Despite world-class aircraft designers, Italian fighter aircraft in the early part of World War II were stymied by weedy engines and a lack of serious firepower. The introduction of German engines and cannon to these transformed these mediocrities into some of the best fighter aircraft in the world, we spoke to author Marco Mattioli to find out more.

What was the C.200 and what were its strengths and weaknesses?

The Macchi C.200 Saetta (thunderbolt or arrow) was the best Italian fighter at the time in June 1940, the time Italy’s entered the War. Like most Italian aeroplanes, it was a delight to fly and was extremely manoeuvrable. Unfortunately, it didn’t win the favour of Italian fighter pilots. Most of the pilots were strongly conservative and used to open cockpits – and didn’t like the 200’s new-fangled enclosed cockpit with its sliding hood (they feared being trapped inside in the event of an emergency). Thus the subsequent variants of the C.200, in something of a retrograde step, were fitted with an open cockpit. The pilots still preferred to fly the more aerobatic Fiat CR.32 and CR.42 biplanes, despite them being far slower than the modern enemy monoplanes they would likely encounter in combat. The pilots were not entirely irrational in their distrust of the new machine as the Saetta had a dangerous quirk: a tendency to stall. If the aircraft stalled at high altitude and had an expert test pilot at its controls, it could recover with apparent ease. But, at low-level with a beginner at the controls, the aircraft was a deathtrap. Sadly, low-level stalls did kill several pilots. A solution was found by the chief designer of SAI Ambrosini firm, engineer Sergio Stefanutti with the assistance of test pilot Adriano Mantelli. The C.200 wing section was redesigned, replacing its former constant profile with a variable one. The wings’ sharp leading edges (in the centre) and wingtips were rounded off, gluing to them balsa wood strips, then shaped and covered with canvas.

The Saetta’s main strength was its excellent manoeuvrability. Its two main weaknesses: it was poorly armed (just two cowling-mounted 12.7 mm Breda-SAFAT machine-guns) and underpowered. Its Fiat radial engine limited maximum speed to only 312 mph.

• How did it fare against Allied fighters?

Until the C.200s had to face the Gloster Gladiator biplanes over Malta, they had a degree of success. The biplane Gladiators, when flown by expert pilots, could seriously challenge C.200s. On paper, the C.200s had the advantage of speed, but the Gladiators were extremely manoeuvrable opponents that were dangerous to underestimate. Over Malta, there was one inconclusive dogfight on 11 June 1940. The Saetta pilot managed to drive his Gloster opponent away from the Italian bombers and one C.200 shot down (pilot becoming a PoW) by a Gladiator flown by Flt Lt Burges on 23 June 1940 (this C.200, being faster than the biplane, had overshot it, and the British pilot could shoot it down). 

Over Greece, C.200s from 153° Gruppo met Gladiators from No 112 Sqn twice in the air: the first combat, on 22 March 1941, was inconclusive but for a No 80 Sqn Gladiator II set ablaze on the ground by the Macchis. Instead in the second action (26 March) the C.200s badly damaged one Gladiator (flown by Plt Off Neville Bowker) in the air and destroyed another from No 112 Sqn on the ground. Finally, on 14 April 1941, C.200s from 153° Gruppo clashed inconclusively with nine Greek Gladiators from the 21 Mira. To my knowledge, the Gloster Gladiators met over Malta were the first fighter opponents ever faced by the MC.200s

The going got tougher when Hawker Hurricane fighters arrived in-theatre. After that, performance parity, it was now purely the skill of the pilot that decided a dogfight’s outcome; when fighting the lethal, and far superior, Spitfire VB, the 200 pilots required extremely good luck to survive. In the fighter-bomber role, especially over North Africa and the Eastern Front, it performed well and proved to be a rugged aircraft.

• Why was it re-engined and what other changes were made to it to create the Macchi C.202 Folgore?

The Macchi C.200 was the foundation which led to create the Macchi C.202. Thanks to the Saetta’s manoeuvrability, its fuselage was deemed by Dr Engineer Mario Castoldi as a fair airframe to house the potent German-built Daimler Benz DB 601A-1 inline engine. This power unit was built under licence in Italy as the RA.1000 RC41-I Monsone (Monsoon). Initially, the C.202 was a re-engined C.200, and was 60 mph/96 kph faster (372 mph/599 kph) than the ‘original’ Saetta, thanks to the effective combination of the DB 601 power unit coupled with the streamlined frontal profile of the new Folgore fighter.

• What were the strengths and the weaknesses of the Macchi C.202 Folgore?

The Folgore’s main strengths were a marked increased speed, agility and rugged construction. Its weaknesses were a wingspan (34 ft 8.5 in/10.58 m) that was over two feet shorter than the one featured by the lethal Spitfire Vs and IXs. This detail affected Folgore’s performance at heights exceeding 20,000 feet (6,096 m), the routine starting altitude for much dogfighting. To make matters worse, the C.202’s radio proved to be so unreliable that the pilots decided to rely on hand gestures as a more reliable alternative. Besides, the undercarriages partially lowered due to high-g pullouts, not to mention faulty oxygen systems which plagued aircraft’s early actions. Finally, C.202’s light armament revealed itself really insufficient when facing newer RAF fighters armed with 20 mm cannon and both well-armed and armoured US heavy bombers.  

• How did it compare to the Allied fighters it faced?

Folgores showed a marked superiority over the Tomahawks, Kittyhawks, Hurricane Is/IIs and Fairey Fulmars it faced all over North Africa and Mediterranean theatres. Anyway C.202s found their match with the Spitfire VBs/VCs, although veteran Italian pilots could hold their own when dogfighting with the RAF’s best fighter. As a matter of fact, since the autumn of 1942 Italian fighter groups were more and more confronted stiff opposition from Allied units equipped with Spitfire IXs, P-38 Lightnings and P-40 K/L Warhawks. All these fighter types not only performed equally or better than the Folgores, but were more heavily armed and overwhelming in numbers.

• What was the Macchi C.205 Veltro?

Through 1943, US medium and heavy bombers began to appear in increasingly large formations all over the Italian skies, escorted by potent new fighters. The Macchi C.202’s armament proved to be pitifully insufficient to shoot down these well-armoured and heavily armed intruders. A new powerfully armed fighter was needed. Engineer Mario Castoldi had been working on two such designs since December 1941. One of Castoldi’s designs, the Macchi C.205N Orione (Orion), never materialised made it into operational service due to the degree of redesign it required. But the other project, which combined the outstanding German DB 1475 hp DB 605A-1 (licence-built as RA.1050 RC58 Tifone – Typhoon) inline engine with the MC.200 wing and the MC.202 fuselage, was quickly developed. It was chosen because its upcycled construction, based mainly on C.202’s airframe, allowed a rapid development and service entry. Initially, it was designated C.202bis, before receiving the far better designation of C.205V Veltro (Greyhound). The Serie I Veltros were armed with four Breda-SAFAT machine-guns (two 12.7 mm cowling-mounted with 370 rounds per weapon, and two 7.7 mm others in the wings with 500 rounds each). The Serie III C.205Vs were armed with two cowl-mounted 12.7 mm machine-guns and two German-built 20-mm MG 151 Mauser cannon in the wings (with 250 rounds per gun).

The would-be Serie II, requested from the Fiat firm, never materialised because the Turin company was busy developing the G.55 Centauro fighter.

The decision to employ the proven C.202 airframes allowed Veltros to be delivered to Regia Aeronautica units by October 1942, a mere six months after the type’s maiden flight in April 1942. Brand-new Veltros featured an aerodynamic retractable tailwheel, while C.202s modified into Veltros kept a fixed tailwheel.

What were the strengths and the weaknesses of the Macchi C.205 Veltro?

The C.205V’s strengths had a high top speed of 399 mph, a high rate of climb (it could reach 20,000 ft in 4 minutes and 52 seconds), and the potent armament: which finally enabled the Italian fighter pilots to mete out serious damage to the Allied heavy bombers and their escort fighters. Weaknesses were a slight reduction in manoeuvrability above 20,000 ft – and a paucity of aircraft. Only 177 were examples built. This last fact was due to the devastating raids flown by RAF Bomber Command bombers on industrial targets in Northern Italy from the autumn of 1942 to August 1943. This meant that Fiat firm struggled to even produce a paltry 12 engines per month at its Turin plant. 

• How well did it perform in combat?

The Veltro’s powerful armament finally allowed the Italian fighter pilots to destroy their Allied opponents, both bombers and escort fighters. As matter of fact, due to their reduced number (just 177 were built), frontline Veltros were usually assigned only to the aces and veteran pilots.

• What was the best Italian fighter aircraft of World War II, and why?

For the production number (nearly 1,300), agility and rugged construction the MC.202 Folgore; for its potent armament, despite their limited number, the Reggiane Re.2005 Sagittario (Archer), the MC.205V Veltro and the Fiat G.55 Centauro.

Tell us about your book

As an enthusiast of all things Italian, I am deeply fond of the Macchi C.202/205V fighters. My book examines in detail the operational careers of two of Italy’s best fighter aircraft in World War 2. The failure of engines’ pre-war designs of their own forced the Italians to ask German technology for good inline power units to be fitted on Regia Aeronautica fighters. The reliable DB 601s and DB 605s, coupled with good airframes, materialised the C.202 and the C.205V fighters. These outstanding aircraft allowed the Italian fighter pilots to be a match against the Allied fighters and bombers, prior to be overwhelmed by more potent Allied aircraft, through late 1942 to mid-1943. My text explores the war actions of the Italian Folgores and Veltros alike over several operational theatres as the Mediterranean, Malta, North Africa, the Eastern Front and Italy’s homeland skies. Not to mention C.202s and C.205Vs in foreign service with both Luftwaffe and Croat Air Force in WW2 and the Royal Egyptian Air Force in the First Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49. The narrative is supported also with plenty of period photos and nice colour profiles of these aircraft types, often identifying for each aircraft the pilot who flew it.

What should have I asked you?

I think you should have asked me about the men who flew such machines as well as the episodes which saw them act as protagonists.

Franco Bordoni Bisleri Franco Bordoni-Bisleri (10 January 1913 – 15 September 1975) was an Italian aviator and racing car driver. He is one of the top-scoring aces of the Regia Aeronautica, with 19 air victories. His nickname was “Robur” (strength) and was painted on most of his aircraft and racing cars.

One among them was high scorer 19-kill ace Tenente (Lieutenant) Franco Bordoni Bisleri of 18° Gruppo Caccia who, on 1 November 1942, was leading a four-strong MC.202 patrol over Mersa Matruh. Suddenly the Italians were jumped by a stronger formation of 12 Kittyhawks from No 250 Sqn: in an hectic and wild dogfight which lasted ten minutes, Ten Bordoni and his wingman Sottotenente Roberto Caetani fared well, shooting down two and one P-40s respectively. This outstanding feat earned Bordoni and Caetani being both decorated with the Medaglia d’Argento al Valor Militare (Silver Medal for Military Valour, Italy’s second-ranking award for bravery). For Bordoni that Silver Medal was his third one. Besides, you have to consider that even single aircraft have their own stories, often linked with the lives of the pilots which flew them. Please let me give some instances: the Macchi C.202 coded ’90-8′ of the 90^ Squadriglia (10° Gruppo, 4° Stormo) and serialled MM7906 had an interesting operational career: it was flown by Tenente Virgilio Vanzan to score a shared kill on 12 June 1942, shooting down a Kittyhawk I of No 260 Squadron, flown by Sgt R A Matthews, who baled out successfully. Vanzan’s Macchi was hit by South African anti-aircraft fire minutes later, but the Italian did succeed to make it back to base. On July 16^th MM7906, this time piloted by Sottotenente Renato Baroni, scored a shared P-40 kill in combat against No 250 Sqn; however it was in turn stricken again during this action and forced to belly-land near El Daba. Let’s us pass to another really interesting aircraft, the one serialled MM7712 and coded ’97-2′: it was the mount at whose controls future ace Sottotenente Jacopo Frigerio of 97^ Squadriglia (9° Gruppo, 4° Stormo) on 30 September 1941 scored the first confirmed victory for the C.202 ever. He had downed an ‘Hurri-bomber’ from No 185 Sqn piloted by Plt Off D W Lintern, following an RAF raid over the Sicilian airfield at Comiso. MM7712 was one of the first production Folgores completed by Macchi firm, and had been ferried by Sottotenente Frigerio himself from Lonate Pozzolo to Gorizia. This machine was destined to feature a really long and varied operational career. After being fitted with a camera for reconnaissance role, the aircraft was posted to 54° Stormo, where it was also flown by ten-kill ace Capitano Adriano Visconti. Then it was transferred to 377^ Squadriglia Autonoma at Palermo-Boccadifalco and, coded ‘377-1’, saw action being piloted by five-kill ace Tenente Luigi Torchio. This latter pilot used MM7712 to claim a P-38 kill on 3 February 1943 near Punta Zafferano. However ‘377-1’ was damaged in the same engagement, forcing its pilot to belly-land at Palermo. Also the C.202 coded ‘151-1’ of 20° Gruppo, 51° Stormo and serialled MM9042 it’s worth being mentioned: it was ferried from Macchi firm to Rome-Ciampino on 16 June 1942, then reaching Sicilian Gela airfield on the 24^th. This aircraft was the regular mount of ace Capitano Furio Niclot Doglio, 151^ Squadriglia CO, who was credited with six individual and two shared Spitfire kills over Malta.  On 6 July 1942 Cap Doglio badly damaged the Spitfire flown by ace Sgt George ‘Buzz’ Beurling; but the Canadian pilot was to take his revenge 21 days later, when on 27 July he shot down Macchi MM9042, at whose controls Cap Doglio lost his life. For his distinguished service, the Italian ace posthumously earned the Medaglia d’Oro al Valor Militare (Gold Medal for Military Valour – Italy’s highest award for bravery). And so on, we could continue for tens of individual stories.

What is the greatest myth or misunderstanding of Italian aircraft in World War 2?

Rather than the aircraft itself, it would be more pertinent to speak about the myths and misunderstandings regarding the Italian Air Arm as a whole. The main misunderstanding derived from the remarkable results achieved by Italy in the ’20s and ’30s with world speed and high altitude records, plus long-range individual and formation flights. These amazing performances, coupled with the wars in Libya, Ethiopia, Spain and Albania, which always saw Italy on the apparent winning side, led the world to consider the Royal Italian Air Force as an efficient, combat-proven, potent and innovative air arm. But this was only a dramatic facade, based on an overestimation. The myth would be tragically unravelled by the combat demands of World War II.

An incredible series of wrong evaluations made by Italy’s politics, industrial and military leaderships forced the Italian Armed Forces to wage a war with insufficient armaments against better-equipped adversaries, whose governments had been more far-sighted than Italy’s. And this was to be true for the Royal Italian Air Force too. The Italian pilots were skilled, but had to fight with both underarmed and underpowered machines, that were not a match for their opponents’ aeroplanes. Among the great mistakes Italy made before and after war’s own entry, was the lack of standardization of its armaments: it would have been better to concentrate the war production on few but really efficient designs, like the combat-proven Macchi C.202/205V for the fighters and the S.79, the would-be redoubtable Cant Z.1018 (this latter, due to several delays, never saw action) for the bombers.

Instead, the Italian war industries foolishly chose to scatter their war productions pursuing an excessive number of pointless projects, which also limited the number of spare parts available for the few operationally efficient aircraft types. Unfortunately for the Italians, though they had many although they had plenty of gifted aircraft designers, they lacked real war production leaders (like Lord Beaverbrook in Great Britain), who could centralise all production destined for the war effort. All this, coupled with the fact that Italy was a country poor in raw materials (fact this that not allowed Italian industries producing military craft in quantities sufficient to match Allied war productions) at the very end would result catastrophic. Often the Italians were considered less effective in combat than the Germans, while on the other hand, some Allied pilots admitted that their Italian opponents were brave. As matter of fact, the Italian fighter pilots, as they liked the aerobatic individual duel, often stayed in combat against their Spitfire and Hurricane adversaries. On the contrary, the more pragmatic German Jagdwaffe pilots would prefer to break off and looking for a better advantageous position during the dogfight.  Paradoxically, if there is a myth, it lies on the fact that Italian aviators compensated their technical inferiority with their own boldness and courage.

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ANATOMY OF THE SHIP Hiryū

Anatomy of the Ship – Hiryū

The home-build aircraft carrier enthusiast is relatively poorly served by most publishers however Osprey’s latest in the Anatomy of the Ship series shows that at least someone is listening to this demographic. For those with the requisite hot riveting skills and supply of mild and armoured steel the Hiryū [1] is a noteworthy subject. The fastest carrier in the world at the time she entered service, and one of only two ever completed with the superstructure on the port side of the flight deck, she saw service with the Kido Butai at Pearl Harbour, Ceylon, and Midway with a mix of 64 Zero, Val, and Kate aircraft.

Stefan Draminski has done an incredible job of creating a coherent set of ship’s plans, drawing on original documents from the Yokosuka Naval Arsenal, as well as providing a potted history of Japanese carrier development and the career of Hiryū herself. A recent addition to the series are 3D-renderings of both the whole ship and cross-sections through it, which will assist the novice builder in translating the plans into a full-size vessel. These renderings include recreations of the aircraft allowing the completist to accurately place their air group, either in preparation for a surprise raid on a nearby island chain or in the hangars for maintenance. The author has also provided three-view drawings of the types embarked and a number of colour plates explaining the aircraft identification markings as used by the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) at the time. For those going the extra mile in their build there are detail drawings of flight deck equipment. Covering everything from the design of the tie-down points, to the chakkanshidōtō, ‘landing guidance lights’ system the IJN used in lieu of the rather Amish ‘man with flags’ system employed by the British and American navies.

The 10 Worst Carrier Aircraft here

The only minor blemish in an otherwise excellent book is the scarcity of photographs of the Hiryū herself, however, blame for this should be placed squarely on the US Navy rather than the author.

The Aircraft Carrier Hiryū (Anatomy of the Ship) is recommended for any level of home build aircraft carrier enthusiast and anyone with an interest in Japanese carrier aviation.

[1] Japanese for ‘Flying Dragon’, which is certainly a better name for an aircraft carrier than Vindex or Campania, looking at you Royal Navy.

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Bing Chandler is a former Lynx Observer. He has a BEng in Marine Technology, an MA in Naval History, and is on Level 3 of Duolingo’s Japanese course. Making him the target market for this book. Bing’s writing appears in The Hush-Kit Book of Warplanes.

Air Marshal G A ‘Black’ Robertson flew the most beautiful jet fighter even flown (outside of the Sea Hawk that is). We met him to find out more about flying the gorgeous Hawker Hunter.

“…a remark I heard a number of times: the engine ate eagles. Not strictly true, of course, but a tribute to the Avon’s strength and reliability.“

What were your first impressions of the Hunter? At last, I thought, here’s a proper aircraft: a camouflaged single-seater with an almost bewildering array of instrumentation – weapons switches too. It’s hard to describe the sense of excitement I felt, strapping into an F6 (XF 526) for my first solo on 8 Nov 67. To put these remarks in context, I was fresh out of training – well, almost. I’d spent the previous five months holding at St Athan, and was privileged to fly five different types, four as captain. But my first operational aircraft was a step beyond all this – a very considerable step too.

Describe the Hunter in 3 words. A pilot’s aircraft.

What was the best thing about the Hunter? Its aesthetic beauty is the obvious answer – a beauty one felt privileged to share.

….and the worst? I’d never say a bad word about the aircraft – even if I could think of one, which I can’t.

What was your unit’s role and how effective was the Hunter at this role? My first and only front-line squadron was 8, a DF/GA unit. For its time – before the advent of precision weapons – the Hunter was more effective than any other aircraft in this dual role. That said, the more powerful Lightning could outperform it in some air combat scenarios, and aircraft like the Canberra and Vulcan  could deliver a heavier weapon load. It could be argued that the Hunter was the first multi-role fighter.

Many people love the aircraft’s looks, do you? Its beauty is ageless and its design, for a relatively modern aircraft, is matchless. I’d put only two other aircraft in its class: the SE5A and the Spitfire – arguably the world’s most beautiful and iconic aircraft. But I never felt the same about the two-seat T7. The widening of the fuselage to accommodate side-by-side seating seemed to me to destroy, certainly in part, the cleanliness of the single-seat design.

Is there a popular myth about the Hunter? The only thing close to this is a remark I heard a number of times: the engine ate eagles. Not strictly true, of course, but a tribute to the Avon’s strength and reliability.

How would you rate it in the following categories

A. Sustained turn
B. Instantaneous turn
C. Acceleration
D. Climb
E. Ergonomics
F. Cockpit comfort

It’s impossible to rate the majority of these categories in absolute terms. To avoid subjectivity one needs a comparator. All I have is the Phantom, and a fading memory. So, other than to say I have no complaints about any of them, I’ll pass on the first four items.

            On ergonomics, it’s often said that the switches in later marks of the aircraft were all over the place – an exaggeration, but it makes the point that cockpit ergonomics could have been better. By way of example, aids such as the radio compass weren’t easy to interpret, tucked away down on the lower right-hand side of the cockpit. But any criticism in this respect must be seen in the light of a design that was progressively improved and updated, not least by the addition of additional equipment, year by year and mark by mark.

            Cockpit comfort was such that one felt very much part of the aeroplane. One could perhaps argue that reaching down to the flap lever during air combat sorties was a bit of a stretch and an exercise in dexterity, but it would be stretching a point to complain about imperfect ergonomics. The HOTAS concept was some years away, of course.

What was your most memorable flight in the Hunter?

It was 7 Feb 1969. Two of us were ferrying refurbished FGA Mk 9s back from the UK to Bahrain. The second leg of the first day was from Hal Far, Malta, to Akrotiri, Cyprus. The last forty minutes of a three-hour trip were completed at night, in and out of massive thunderstorms accompanied by lightning flashes that lit up the entire sky. By the time I was handed over to the final controller for the mandatory radar approach I was more than a little tense. However, my nerves were quickly calmed by the crystal clear tones of a woman’s voice; the very model of professionalism, she guided me down to a safe landing. Rarely had ‘On centre-line, on glidepath,’ sounded so sweet, and rarely had I been so relieved to see runway lights emerge from the gloom. I was eventually reunited with my leader, who’d earlier exercised his prerogative to descend first, ‘to see what it was like’ – a questionable decision given that I was much lower on fuel. What if he’d found conditions difficult? There was little he could do to help. In the end though, a valuable lesson was learned: check sunset time at the destination airfield before departure! Night flying, let alone night formation, hadn’t been part of the plan.

Was the absence of missiles or a serious radar an issue? Not in the DF/GA role in my time. While both might have been nice to have, they would probably have brought penalties (performance?) too. The aircraft had arguably reached the end of its stretch potential when it was retired from operational service.

What other equipment did Hunter pilots long for? While nothing comes to mind, given that even experienced pilots managed to land wheels up, some scraping along on the 230-gallon underwing tanks before lurching airborne again, a (radio altimeter-type) indication that the wheels weren’t down as the aircraft reached a critical height might have proved useful.

Tell me something I don’t know about the Hunter. Sydney Camm was reputedly less than enamoured with the addition of the under-fuselage air brake – it ruined the aesthetics of his elegant design. While he wanted it removed, it was deemed a necessary addition.

What should I have asked you?  Where does the Hunter rank amongst all the aircraft you’ve flown? Apart from a single, memorable hour in a Sea Fury, it’s the aircraft I love best

Where/when and in which service did you fly the Hunter?

No 130 DFGA (Day Fighter/Ground Attack) Course, No 229 OCU, RAF Chivenor; Oct 67-Feb 68.

8 Sqn, RAF Muharraq, Bahrain; Mar 68-Apr 69.

No 101 Short TWU Course, 79 Sqn, RAF Brawdy; Mar-Jul 82.

Former RAF Tornado pilot Michael Napier has written a book about some of the most exciting and intrigueing military air campaigns of the Cold War, we met up with him to find out more.

HK: I know some historians are uncomfortable with the term ‘Cold War’- how do you feel about it? Also, the term ‘crisis*’ relating to post or late colonial warfare? 

I am very comfortable with the term Cold War – I think that it is an apt description of the world order in the ’50s, 60s, 70s and 80s when there was definite hostility between the USSR and Warsaw Pact on one side and the USA and NATO on the other, but the balance of force – both nuclear and conventional – ensured that open conflict never broke out. ‘Crisis’ too is a good description of various relatively short-term events where conflict either nearly or actually occurred.

*Hush-Kit note: Some see ‘crisis’ as a Government approved term to play down military actions, akin to the Russia state using ‘special military operation’ to describe the current attempted invasion of Ukraine. For example, ‘Suez Crisis’ is the British term for what others describe as the Tripartite Aggression

What was the Suez Crisis and which aircraft types were used – and for what roles?

The Suez Crisis was an attempt by the UK and France (colluding with Israel) to use force to seize back the Suez Canal which had been nationalised by the Egyptian government. A short bombing campaign was followed by amphibious landings and parachute assaults on the Canal Zone. Although the Anglo-French forces achieved the military aim, the venture was a politico-strategic failure. The RAF bombing force – Valiants and Canberras – were used to neutralise Egyptian air bases and military targets, supported by British and French carrier-borne aircraft – Wyverns, Sea Hawks, Sea Venoms, TBM Avengers and Corsairs. The carrier aircraft and land-based fighter-bombers – Venoms, Thunderstreaks and Mystères – also bombed and strafed tactical targets in the Canal Zone and provided air support to the amphibious and parachute troops. The Israeli air force operated over Sinai with Mustangs, B-17s, Meteors, Mosquitoes and Ouragans, while the Egyptian air force had Vampires, MiG-15s, Meteors and Il-28s. The Egyptian air force realised early on that it could not win, so it very sensible withdrew its aircraft out of range of the Anglo-French forces to preserve it to be able to fight another day.

Which aircraft performed well and which performed badly in the Suez attacks?

The most surprising thing for me was to learn that the RAF Valiant and Canberra force were still using WW2 bomber tactics, with ‘pathfinders’ dropping Target Indicator flares n the targets and the bomber dropping on the flares. While it had worked to some extent for Lancasters bombing city-sized targets it did not really work against targets like airfields. So I would say that the bombing campaign was a failure. The most successful work was done by the French air force F-84F Thunderstreaks operating from Lod which destroyed 10 Egyptian Il-28s at Luxor. The most interesting aircraft from my perspective was the Wyvern which carried out attacks on coastal targets; unfortunately, it was restricted to operating over coastal areas because of concerns that propeller-driven aircraft would be vulnerable to Egyptian jet fighters. Wyverns from 830 NAS successfully destroyed an Egyptian coast guard barracks which was holding up the advance of paratroops near Port Said, but one aircraft was shot down by groundfire.

What air power lessons could be learned from the Suez campaign?

I think that the main lesson is that for anti-airfield attacks to be successful they must be delivered extremely accurately onto the operating surfaces and that medium-level bombing by heavy bombers and low-level attacks by fighter-bombers without specific-to-role weapons are unlikely to succeed. This lesson had not been learnt during the Falklands conflict. Another lesson was that reconnaissance interpretation equipment needs to be co-located with the aircraft operators if the intelligence is to be used in a timely manner; this was why the French recce effort was more successful than the RAF effort.

What was the Congo Crisis and which aircraft types were used – and for what roles?

The Congo Crisis was precipitated by the province of Katanga attempting to break away from Congo and the efforts of the United Nations to drive a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The Katangese air force (Avikat) comprised DH Doves and Dakotas converted into bombers as well as Fouga Magisters and later Harvards. The UN force included Indian Canberras, Ethiopian, Iranian and Philippine F-86 Sabres and Swedish Saab J-29s.

Which aircraft performed well and which performed badly in the Congo attacks?

The UN J-29s were very successful, as was the single Avikat Magister which ran a short “reign of terror” before the arrival in the country of UN fighters. Perhaps the most disappointing were the F-86s which did not appear to achieve vey much!

What air power lessons could be learned from the Congo Crisis?

The Congo Crisis is fascinating from an air power perspective because it shows firstly how effective airpower is if it is unopposed and secondly how limited it is once it is opposed. Avikat had the run of the country before the UN fighter force arrived, but once the UN fighters were established in Congo, Avikat was completely sidelined from the ground campaign.

What were the Arab-Israeli Wars and which aircraft types were used – and for what roles?

The Arab-Israeli wars were fought in 1967 (the Six-Day War) and 1973 (The October War) as Israel tried to secure its borders and the Egyptians and Syrians attempted to invade and destroy the state of Israel. In 1967, the Israeli air force was mainly equipped with French aircraft such as Mirages, Ouragans, Mystères and Vautors, all of which were employed as fighter-bombers, while in 1973 it had reequipped with American aircraft such as the F-4 Phantom and A-4 Skyhawk. The Egyptian and Syrian air forces flew Soviet aircraft such as MiG-15, MiG-17, MiG-19, MiG-21 and Su-7, while the Iraqi and Jordanian air forces flew the Hunter.

Which aircraft performed well and which performed badly in the Arab-Israeli Wars attacks?

The star of the ’67 War was undoubtedly the Mirage and of the ’73 War the F-4; however, the MiG-21 also performed very well in ’73. The older MiG variants were generally outclassed in the combat arena.

What air power lessons could be learned from the Arab-Israeli Wars?

The pre-emptive counter-air strikes by the Israeli air force in the ’67 War was a masterclass in how to neutralise enemy airfields and prevent the opposition from using its own air power effectively. In ’73 probably the greatest lesson was the effectiveness of modern SAMs against aircraft and the necessity of electronic countermeasures and dedicated Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) missions. In addition, the lack of effectiveness of the Egyptian air force showed how the appointment of political, rather than professionally competent, officers to high ranks will inevitably render the entire force unfit for purpose.

What were the Indo-Pakistan Wars and which aircraft types were used – and for what roles?

The ’65 Indo-Pak War started with an attempt by Pakistan to cut Indian land access to Kashmir and was met by an Indian counter-offensive further to the south, resulting in a stalemate. In ’71, India intervened in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in support of the separatist movement, and Pakistan responded by attacking northwest India. East Pakistan succeeded in breaking away from West Pakistan, and in the west the ground campaign was much like a re-run of the ’65 campaign, once again ending in a stalemate. The Pakistan air force was all-American in ’65, comprising F-86 Sabres (both air-to-ground and air-to-air), F-104 Starfighters (air defence) and B-57 Canberras (bombers); in ’71 these aircraft had been supplemented by the Shenyang F-6 (Chinese version of the MiG-19 used for both air defence and offensive support)). The Indian air force was equipped with Hunters, Gnats, Canberras, Mystères, Ouragans and MiG-21s (the latter in the air-to-air role) in ’65 and in ’73 the line-up included more MiG-21s, the Su-7 and the HAL Marut (both of these types used for offensive support).

Which aircraft performed well and which performed badly in the Indo-Pakistan Wars?

The Pakistan air force F-86 Sabres performed very well in both conflicts, reflecting the excellent training and leadership of the Pakistan air force. On the Indian side, the Gnat was impressive in ’65 and in ’71 the Su-7 and Marut both performed very well in the ground-attack role. The Indian MiG-21s did not do well in ’65 largely due to poor Soviet missile technology.

What air power lessons could be learned from the Indo-Pakistan Wars?

The quality of leadership and training of the Pakistan air force showed just how important these factors are in the overall effectiveness of an air force. As Gen George Patton observed “you fight like to train” so high-quality relevant training is vital for any air force. In ’73, the Indian air force ran a highly successful counter-air campaign against airfields in East Pakistan and grounded the Pakistan air force, by using excellent weapon-to-target matching and employing an overwhelming force.

The Hush-Kit Book of Warplanes will feature the finest cuts from Hush-Kit along with exclusive new articles, explosive photography and gorgeous bespoke illustrations. Pre-order The Hush-Kit Book of Warplanes here. Save the Hush-Kit blog. If you’ve enjoyed an article you can donate here. Your donations keep this going. Thank you. Our shop is here and our Twitter account here @Hush_Kit. Sign up for our newsletter here.

What was the Iran-Iraq War and which aircraft types were used – and for what roles?

Taking advantage of the post-revolution chaos in Iran, Iraq invaded Iran in 1980 in order to take control, of the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Expecting a swift and successful campaign, Iraq was surprised by the robust and ferocious response from Iran and by a war which dragged on for eight years. With the ground forces bogged down in a WW1-style war of attrition, the air forces switched to attacking each other’s oil production and export infrastructure, including the “tanker war” in which oil tankers were attacked in the Persian Gulf. The Iranian air force fielded F-4 Phantoms, F-5 Tigers for ground attack and F-14 Tomcats for air defence, while the Iraqis operated MiG-21, MiG-23, Su-7, Su-22 as well as Mirage F1s and MiG-25s.

Which aircraft performed well and which performed badly in the Iran-Iraq War?

Despite limited spares support, the Iranian F-4s and F-14s were very effective in role; the Iraqi Mirage F-1s also achieved some spectacular successes with long-range strikes against Iranian oil terminals. Perhaps the least successful was the Iraqi MiG-23 thanks to its less than ideal handling characteristics.

What air power lessons could be learned from the Iran-Iraq War?

Much like the Egyptians in 1967, the big lesson here is that political or quasi-religious interference in air forces will render them ineffective. Both the Iraqi and Iranian air forces suffered badly because of interference and mismanagement by political (Iraq) and religious (Iran) figures who knew nothing about air power.

What is going on in with the UK programme and ‘Loyal Wingmen’ in general?

The UK has walked away from Project Mosquito, an effort to create a technology demonstrator of a ‘Loyal Wingman’ technology (an unmanned fast aircraft that could support manned aircraft in high-threat environments). Jim Smith looks at what this means – and considers the current state of autonomous buddy aircraft and what the UK wants and needs.

In a fairly recent article for @Hush_Kit, examining the future of air operations:

Re-read this article in forty years time: We predict the future of aviation

I observed that “… the US, China, and Russia, all appear to be converging on a system-of-systems approach to both air combat and strike missions” and also noted that “the ‘system-of-systems’ approach I am considering is also intended to allow unfettered operation over hostile territory, is ‘offensive’ rather than ‘defensive’ in nature, and appears to be the direction being taken by the US, Russia, and China.”

In this context, it was extremely interesting to read, from defbrief.com that the UK has decided not to proceed with its unmanned loyal wingman demonstrator being examined under Project Mosquito.

Unpacking this a little, we can observe the following key points:

• The LANCA programme will not proceed beyond the design phase
• The capability can be achieved more cost-effectively with smaller (and by implication) more specialised off-board assets
• The intent is to introduce such capabilities in the near-term
• Examination of loyal wingman concepts will continue as part of the Future Combat Air Systems Enterprise

So, what might lie behind this change in direction?

At the simplest level, it seems the work done towards LANCA has given an indication of the likely cost, size, complexity, and hence timescale, of developing the MoD’s concept of a loyal wingman system, and the result is not in line with the near-term needs of the RAF.

By implication, cost-effectiveness and timeliness appear to be the main issues, and short-term alternatives are suggested, while keeping the option open of broader and longer-term studies and options under the FCASE program.

What is the ‘capability need’?

All well and good, and perhaps a sensible compromise, in order to contain costs while continuing FCASE studies and keeping an eye on the Australian and US unmanned combat aircraft adjunct programs, perhaps with an eye to a future Off-The-Shelf purchase. However, there remain some fundamental question about what the UK might actually be looking for in the Future Combat Air Systems Enterprise.

Of course, the critical aspects will be to determine what future capability is likely to be needed, in what timescale, against what threats, and in what operational context. By the latter, I mean whether the capability is primarily perceived to be driven by the UK acting in coalition, or in a stand-alone capacity.

The details of all that would be secret, but some guesses can be made. Firstly, if the UK is involved in direct conflict with a 1^st tier opponent such as Russia or China, this is only credible in a coalition, as the capability and force structure to do so in a stand-alone sense would be unaffordable.

A second consideration would be how long a conflict might need to be sustained. All recent experience suggests that the idea of a ‘short, sharp conflict’ against capable opposition are long gone. Recent UK coalition operations have lasted years, not months.

A third consideration is whether the UK would be involved in primarily defensive, or primarily offensive operations. Since the second world war, this has been a changing picture. As a post-war colonial power, the UK was involved in all sorts of operations. This shrank when activities were constrained to no longer be ‘East of Suez’, and changed again with the Gulf War and successor activities including engagement in Afghanistan. So, Air Defence of the UK and its Colonies focussed down to Air Defence of the UK, and then expanded to Support to the US in Coalition.

From all this, I conclude that the main actual driver for the UK Force structure is now supporting the US in coalition operations, essentially worldwide and of long duration, but leavened by an expectation that the US would do the heavy lifting against the most difficult targets.

Short-term and Longer-term needs

The Project Mosquito announcement essentially defers introduction of a loyal wingman capability to consideration under the FCASE project. Instead, the focus is to shift “to aggressively pursue the RAF’s unchanged firm commitment to integrate advanced uncrewed capabilities into the near-term force mix with more immediate beneficial value”.

Hence, given the near-term force mix essentially being JSF and Typhoon, off-board, unmanned assets to support those assets. From which one might expect off-board defensive aids, including deployable EW capabilities, possibly Datalink and communications relays, perhaps some ISR and damage assessment capabilities, and perhaps deception drones to aid in defence suppression. Are numerous, separate, unmanned and deployable capabilities a cheaper option than a loyal wingman?

Almost certainly, provided they are managed intelligently, for example using a simple unmanned bus concept, which would be loaded with the appropriate mission systems to deliver the different capabilities. Developed as separate capabilities – much less certainly, especially if integration with the platform or other unmanned systems were to be required.

Longer-term

If we assume the longer-term objective is to support FCASE, then the timescale should allow mature consideration of what loyal wingman capabilities are required. It would also allow possible alternative options to appear, with UA and AUS systems as possible alternatives to a UK programme.

The capability arguments suggest a sustainable rather than throw-away capability would be required. While there is a certain attraction in using unmanned QF-16 aircraft as a thrust to erode defence capabilities ahead of a ‘Shock and Awe’ first strike mission, this is a destabilising, overtly offensive, one-shot capability that, however attractive, could not really be a credible approach for the UK. Or, indeed, anyone, except perhaps the US or Israel.

A loyal wingman which was, itself, survivable (aka stealthy), but which might be used to deploy decoys, jammers, harassment drones, anti-radar and, perhaps, offensive cyber capabilities might well be a good adjunct to whatever manned system comes out of FCASE (Tempest?).

Such a system would, inevitably, be nearly as expensive as a low signature manned system, but, through its ability to forward-deploy defence suppression aids, could make survivable manned strike and air superiority missions much easier to deliver. The wingman platform might also be adaptable for other capabilities such as Air-to-air refuelling, electronic surveillance, target acquisition and designation.

What Next?

The UK appears to have had a look at a near-term Loyal Wingman capability and realised that any Lightweight and Affordable system is unlikely to be available in the short-term, and perhaps unable to deliver the capability it requires. A short-term shift to multiple, separate, deployable systems appears likely to be the outcome. To deliver this in a cost-effective way will require early attention to detail in integrating the various systems with their platforms, and perhaps with each other.

Continuation of the loyal wingman studies under the FCASE project also appears to be a sensible option, and to have the benefit of allowing UK thinking on capability requirements to mature, while keeping a watchful eye on relevant International programmes. Critical questions to be resolved will be the balance between survivable and attritable systems; identification of the missions which can be delivered by unmanned systems; and designing a cost-effective integrated system to deliver the capability outcomes required.

With its Bayraktar TB2 unmanned combat aircraft proving itself as a formidable weapon in Ukraine, a fifth-generation fighter in development, and a wealth of other aerospace projects, Turkey is growing in importance as an aircraft-producing nation. We get the Turkish perspective on the latest Turkish aerospace developments.

By Arda Mevlutoglu

What is going on with Kale & Rolls-Royce? Kale Group and Rolls Royce formed up a joint venture named Turkish Air Engine Company (TAEC) in 2017, primarily for the development of the engine of the MMU (Milli Muharip Ucak; National Combat Aircraft). Back then, negotiations were underway with the Kale – Rolls Royce partnership and Turkey’s Savunma Sanayii Baskanligi (SSB; Presidency for Defence Industries) who oversees the whole MMU programme.

The negotiations, which continued until around 2019 did not produce a result and SSB looked for other alternatives. According to local media, one of the main reasons for this was Turkish side insisting on the involvement of the TRMotor company, a joint venture which was then formed up by Turkish Aerospace (TA), SSB and BMC Power, a Turkish – Qatari joint venture for powerplant technologies. Reportedly, the British side did not welcome the inclusion of the TRMotor, mainly due to the presence of another country (Qatar) through shares, because of intellectual property (IP) and export end-use issues.

In the meantime, several F110 turbofan engines were ordered from General Electric for the prototypes. Also, TA has purchased all other shares in the TRMotor, making it its subsidiary, thereby addressing British concerns of the Qatari involvement. Very recently, the head of SSB, Prof. Ismail Demir announced negotiations with TAEC to be resumed. As of today, negotiations are underway and if everything goes well, a collaboration agreement will be signed with the TAEC. The role of the TRMotor and other Turkish engine companies, such as TEI is unclear, at least for the public for now.

• What new Turkish aircraft projects are in development and how are the programme’s going?

The main aircraft development project is the MMU. TA has started manufacturing of structural parts of the prototype, and the roll-out is planned to take place on March 18, next year. First flight is expected to be sometime between 2025-26.

Another project is the Hurjet, advanced jet trainer development programme. Hurjet is being developd as a replacement for the T-38M trainers and the F-5 2000 of the Turkish Stars aerobatics team. The aircraft will be powered by a single General Electric F404 turbofan and will be capable of achieving Mach 1.4 speed at around 45,000ft altitude. It will be equipped with advanced avionics and communication systems, suited for training of 5th generation combat aircraft pilots. The first flight of the Hurjet is planned for 2023.

• Why does a Turkish Typhoon deal seem a possibility again?

Turkey was expelled from the F-35 project as a result of the acquisition of S-400 air defence system from the Russian Federation. Until then, Turkey had been a Level III industrial partner to the project from the very start and planned to acquire 100 F-35As for the Air Force and between 12 and 20 F-35Bs for the Navy, for use with the Anadolu LHD, which is under construction.

The TurAF planned to equip the first squadron, the 171 Filo with the F-35As by early 2020s. The 100 F-35As were to be delivered to 171, 172, 111 and 112 Filos, replacing the F-4E 2020 Terminator. In the meantime, the MMU, which is planned to be delivered from late 2020’s would gradually replace the F-16 fleet, starting from the oldest Block 30 models.

Turkey’s ejection from the F-35 programme therefore dealt a severe blow to the TurAF’s modernization roadmap. The time required for the MMU to achieve a full operational capability and in significant number of aircraft will most likely see the first half of the next decade, and neighbouring countries’ significant investments in air power create major risk of losing qualitative superiority. As a result, Turkey requested from the United States the sale of 40 new F-16Vs and kits for 80 existing aircraft to upgrade them to F-16V standard. The Turkish – American relations, however, have significantly deteriorated in the past years and the mood in the Congress towards Turkey is especially negative. That’s why, as an alternative, acquisition of Typhoons from United Kingdom, either as second hand or new production -or maybe both- have been brought to agenda. There are not much details on this issue, but given the deepening bilateral relations and increased defence cooperation, Typhoon is most likely being discussed upon.

What is Erdogan’s relationship with Putin, and his position on the Russian invasion attempt in Ukraine? Does Russia have good relations with Turkey?

Turkey’s relationship with Russia has so far maintained on the razor’s edge. Russia is Turkey’s neighbour and the two nations have fought, made peace, made business and interacted culturally for many centuries. Even during certain periods in the Cold War, the Soviet Union and Turkey had good economic relations. But at the end of the day it is geopolitics that have the last word. The two states are geopolitical competitors, though remarkably successful in maintaining compartmentalizing issues and challenges.

From the very first day, Turkey has officially condemned Russia’s unprovoked and unjust attack on Ukraine. Ankara has also been refusing to recognize the annexation of Crimea. Turkey has been providing Ukraine with Bayraktar TB2 armed drones, and in early February the two countries signed an agreement to establish a factory in Ukraine to manufacture a localized version of the TB2, through transfer of technology. Turkey is also constructing a derivative of the MilGem class corvette for the Ukrainian navy and ASELSAN has provided advanced communication systems. Ukraine, on the other hand has become one of the important suppliers for the Turkish defence industry: Ukrainian turboprop engines are being used on the Bayraktar Akıncı strike drone, the T929 ATAK II next-generation attack helicopter and the upcoming Bayraktar Kızıl Elma jet-powered UCAV.

• Why is Erdogan critical of NATO entry for Sweden and Finland?

One of the main reasons for Turkey’s negative position regarding these countries, especially Sweden providing a safe haven and even support for the PKK terrorist organization [editor note: the group is not described as a terrorist organisation by some] and Gulenist movement, which organized the July 15^th coup attempt in 2016. Both countries have been more than reluctant in cooperating with Turkey in counter-terrorism operations.

• Is there any chance Turkey could provide air defence systems to Ukraine, if so which? If not, why?

Turkey has so far developed the Korkut self- propelled low altitude air defence gun system, the Hisar A+ low altitude and the Hisar O+ medium-altitude air defence missile systems. These platforms have completed development and are in serial production phase. It is theoretically possible for Turkey to provide some of these systems to Ukraine but I believe this decision would be subject to complex military and political considerations.

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• Has Turkey provided military aid to Ukraine, if so, what?

I don’t have information on whether or not Turkey has supplied any type of military equipment to Ukraine after the start of the war. Baykar Technology has recently announced the donation of a Bayraktar TB2, after a fundraising campaign by Lithuania raised enough money for one system along with weapons.

• Is there a possibility of Turkey rejoining the F-35 effort?

I believe, Turkey rejoining the programme as an industrial partner is impossible. Getting the aircraft in the not-so-soon future might be a slim possibility and that would depend on a number of conditions, the S-400 issue being the number one.

• What should I have asked you?

What’s next for the Turkish Air Force? Well, the MMU and the drone programme have the utmost priorities. The MMU is the most complex and the most strategic project, albeit being an over-ambitious one in terms of budget, schedule, human capital, infrastructure and requirements. On the drone side, the Akıncı, Aksungur, and the Kızıl Elma will contribute to the transformation of the Turkish Air Force into something new, and something big. It is important to underline that a major part of this transformation is Turkey’s unprecedented leap in developing and fielding a wide range of precision-guided weapon systems such as guidance kits, multi-mode guided bombs, cruise missiles and miniature bombs.

Arda Mevlutoglu is an astronautical engineer. He is currently working as the VP of an international trading and consultancy company, focusing on defense and aerospace sector. He is currently working as the Vice President of Defense Programs at an international trading and consultancy company. His research focuses on defense industry technology, policies and geopolitical assessments, with a focus to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea region. His works have been published in various local and international journals such as Air Forces Monthly, Air International, Combat Aircraft, EurasiaCritic, ORSAM Middle East Analysis. He has been quoted by Financial Times, Reuters, BBC, Al Monitor, CNN Turk and TRT on issues covering Turkish defence industry and military developments.

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“If you have any interest in aviation, you’ll be surprised, entertained and fascinated by Hush-Kit – the world’s best aviation blog”. Rowland White, author of the best-selling ‘Vulcan 607’

I’ve selected the richest juiciest cuts of Hush-Kit, added a huge slab of new unpublished material, and with Unbound, I want to create a beautiful coffee-table book. Pre-order your copy now right here  

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From the cocaine, blood and flying scarves of World War One dogfighting to the dark arts of modern air combat, here is an enthralling ode to these brutally exciting killing machines.

The Hush-Kit Book of Warplanes is a beautifully designed, highly visual, collection of the best articles from the fascinating world of military aviation –hand-picked from the highly acclaimed Hush-kit online magazine (and mixed with a heavy punch of new exclusive material). It is packed with a feast of material, ranging from interviews with fighter pilots (including the English Electric Lightning, stealthy F-35B and Mach 3 MiG-25 ‘Foxbat’), to wicked satire, expert historical analysis, top 10s and all manner of things aeronautical, from the site described as:

“the thinking-man’s Top Gear… but for planes”.

The solid well-researched information about aeroplanes is brilliantly combined with an irreverent attitude and real insight into the dangerous romantic world of combat aircraft.

FEATURING

• Interviews with pilots of the F-14 Tomcat, Mirage, MiG-25, English Electric Lighting, B-52 and many more.
• Engaging Top (and bottom) 10s including: Greatest fighter aircraft of World War II, Worst British aircraft, Worst Soviet aircraft and many more insanely specific ones.
• Expert analysis of weapons, tactics and technology.
• A look into art and culture’s love affair with the aeroplane.
• Bizarre moments in aviation history.
• Fascinating insights into exceptionally obscure warplanes.

The book will be a stunning object: an essential addition to the library of anyone with even a passing interest in the high-flying world of warplanes, and featuring first-rate photography and a wealth of new world-class illustrations.

Rewards levels include these packs of specially produced trump cards.

As tha D-O-double-G (double G) folks often ask me if I know the most poppin’ aerial target tugs. Say what? Fo’ shizzle, I do. Light that chronic, dig out tha mary-Jane’s All tha World’s Bitchin’ Aircraft and prepare for 10 planes that want your fire.

It’s the Tea You Double G!

10. Vultee A-31 Vengeance

Have to mention this West Coast hero, California dreamin’ and schemin’ with Vengence. Startin’ life as a dive-bomber for France, had got a body that girls would die for.

9. Westland Lysander

Just say the word and his undercarriage spat out all over the curb. Shoot ’em up bang bang, yeah it’s a cold thang, the Lysander gotta high high wing. Love this fat-ass spat-wearin’ baller.

8. Boulton Paul Defiant

I swear, I feel like I’m ballin’, yeah I’m ballin’, yeah I’m ball turreting – but I ball so hard the motherfuckin’ ball turret fall off. It’s so easy to see, painted and pimped up like some player bumblebee.

7. Hawker Henley

Bring out the Hennessy for the Hawker Henley, this Merlin-ass bitch’ll tug you and thug you and say thank you for the fire you brung too. Too much of a pussy to be a light bomber – as a tug it had the disgrace to be replaced by the mos def turrent-compliant Defiant. The Henley was bullshit.

6. Ilyushin Il-28 Beagle

Dog-to-dog love for the Finnish touch, the Il-28 was much too much. Fly so regal, fly like a Beagle.

5. Miles M.25 Martinet 

Dr Dre’s favourite target tug, gonna whip you with my martinet. A martinet is a disciplinarian, so get your money, whip your hair, the Martinet is gonna be there. It was based on the Master, staying on an S to the M to the S&M tip. Whip your booty girl!

4. Douglas Skyraider

Poppin’, stoppin’, hoppin’ like a rabbit – tha Swedish Shiznit don’t need no gat to tug a target. This be troll-hatin’ all the way to Trollhättan.

3. Hawker Fury

Marzipan ain’t tha only shit straight outta Lübeck, rollin’ down tha air-strasses keepin’ it gangsta was this grimy limey.

2. Short Sturgeon TT.2

This is some Optimus Prime Transformer Beef, folds up like g’s. ‘Cause Snoop Dogg is trump tight like a virgin, tha Sturgeon. Tupac knew Tug life, and I know mo’.

1. F+W C-3605

Fo shizzle, it got to be tha Alpine anteater itself at tha top slot. Effin’ W, tha F, tha F & W. Holy like Swiss cheese, this neautral-ass muthafucker is 3 to tha 6 to tha 05. Bitches be lovin’ its long long nose poking right up their alpine p’ass. Based on tha Bf 109 originally, and painted up like some funky-ass fluorescent bumble-bee. That long-dong snout holding tha Lycomings-and-Lygoings-of tha T-mother-fuckin-53.

I just went to see Top Gun Maverick. I went with high expectations as I have only seen and heard good things; I don’t know why…I almost fell asleep twice.

By Nick Astle

I don’t know what ideal the brave pilots of Maverick are defending, or why I should like them. Their world is one without humour, the characters have the kind of wit, emotional intelligence and sensitivity of a tired stag party staggering through a city centre dressed as Spice Girls. The credo Maverick teaches his aircrew: Don’t Think, Do. I lazily wondered if this made the film Trumpist, but it could only dream of having a relationship with reality as tangible as that (though it’s not not Trumpist). The lack of likeability is an issue, as though Cruise is fun to watch, he hasn’t got much to work with as the dialogue is just guff – though mercifully minimal.

Still Gay enough?

The 1986 Top Gun was famous for its beach volleyball scene, an unapologetically homoerotic celebration of the male form, youth and life in the sunshine. As a couple of tokenistic female fighter pilots are chucked into the new movie, I wondered if we would be perving over them in the same way during Maverick’s inevitable volleyball call-back scene – interestingly we were not. The girls wore more than the boys and remained in the shadows while the glistening semi-nude young men (and Cruise) sweated in the sunshine. While this could be viewed as progressive, the women in the film are literally and figuratively in the shadows throughout the film. Any viewers fearing the film would be overly woke can sleep easily, it reaches, in terms of representation, a film from around 2003. This is perhaps understandable when you remember the central theme of the first film seemed to be masculinity (along with militarism and an awkward attempt to reconcile the individualism of American capitalism with the collaborative conformist nature of military culture). How do you make a handsome brilliant test pilot and war hero an outsider? Not very convincingly is the answer in this case. The ‘man’, the voice of bureaucratic naysayers is played by Jon Hamm. Maverick’s renegade views are a bit Clarksonesque, the sleepy unimaginative mantra of men of a certain age complaining everything is ‘health and safety gone mad’. Quite how a carrier pilot who is so clearly slapdash has survived this long is anybody’s guess. Can’t imagine Eric ‘Winkle’ Brown in Maverick’s role (though a British Top Gun set in the 1950s would be amazing).

Darkstar

The Darkstar aircraft section is very revealing. Why did Lockheed Martin Skunkworks help with the design of this stealthy Mach 10 aircraft – and allow their logo to be used? Because the virtual absence of F-35s must have been embarrassing. The F-35 cannot be used for the main mission in the plot as the target is protected by GPS-jammers and requires the laser designation capabilities of the Super Hornet. I’m not sure this stands up to much scrutiny, and I guess the real reason is that it was easy to film using Super Hornets rather than precious and security restricted F-35s. Or maybe it’s just hard to film in a single-seater! Without Darkstar, Boeing with its Super Hornet would have all of the glory. Wanking over the hardware of the military-industrial complex is, like the first film, a major part of the film. In a comically shameless defence of the F-35 programme and eternally delayed Lockheed Martin projects, Darkstar is threatened by the usual pencil-pushers who believe that the aircraft project is behind schedule and are threatening to cancel it. The project can only demonstrate the required milestone of development by Maverick risking his life and the aircraft by flying irresponsibly fast – and then flying even faster for no reason other than his own inexplicable need for speed. Making multi-billion dollar warplane acquisition projects vulnerable underdogs is really weird.

The enemies – a chimera of Russia and Iran boringly enriching uranium – are faceless, an utterly childish and dangerously easy way to dehumanise them (Austin Powers had greater sympathy for the ‘bad guys’). They operate Su-57s (as Russia pretends to), F-14s (as Iran actually does) and pimped-up Mi-24s (as pretty much everyone does).

The real hero

The hero of the film is not Tom Cruise – or the Super Hornet – or the CGI F-14 for that matter – It is the Su-57 ‘Felon’ (or rather the CGI depiction of it) described vaguely as an invincible ‘fifth generation’ fighter, that steals the show. It is a real Russian fighter design, and it looks utterly badass in the film, piloted by black-visored baddies in black. It is far more exciting than the rather workmanlike Super Hornet or tired F-14, though predictably as combat effective as a TIE fighter. There is strong Firefox (the film not the web browser) and MiG-28 energy in the ‘Felon’ scenes and these are the high points of the movie.

As in all war movies featuring jets, infra-red flares can fool radar-guided missiles. The pedantically minded may also enjoy spotting that shadow of Maverick’s single-seat aircraft is that of a two-seater.

What, if anything, is the film’s central message? It is far too conventional not to have a central message – and it seems to revolve around ageism. Both Maverick and the F-14 are older, seemingly obsolete, and win the day. This is reassuring to the millions of 40+ plus moviegoers feeling increasingly obsolete in their own lives.

The flying sections are very well done, but much like the first film, do not represent a great percentage of screen time.

The movie is a pointless – and occasionally fun – exercise in nostalgia. Is American cinema a rusty old F-14 expensively limping home with one engine? Unmanned aircraft are villainous threats to the future existence of fighter pilots in this movie, and Maverick would clearly rather have his kicks than entertain a future without friendly casualties. Villianising unmanned aircraft is itself a quite old fashioned view nowadays, it should be noted that songs are sung in celebration of the Bayraktar in 2022. The whole experience was like lying in a long cold bath. It is soupy pointless nostalgia that cost god knows how much to make.

The biggest mystery of the film, apart from the inexplicably universal positive reviews, is that a naval aviator would choose a P-51, an air force aircraft, as his weekend ride.

Click here for part 1 of Guy Plopsky’s fascinating analysis of Russian air power in Ukraine.

Part 2 will be out soon and will cover the more recent news.