to take on Japan’s superb new fighters for home defence, the Ki-84 and Ki-100, which had notably roughed up a squadron of Hellcats in one of its encounters. And of course the Seafire would be developed into the Seafire Mk 47, one of the fastest piston-engined fighters of all time which served off aircraft carriers until the late 1950s.

It didn’t just look the part – it looked beautiful. It captured people’s imagination. It even captured the Luftwaffe’s imaginations. It made Adolf Galland green with envy. And it won the war. That’s why the Spitfire is the greatest fighter of World War 2.

Edward Rippet

Head of Primary Publishing, International schools
Cambridge University Press

In the first of a series of articles presenting cases for the best fighter aircraft of World War II, we start with Jim Smith’s case for the Messerchmitt Bf 109. Let us know your thoughts in the comments section below.

The Messerschmitt Bf 109 was the greatest fighter of the Second World War.

A simple, bold statement, which many will question, based on their knowledge that other aircraft, in particular variants, were superior to particular variants of the Bf 109.

Nevertheless, if we look at the big picture, of duration in service, of numbers built, and of victories claimed, there can be little doubt that the Bf 109 deserves this accolade.

Firstly, the aircraft design ensured its initial success and immediate superiority. Messerschmitt combined all the available technologies of 1934 to design a stressed-skin, retractable undercarriage fighter with the smallest and lightest possible airframe, around the most powerful available engine. Sharing many of these features with its great rival, the Spitfire, Messerschmitt took advantage of wing leading edge slots, and slotted flaps to reduce wing size without compromising landing speed and controllability at low speeds.

The aircraft enjoyed an initial operational period of superiority over all its competitors, with no match in combat in Spain, or in the initial campaigns of the Second World War in Poland and in France, where its superiority over the Hurricane was evident. Air combat with its British match, the Spitfire, did not occur until May 1940, during the evacuation of Dunkirk.

Contemporary comparisons of the Bf 109E with the Mk 1 Spitfire showed these aircraft to be closely competitive in air combat, with the Spitfire offering greater manoeuvrability due to its lower wing loading, and the Messerschmitt slightly higher speed, a higher climb rate up to 20,000 ft, and the ability to disengage from air combat at will by diving away, thanks to its fuel-injected engine.

Secondly, continuous development kept the Bf 109 competitive with its opponents in the Western Theatre, and superior to its opposition in North Africa, and on the Eastern Front, at least until late in the war. Naturally, both the Spitfire and Messerschmitt were rapidly developed, each in an effort to out-perform their dangerous opponent, and this competitive development resulted in the Spitfire V, with two-stage supercharging, and cannon armament, appearing in 1941. The Bf 109 received extensive aerodynamic refinements and engine development, resulting in the Bf 109F, which came into service at about the same time as the Spitfire V.

Significant improvements to the Bf 109F included refinements to its cooling system, lowering drag, and improvements to flaps, slats and ailerons. The armament was revised to remove the wing-mounted cannon in favour of an engine mounted 20 mm cannon, and two fuselage-mounted 7.9mm machine guns. These changes improved both the manoeuvrability and climb rate of the aircraft, and later models incorporated Nitrous Oxide injection to increase power, and a variety of armament modifications.

The opening of hostilities against the Soviet Union in June 1941 involved large numbers of Bf 109E and Bf 109F aircraft, and resulted in very high numbers of kills of Soviet aircraft. Soviet losses by midday on the second day of the Operation Barbarossa campaign amounted to 1200 aircraft, of which slightly more than 800 were destroyed on the ground. The campaign on the Eastern Front presented the opportunity for experienced fighter pilots, flying the Bf 109 in conditions of air superiority against relatively poorly equipped and trained opposition, to score enormous numbers of kills.

This constitutes the third element in the case for the Bf 109 being the greatest fighter of the Second World War, and is illustrated by some compelling statistics. The top 3 fighter pilots of WW2, all flying Bf 109s on the Eastern Front, claimed a total of 928 victories, 352 falling to Erich Hartmann, 301 to Gerhard Barkhorn, and 275 to Günter Rall. In North Africa, Hans-Joachim Marseille accounted for 158 allied aircraft, and no less than 105 Bf 109 pilots claimed more than 100 aircraft kills.

Development of the Bf 109 continued, with the more powerful, heavier and faster Bf 109G, powered by the Daimler-Benz DB 605 engine. The Bf 109G was substantially heavier than earlier models, though, and the increased weight did impact on stability and control, handling qualities and manoeuvrability. Nonetheless, the Bf 109G became the most produced version of the aircraft and, when it entered service in April 1942, was superior to the Spitfire V, particularly when using Nitrous-oxide (GM-1) boost, which was fitted as standard.

While gradually supplemented, by the FW 190 in the West, large numbers of Bf 109G continued to serve on the Eastern and other fronts, and, from mid-1943, increasing use was made of the type as a reconnaissance aircraft, for ground attack, and as a night fighter.

Appearance of the Bf 109F and G, coupled with the entry to service of the Focke-Wulf 190, added urgency to the development of the Spitfire Mk IX, powered by the two-speed, two-stage supercharged Merlin 60, and this aircraft became operational with the RAF in July 1942.

The advent of the Spitfire IX, and from 1944, the P-51 Mustang, Griffon-powered Spitfire variants, and, in the East, the Lavochkin La-7 and Yak-3, placed the Bf 109 in a difficult position. Nevertheless, large numbers of aircraft continued to serve with the Luftwaffe, with the focus of their operations gradually shifting towards homeland defence as Allied forces advanced, following their successes in North Africa, in the invasion of France and Italy, and Soviet advances on the Eastern Front.

The final few months of the war essentially left the Luftwaffe in a defensive situation, with the Messerschmitt 109 now lacking performance against the best of the Allied fighters, and advanced aircraft like the Messerschmitt 262 only available in small numbers. All of the available fighters, principally Bf 109s and Focke-Wulf Fw 190s, were badly affected by logistical issues, particularly shortages of fuel and spare parts.

The fourth and final element of the case for the Bf 109 being the greatest fighter of the Second World War rests simply on the number built and its longevity in service. With continuous development from design initiation in 1934, through innumerable variations up to the end of the conflict in Europe, and beyond, the Bf 109 demonstrated both adaptability and longevity. Post-war variants came from Czechoslovakia with the Avia S-99 and developments, and from Spain, where the Hispano HA 1109 and ultimately the HA 1112 Buchon remained operational up to the end of 1965.

A total of 33,984 Messerschmitt Bf 109 were built, with additional production of about 600 Avia S-99/199 aircraft in Czechoslovakia, and a further 200 or so Hispano 1112 aircraft in Spain.  Nearly 14,000 Bf 109G were manufactured in 1944 alone, and overall, Bf 109 production amounted to about a quarter of all aircraft built for the Luftwaffe. By comparison, production of the Spitfire, which also occurred throughout the conflict, amounted to 22,759 airframes.

The Bf 109 was the greatest fighter of the Second World War because:

• Its advanced design resulted in periods of superiority over its opponents, particularly for early variants in the Spanish Civil War, and for the Bf 109E, which was superior to all opposition up to May 1940, from which time the Spitfire 1 achieved broad parity with the Bf 109E;
• The aerodynamic and engine improvements introduced with the Bf 109F gave that aircraft superiority over the Spitfire V, over Allied fighters in the early part of the North Africa campaign, and over Soviet aircraft in the first year of the campaign on the Eastern Front;
• The number of victories claimed by Bf 109 pilots far exceeds the numbers achieved by pilots of any other aircraft, largely due to the superiority enjoyed by Luftwaffe pilots over Soviet aircraft and pilots on the Eastern Front, but also due to the aircraft’s successes in other Theatres;
• The number of aircraft produced and fielded exceeded that of all other military aircraft, with the exception of the Ilyushin Il 2 armoured attack aircraft. The Bf 109, like the Spitfire, was manufactured from before WW2 through to the end of hostilities and beyond. The final related version, the Merlin-engined Buchon, first flew in 1954, and was operational until the end of 1965, 30 years after the prototype Bf 109’s first flight.

Sources:

Warplanes of the Third Reich, William Green, 1970

Warplanes of the Second World War – Fighters Vol 1 & 2, William Green, 1960

Wings of Fame Volume 4: Messerschmitt Bf 109 early variants, David Donald, 1996

Wings of Fame Volume 11: Messerschmitt Bf 109: the later variants, David Donald, 1998

Wikipedia