Is the attack helicopter dead?
The attack helicopter is costly and complex to operate, yet it is taking a mauling in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s full-scale invasion attempt of Ukraine starting in 2022 has shown both the vulnerability of helicopters and the effectiveness of small, uncrewed aircraft against armour. With this in mind, we ask: Is the attack helicopter dead?
- Ron Smith
Few observers thought Ukraine could withstand the Russian onslaught of 2022. Footage released in April footage of the destruction of a Russian Kamov attack helicopter was a huge morale boost. And more followed. The war in Ukraine has been marked by staggering losses of both anti-armour helicopters and armour.
Armour operations
Typical Western doctrine (offensive or defensive) uses manned armoured reconnaissance ahead of the Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) to locate enemy forces and determine their intentions. Increasingly, manned operations will be supported by other ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) platforms, such as Uncrewed Air Vehicles (UAV) and later Uncrewed Ground Vehicles (UGVs), to augment the manned platforms.
Recce: This is driven by a recce Plan determined by the Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs), designed to fill in gaps in intelligence and distinguish enemy feints and deception tactics from their main force’s true intentions and timing. Other objectives would typically be to locate enemy command and control, logistics, air defence units, long-range artillery, and other high-value/high-threat components.
The recce info will then shape the deployment of main armour and infantry (again offensive or defensive), supporting anti-armour helicopter and precision long-range artillery operations.
Manned armoured reconnaissance beyond the FLOT (i.e., in enemy territory) is likely hazardous, particularly if the enemy has effective electronic surveillance capabilities. Traffic analysis can be used to locate signal traffic from unknown forces and, even if encrypted, is likely to result in unwelcome attention. The US tends to assume its comms cannot be read, so it reports every enemy observation. The UK is more concerned about detected transmissions (even if not read) and operates largely under radio silence.
Terrain masking to avoid detection may make Very High Frequency traffic difficult, so HF or datalink to SATCOMs may have to be used.
Armour and Mechanised Infantry: In addition, armour, on both sides, is having a hard time. In the Ukraine case, the threat has proven to be a combination of precision artillery and long-range missile attack, combined with top attack by armed drones.
The author identified this latter threat as a concern more than a dozen years ago – having noted that Hezbollah, in the first Lebanon conflict, had deployed armed drones against Israeli armour.
Because the high mass of protective armour leads to weight and mobility issues, MBT protection is concentrated against direct fire attacks from other MBTs. Top protection is typically reduced, primarily against artillery near misses rather than direct hits, which are now the norm. Even with these measures, deployed MBT mass is typically around 62 tonnes, and top protection is one area that is typically traded off to achieve acceptable mobility.
Active protection systems are not yet regarded as mature and may introduce hazards to nearby personnel (if operating with infantry, for example). I am unsure how successful these are in Israeli use, or whether they have been used successfully in Ukraine.
Furthermore, Western armour generally has no organic means of detecting or countering the drone threat, although directed energy weapons or RF countermeasures may offer some capability in the future and are undoubtedly being actively researched and trialled.
So heavy armour is looking increasingly vulnerable, as, in the Ukrainian conflict at least, attack helicopters. However, heavy armour is clearly still important for taking and holding ground, so it will most likely continue to be central in many operations.
Attack Helicopter operations
When the UK was developing its thinking for GST3971 to acquire a dedicated attack helicopter in the mid-1980s, the vision was of a helicopter that could engage in autonomous direct-fire attack of heavy armour. The threat was essentially Cold War, with massed Soviet armour operating across the North German Plain. Organic air defence (then primarily radar-directed ZSU-23-4) was a significant threat, leading to a desire to stand-off outside its lethal range. Priority targets were enemy air defence, command and control centres and heavy armour.
The solution was deemed to be a low-signature helicopter (radar and IR signatures, particularly) fitted with a mast-mounted sight and using terrain screening. A long-range fire-and-forget weapon was required so that the helicopter would not be exposed throughout the weapon’s flight time.
Initially, Apache was not favoured because the AH-64A was regarded as having large visual and radar signatures and an inadequate sighting system. Without a mast-mounted sight, Scout helicopter support would also be required for target acquisition and designation.
The AH-64D with Longbow and RF Hellfire largely solved these problems by acquiring targets at long range and engaging in indirect fire. However, the missile and target detection range exceeded the recognition and identification range of the TADS sight (which also required the helicopter to be exposed to gain a line of sight to the target). This introduced some concern about the ability to achieve positive target identification when operating under restrictive rules of engagement.
The Situation in Ukraine
Russian operations over Ukrainian-held territory
Today, taking the Ukraine experience as representative, Russian attack helicopters are operating over large regions of Ukrainian-held territory without air superiority and with a dispersed infantry threat armed with capable MANPADS systems. The defending forces can adopt positions that are well hidden, but which offer good fields of fire.
The difficulty of detecting and countering this threat, combined with extensive areas lacking terrain cover, significantly increases the risk to attack helicopters in transit to and from their targets. This is compounded by the apparent ineffectiveness of the helicopter protection and countermeasures equipment.
There are reports of both sides in Ukraine using armed drones for anti-personnel operations against individual soldiers, so operation under cover, if not actually below ground is becoming necessary, if there are enemy drones in the area. This undoubtedly reduces the opportunities for, or increases the risk of, MANPADS operation.
Ukraine perspective – early phase
In the early phase of the invasion there was an armoured attack along the borders, but particularly moving south towards Kyiv from Belarus. This was largely canalised along main routes, as were its supporting logistic columns. This resulted in heavy losses. These were inflicted mainly by mines and artillery. Flooding of off-road terrain reduced the transit route options for the invading force.
Later Developments
After being pushed back from Kyiv in the initial armour thrust, Russian armour and mechanised infantry have been grinding out attacks from Ukraine’s borders, particularly from the south and east. This relatively static land battle is accompanied by long-range missile attacks on critical infrastructure and population centres.
Both sides have effective anti-aircraft missile systems, and neither side has achieved full air superiority over the battlefield. The later Russian attack has featured the use of medium- to long-range stand-off weapons (cruise or ballistic missiles and glide bombs), air-or ground-launched, often from within Russian territory. There seems little scope to counter this, while the political does not exist to mount attacks on launch locations well into Russian territory. The best possible missile defence system may ameliorate damage but will not hasten the end of the conflict, which has become strategic rather than tactical.
Significant numbers of western ground-to-air missile systems are also being supplied. Ukrainian anti-armour operations have increasingly been able to use precision artillery such as HIMARS and ATACMS. The availability of such systems and their munitions is likely to be in short supply and is dependent on enduring political support from EU and NATO countries. It is, therefore, vulnerable, for example, should Donald Trump be returned as US President following the November election.
It seems likely that NATO surveillance assets (E-3, RC-135W, U-2S and satellite cover) are gathering real time intelligence over the battlefield – whether such information is being passed to inform Ukraine deployments and targeting decisions has not been revealed. In any future conflict, using such overhead assets and effective datalinks to transmit near real-time intelligence is likely to be key to effective offensive or defensive operations.
Both Russia and the Ukraine have adopted the use of armed drones for the top attack of armour and these appear to have been very successful. (Relatively little imagery has been released showing Ukraine anti-armour helicopter attacks on Russian armour, or indeed Russian helicopter attacks on Ukrainian armour – Western or otherwise).
NATO nations are beginning to supply air-to-ground weapons such as Brimstone and Storm Shadow, and F-16 aircraft have entered Ukrainian service. It is not known whether Western air-to-ground missiles have been integrated for release from existing Russian-built equipment operating with the Ukrainian Air Force.
Suggested Success Factors for Helicopter anti-armour operations
What do you need for successful helicopter anti-armour missions? Ideally, you want air superiority and not to operate over large swathes of enemy-held territory occupied by determined resistance, equipped with capable MANPADS and other air defence systems such as S-200 and S-300.
Here is a list of possible success factors for postulated helicopter anti-armour operations.
- Accurate intelligence as to disposition and movement of enemy armour: satellite, aerial recce, stand-off radar, comms / SIGINT, manned armoured reconnaissance, SF, etc.
- A command and control infrastructure capable of providing updated target information in near real-time
- Ability to comply with restrictive rules of engagement when necessary
- Preferably having air superiority over the area of operations
- Ability to reach an engagement position with minimal exposure to threat systems
- Ability to engage at long-range
- The necessity of avoiding enemy drone threats to AH is likely to favour mobile rather than static operation.
- Carriage of sufficient weapons to inflict significant attrition on the enemy force (likely to determine the number of helicopters in the attack)
- Use of longer-range missiles (Rafael Spike NLOS quotes 27 km range, helicopter-launched Brimstone is said to have similar range capability).
- Proven and effective countermeasures against unexpected missile attack – missile launch detection and tracking, plus sophisticated countermeasures and effective signature reduction. Today, there must be some query as to the availability and effectiveness of such systems.
- Ballistic tolerance at least against small arms and medium machine gun threats
- Reliable, low-maintenance platform, capable of operation in all weather and climatic conditions.
- Crashworthy fuel systems
- Run-dry transmission systems
Defensive Operations
The above factors suggest that deploying attack helicopters operating defensively (over one’s territory) could still be effective.
If the enemy uses the same or similar equipment, there would still be problems to solve regarding positive target ID. Also, effective command and control to deal with a fluid ground situation could be problematic, as could maintaining a supply of munitions to the AH force. Missile countermeasures remain an uncertain problem.
Offensive Operations
Long-range indirect fire engagements would be preferred for both offensive and defensive operations, and they would probably be essential in the offensive case.
The high helicopter losses sustained by Russia in current offensive operations probably reflect high risk operations, in the face of determined opposition with capable weapons and not much terrain cover for the helicopters. Also, no air superiority to provide top cover and hinder ground air defence, together with apparently ineffective measures to hinder missile lock-on and to break lock, once engaged.
Moreover, the threat is not the organic air defences of battlegroups or a Soviet Motor-Rifle Regiment or Brigade but dispersed and well-hidden infantry and special forces units equipped with modern MANPADS missile systems. Furthermore, because the enemy forces are operating over the defenders’ own ground, the defence can be cued and alerted to approaching helicopters, given good data connectivity.
In the case of offensive operations, it would appear that stand-off operations from the ground already held by one’s own forces might be the order of the day. In this case, the helicopters might operate similarly to a highly mobile precision artillery unit, able to redeploy kilometres across the field of operations in minutes. With a lack of local air superiority, the Russian use of stand-off weapons launched from within their territory supports this proposition.
A further consideration is that maintaining the mobility of the helicopter force is likely to benefit it by hampering any drone threat targeted at it.
The focus of attack might shift towards enemy logistics – MBTs without fuel or ammunition cannot conduct manoeuvre warfare.
Increasing the range at which the attack is conducted could suggest the use of larger helicopters to carry the heavier weapons likely to be required – feasible if operating over safe ground. The carriage of Exocet on certain export Sea King aircraft is an example of such a usage. Rafael Spike and Brimstone are also attracting interest because of their long-range capability. Clearly, target selection would be entirely dependent on the higher-level ISTAR infrastructure, although salvo-fired Brimstone has already shown some autonomous target discrimination capability.
An alternative to using one heavy long-range missile per tank destroyed might be to use a larger helicopter to launch long-range drone-carrying systems. This could allow several medium helicopters to launch attack and surveillance drones into a given operational area, possibly in the enemy’s rear. Command and control, logistics, comms, armour, barracks, and hardened targets could all be engaged in this way.
Forward-launched recce drones could provide target designation and satisfy positive ID requirements when operating under tight rules of engagement.
Such an approach could also overload the enemy air defence command and control and be usefully deployed in conjunction with simultaneous missile and/or manned aircraft operations.
This capability is alluded to in several planned US programmes, including the abandoned FARA and FLRAA. We are talking about air-launched effects (LE) for reconnaissance or attack and Future Tactical Unmanned Aircraft Systems. The air-launched effects were described (Vertiflite March / April 2024) as being deployed from FARA, FLRAA and Black Hawk “to decoy, disrupt or destroy enemy air defences and to spot targets for joint forces”. The same article indicates that ”the Army plans first flight of a fully-integrated ALTIUS – Air-Launched, Tube Integrated Unmanned System from a Black Hawk this year” potentially for a rapid fielding decision in 2025.
The US’s ”long-standing interest in technologies that enable a single operator to control multiple UAS is associated with this.”
Perhaps network-enabled command and control, ISTAR, and other means of target verification can integrate existing AH capability in defensive operations. Medium helicopters operating further back could launch a mix of longer-range weapons and ‘Launched effect UAS’ in both offensive and defensive scenarios.
Further to the suggestion of stand-off medium helicopters for anti-armour ops over enemy territory (and the US reference to Air Launched Effects), see here.
It is also worth noting that Sea King was cleared for export customers to launch Sea Eagle (India) and Exocet (Qatar, Pakistan), suggesting plenty of payload for air-launched systems controlled by medium support helicopters. [A good role for the FAA Merlin Mk.4 force?]
The Drone Threat to Helicopters
In a traditional mechanised offensive, armour and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) operate collectively to gain and hold ground. Helicopters are used forward to take out enemy armour and attack command posts while scouting and designating targets for precision artillery strikes.
Infantry also relies on helicopter support for air cover and casevac. Recently, drones have been used in kamikaze attacks on helicopters. Used in this way, drones could significantly hamper helicopter operations and severely affect infantry morale.
Both helicopters and ground vehicles now need to adopt design and protection / defensive measures cognisant of the drone threat. In this scenario, the twin tail rotors suggested on some Westland designs (admittedly for other purposes) could provide a degree of redundancy.
General Observations
As the earlier discussion shows, the systems are more important than the platform. Ideally, you want to be network-enabled (so that someone else sorts out the targets and satisfies the rules of engagement). Then you want a long-range fire-and-forget weapon system capable of defeating enemy countermeasures and with a tandem charge, warhead to deal with ERA. If the missile sensor can discriminate between target types, so much the better. If I were in a tank, I’d still be worried about drones – as I said in a briefing a dozen years ago.
Given the right network integration and the right weapons, you could inflict a deal of pain in a fairly basic helicopter while staying well out of the way of any air defence. You still have to protect yourself against chance encounters – partisans or special forces with shoulder-launched weapons, for example. This appears easier said than done.
Assuming conditions allow offensive aircraft operations, integrating western weapon systems such as Brimstone on suitable platforms, such as Frogfoot, could provide the ability to salvo fire against multiple targets. Its MMW radar seeker is supposed to support this capability, with the weapons themselves avoiding duplication of effort and allocating targets across the salvo (fire-and-forget en masse).
The capacity offered by a medium helicopter in this role could extend to area denial or countermobility operations. This type of platform might be used to deliver area denial or scatterable countermeasures (even mines, perhaps) to rapidly counter enemy armour. Missiles such as Brimstone might be more effectively employed in this scenario.
Whether in a defensive or offensive posture, an agile and responsive command and control system will be required to maintain a responsive decision-making process. This is known as the OODA-loop (OODA stands for observe, orient, decide, act). There is some question as to whether current NATO surveillance assets are providing near-real-time intelligence to Ukraine. It is clear, however, that long-range stand-off anti-armour operations will require a persistent (probably stealthy) high-flying or stand-off system to provide situation awareness, detect armour targets across the battlefield and enable the use of precision indirect fires (whether by artillery or helicopter, operations).
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One very good use case for low or zero sensors but good comms is to have airborne nodes in a ‘scrum half’ position behind the tactical edge. Anything up threat (exquisite and LO) can use directional comms to get data back / receive C2 and Intel from the nodes; the nodes then use any route to get to the optimal place – including space and terrestrial – from a position that cannot be easily targeted by OPFOR.
Urgent Operational Requirements manage rapid change during conflict, usually in response to painful lessons learned. This is generally at the subsystem/protection level rather than the system and platform level. Examples could be the rapid introduction of electronic countermeasures, protective screens, and responses to enemy countermeasures. The targeting infrastructure required to support helicopter indirect fire long-range attacks appears a little different from that required to support MLRS / HIMARS / ATACMS operations and should, therefore, be available, provided suitable tasking orders can be accommodated.
Interestingly, the available description of the Leonardo AW249 mentions the ability to operate air-launched RPVs. The latest Aerospace magazine indicates more on its network capability: “acts as a sensor ISR node on a C4 network, and (can) control and manage UAVs – with a Wide Band LOS Datalink … LTE Gateway and Link 16.” The articles do not address the routine concept of operations, but the connectivity and network capabilities could allow a range of collaborating systems to provide targeting data. Now they just need to adapt AW149 and/or NH90 TTH to the stand-off anti-armour role …”
Tentative Conclusions
There are many problems facing armoured units in modern land warfare. Broadly, these fall into
(1) threats: enemy armour, helicopters, armed drones, precision artillery and missiles, minefields and obstacles;
and (2) the difficulty of sustaining operations over time at long range: logistics – fuel, ammunition, repair, crew sustainment, rules of engagement.
Similarly, one can discuss the problems facing the counter-armour forces – again dependent on terrain/area of operations, posture, equipment and C4ISTAR systems and their connectivity.
Operational changes may arise under TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) rather than wholesale doctrinal revisions. The challenge is to inflict heavy casualties on enemy forces while increasing one’s own chances of survival.
Used carefully, existing attack helicopters operating over ‘friendly’ terrain can still be effective. Increased use of ‘network-enabled warfare’ seems essential, combined with the ability to engage targets primarily at range and preferably non-line-of-sight.
You might end up with some new operational concepts and the reprioritisation of target lists. Flooding of land to ‘canalise’ (literally and metaphorically) the routes available to armour (and logistics); out-of-contact launching and controlling of recce/designator / armed drones – and longer-range missiles from medium helicopters looks like a decent tactic for anti-armour operations and may have a place in both defensive and offensive postures.
Brimstone 2 (helicopter launched) has a stated range of 40 km+. As an operational concept, half a dozen AW149s (or NH90s, or Merlins, or Sea Kings), each with eight Brimstone 2, could do a lot of damage providing indirect fire—provided near real-time networked stand-off target information was available. In this role, the helicopter fleet operates as a highly mobile precision artillery force.
Exploitation of night capability and simultaneous attacks along a front might come into play. Deep strikes into enemy training and rear areas (and recruitment centres) might also be targeted to affect public opinion and morale.
Other options could include using dummy armour supported by signals deception activity to draw in enemy forces or distract from more covert operations.
Finally, it would appear that heavy armour forces do need organic close-in air defence. Perhaps the naval approach (e.g., Phalanx)—whether by high rate-of-fire radar-directed gun systems, electronic countermeasures (potentially including EMP to disrupt connectivity of control systems), or directed energy means—might go a good way to countering the ‘kamikaze drone’ threat. Target detection and tracking systems would have to be modified to suit the targets to be engaged.
The low cost and simplicity of the drones mean that they have a significant number of advantages, and identifying and then defeating drones once in the air is hard; their low profile and low signature are a challenge, and their agility makes physical defeat hard. This strongly favours electronic countermeasures might be the preferred approach.
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The discussion suggests that intelligence, communications, and the ability to counter enemy operations are becoming dominant factors in future land warfare. Land platforms and helicopters should now be designed, considering enemy drone operations as a key threat.
Equally, friendly drone operations – offensive, defensive, intelligence gathering, defence suppression, etc. —should be integrated into and with operational planning and land and air platform capabilities.
RV Smith
Dr Ron Smith joined the British helicopter company Westland in 1975, working in Research Aerodynamics, and remotely piloted helicopters (before they were cool), and later became Head of Future Projects. He had a strong influence on the design of the NH90 helicopter, and was involved in the assessment of the Apache for Britain. He also explored a variety of exotic future technologies for Westland. One such exotic machine was a secret stealth attack helicopter.
Credit is also due to John Puddy, Robert Hopkins, Jeremy Smith, and Jim Smith for the valuable insights they provided.
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RAF Jaguar Flight Safety Film
MOSQUITO versus BEAUFIGHTER Round 1
We take class warfare to 300mph as we pit the aristocratic Mosquito against the no-nonsense proletariat muscle of the Beaufighter to find out who the real war-winning twin is.
A well-born beauty with two Merlins running on blueblood, the ecstatically swift Mosquito was the most refined fighter in the war. The Mosquito was stealthy enough to choose fights as it wished and had a reputation for invulnerability. Then there was the honest, almost thuggish, functionalism of the Beaufighter, which was all firepower and brute force – a design that seemingly believed streamlining was for cowards. The Beau carried enough ammunition to invade a small nation single-handedly and outgunned everything it faced with its multiple cannons and machine guns. But when push comes to shove, which was actually the war winner, the Mosquito or the Beaufighter? To determine the answer, we’ve developed some unimpeachable criteria based on actual operational usage. We then did a fucking ton of homework. Strap in!
ROUND 1: Timing
If World War II had started two years earlier, the Bristol Blenheim would have been legendary, and the Fairey Battle would still be remembered as shite.
In the crucial aspect of timing, the Beaufighter scores extraordinarily well. Its introduction coincided with the Luftwaffe switch to night bombing in early September, and it was there for the first Airborne Interception radar in the Autumn of 1940. Crucially, it also arrived late enough to avoid being squandered on the hopeless Battle of France or mis-deployed in the Battle of Britain, like its forerunner, the Bristol Blenheim.
The Beaufighter’s presence meant crucial lessons about night-fighter interception were learned in time to later defeat the Blitz in the Spring of 1941. Its contemporaries, such as the Blenheim, simply didn’t have the performance to keep up with German bombers, while the Boulton Paul Defiant was obsolete the moment AI radar was made to work. The perfect timing would play out with its introduction into the Mediterranean Theatre in 1941 and 1942, in time to make a decisive difference. The Beaufighter shone a harsh light on the shortcomings of its predecessors and would revolutionise aerial anti-shipping, as we’ll soon see.
However, the Mosquito was also well-timed, though somewhat later. Reaching squadrons in early 1942, its arrival as a light bomber coincided with Bomber Command’s building of a strategic air force. There was also a desperate need for a high-performance light bomber for target-marking when losses were soaring, and it was discovered that bombers were missing their targets by miles. Like the Beaufighter, it truly underscored where the RAF was going badly wrong, and had it been available one year earlier, the RAF might have avoided the idiocy of mass-escorted Stirlings, Hampdens and Blenheims on futile and wasteful Circus and Rhubarb raids (small-scale fighter sorties against ground targets of opportunity).
By the end of the war, both the Mosquito and Beafighter remained effective in what they were tasked to do (even if the Mosquito had some time earlier superseded the Beaufighter as the RAF’s main night fighter).
The Beaufighter edges it with perfect timing of its introduction at the inception of AI and the Luftwaffe’s switch to night bombing.
Beaufighter 1, Mosquito 0
8 MORE BLOODY ROUNDS TO COME…STAY TUNED!
Eddie Rippeth/Joe Coles
Eddie Rippeth is Head of Primary Publishing, International schools
Cambridge University Press
I flew the Big Sexy KC-10 super-tanker and I will miss it
The KC-10 did not require modification to carry the SR-71’s special JP-7 fuel, as it had fuel tanks that could be isolated (if desired) and only delivered to the boom. Those tanks could also hold regular JP-8 and feed it to the engines if needed.
Last week, the KC-10 Extender, a superb aerial refuelling aircraft, retired. We spoke to a KC-10 pilot to learn about ‘Big Sexy’.
The best KC-10 was its versatility and the flexibility of its crews. Unlike the KC-135, the KC-10 was ready to refuel probe or drogue receivers without any extra work or attachments needed before launch. With the ability to be refuelled itself, the KC-10 could be launched and flexed to almost any refuelling mission quickly.
The worst thing about the KC-10 was taxiing it around on smaller airfields. The nosewheel sits 20+ feet behind the pilots, so you must be very careful about turning sharp corners or trying 180° turns. In these cases, we’d often have a boom operator open the forward doors, lay on their stomach & hang out of the aircraft; they were on the intercom, relaying the position of the main and nose wheels to the pilots, keeping us from crunching taxi lights or ending up in the grass (which we sometimes did anyway).
Based on overall capacity, the KC-10 was better than the KC-135; it could take off with a much higher fuel load. While it burned more per hour, there was still significantly more fuel available for receivers. The ‘135 also couldn’t do Drogue receivers unless the boom was modified ahead of time (which meant it couldn’t do probe receivers) or if you attached pods to the wings. The KC-10 was ready for either at any time (and we could put our own pods on the wings, if needed).
The empty weight of the KC-10 was about 250,000 lbs. Maximum takeoff weight was 590,000 lbs…so about 340,000 lbs of fuel, if you weren’t carrying cargo. All of it could be offloaded, other than what we needed to save to get ourselves home…and sometimes we pushed that limit! In one case, I pushed a little too far – we got back to our deployed base, and it was fogged in. We couldn’t even attempt an approach.
We were getting close to diverting, which would have been painful, but another KC-10 arrived. They took up a holding pattern over the base, a couple thousand feet above us. We started coordinating between ourselves to balance fuel out so nobody had to divert, then just did it. At one point, there were four of us in the pattern, talking to each other, and passing fuel so that everyone got to sleep in their own bunks. The fog eventually lifted, and we all made it in.
The KC-10 was actually pretty easy to take off and land. It was very stable and large, and bumps that would affect smaller jets didn’t have much impact on us. The controls were pretty straightforward. On landing, you’d start the process of “flaring” just after the 50’ radar altimeter callout.
You rarely landed smoothly, though, as the centre gear touched down first on crowned runways. It shook & rattled, so there was always some of that, except in the rare instance you’d land with the centre gear retracted.
There weren’t many foibles to the jet; it handled well. It was just very large. When refuelling with KC-135s years ago, the bow wave of a heavy KC-10 could hit a sensor in the 135’s tail, disconnecting their autopilot. If they weren’t watching it, you’d suddenly end up with a face-full of KC-135 as their autopilot kicked off and the nose dropped. They eventually fixed that problem, if I recall.
One peculiar aspect was that the number 2 engine in the tail was angled down at about 2.5°. We tried not to use it for taxiing, as we were already worried about blowing things over…some would limit how much they used it when air refuelling, too, as a big input could push the nose down.
Something you may not know about the KC-10: well, it had a large space under the cargo floor that was just empty. I think it was the galley on the DC-10, but the Air Force had no need. We called it “The Pool Room”; I was told it was because you could put a pool table in there, and have room to play. Getting into it was a hassle.
You could access the KC-10 through the nose gear. We occasionally had to do that; you’d climb up & shimmy through the avionics compartment, eventually ending up in the cockpit. It was a tight fit!
The newer KC-46 is a decent aircraft. It’s had teething issues, but they will eventually sort it out. The problem is that losing the KC-10 still represents a major loss of overall capacity, as there will be less fuel in the air at any given time. The Air Force already can’t meet all its demand for Air Refueling, and I’m afraid that is much worse today.
My favourite aircraft to refuel was the B-1; it wasn’t particularly cool or anything, but when it showed up on your schedule in Afghanistan, they were going to take about 100k lbs of fuel…and your day just got a lot shorter!
My least favourite aircraft to refuel was the A-10. It doesn’t have the power of other jets and flies pretty slowly; we had to use slats and sometimes flaps to get slow enough. Above certain weights, it was just not possible.
The deck angle when refuelling A-10s could be in excess of 5° nose up…almost feels like you are setting up for a power-on stall. We had a procedure to help called a “Toboggan”…we’d enter a slight descent at around 300 feet per minute. That gave the A-10 the help it needed to get on the boom, but you only had 1,000’ below you before you’d be outside of your protected airspace, so you’d only get 3 minutes or so. Then you’d have to climb up & do it again.
Nobody was necessarily bad at meeting the tanker, and we went out of our way to come to them. It didn’t always work, but we usually managed to end up 1-3 miles in front of them. Many fighter types referred to the KC-10 as the “mothership” because it was so large and was just there, in front of you.
Occasionally, the AWACs would control our rejoins. They didn’t seem to have much practice doing so; I can recall them vectoring us to our bomber, and vectoring the bomber to us…AWACs handed us off nose to nose at around 3 miles, closing at probably 600-700 knots. We were separated by 1,000’, so it wasn’t unsafe, but AWACs kind of said, “There you go,” and we immediately shot past each other in opposite directions. It was funny…we took over & directed a mutual turn on the same magnetic heading, which at least put us abeam each other & fixed it from there.
The KC-10 set the bar for tanker ops, hands down. As we discussed, the flexibility to do any Air Refueling mission at any time was key, and our ability to be refuelled meant we could be doing it for long hours.
We also had a significant cargo capacity. You could load up support troops and their equipment, then drag multiple fighters across an ocean. When you landed, you were almost your own little Air Force and could start operations quickly.
1A good tanker crew got to be a mini family. We didn’t use ranks in the KC-10 while flying, but rather, first names. We wanted every member of the crew to feel like they could speak up if they saw something wrong; everyone knew who the Aircraft Commander was, but that wasn’t something you wanted to flex on your crew – doing so may mean you win the battle, but you’re losing the war.
A good crew got to the point where they knew what everyone else needed, and they were ready before anyone asked. They understood the bigger picture, and took care of each other; you could complain, but my only rule was that the complaints better be funny because there wasn’t a lot we could do about most of it…it was better to laugh about it than to make each other miserable.
Big Sexy was the most common name, yes. Sometimes referred to as Gucci, but the official name was the Extender.
Three engines weren’t particularly unusual, no. The tail engine was exactly like the other two, but with a longer cowling. It was angled down slightly, though, as I mentioned.
If you had an engine failure (like we did in the simulator every quarter), you hoped it would be the tail engine. There was no asymmetrical thrust; the loss of one of the wing engines caused a lot of asymmetrical thrust, which required a lot of rudder to counteract.
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There’s a Hush-Kit Book of Warplanes Vol 1, and there will soon be a Vol 2 and then a Vol 3!
Thank you for reading the Hush-Kit site. It’s all been a massive labour of love to which I have devoted much time over the last 12 years. There are over 1100 free articles on Hush-Kit; think of the work that’s gone into that! To keep this going, consider donating (see button on top of page) or supporting on Patreon. Not having a sponsor or paid content keeps this free, unbiased (other than to the Whirlwind) and a lot naughtier. We can only do this with your support. I love this site and want it to keep going; this is where you come in.
To those who already support us I’d like to say a big thank you.
All the best, Hush-Kit
10 Advanced Features of the World’s Most Impressive Piston-Engined Aeroplane, the Incredible Republic XF-12 Rainbow Spyplane
In 1943, the USAAF desperately needed an aircraft that could fly a vast distance, penetrate the Japanese Empire’s defence, outrun fighters, perform vital reconnaissance of the heartland and then fly back. This was a very tall order in 1943, even more so when the USAAF demanded a 400mph aeroplane capable of prolonged flight at 40,000 feet. This was the first time a reconnaissance aircraft was designed from scratch, not a converted fighter or bomber, but a modern dedicated camera platform incorporating all the latest technical advances. This was a new game, and manufacturers cock-blocked from the heavy aircraft market now stood a chance. Republic, creator of the incredible P-47, leapt the opportunity to compete for this potentially lucrative opportunity. The result was the superb Republic Rainbow, the most impressive piston-engine aircraft ever flown.
10. Empire of pane
Long before Concorde used its famous ‘droopsnoot’ to exchange high-speed aerodynamics for a better view for the pilot during landing, the Rainbow had a similar solution. Like the earlier the B-29, the Rainbow had a nose of curved glass panes. While B-29 crews loved the curved glazed nose for the unobstructed view in flight, and its low drag, they hated the fact it cast dangerously distracting reflections during landing. Designer Kartveli (the genius behind the P-47) was keen to avoid the B-29’s problem, and his solution was to make the curved sections of glass in the nose slide out of the way when not required, revealing a flat windscreen.
Shhh, here’s a secret link to the Hush-Kit Substack which has a load of very cool aviation articles.
9. Obscene speed
Very few piston-engined aircraft exceeded 450mph, even fewer could exceed 470mph. The only piston-engined aircraft (other than heavily modified racers) that have reached 470 mph were: the F4U-5, Ta 152H, Hornet, Do 335, P-47M, XP-82, Fury/Sea Fury, Spiteful, P-51H, XP-72 and XP-47J. The Rainbow is quite unlike the other aircraft, which are all fighters, and mostly single-engined radials. The Rainbow was the fastest four piston aircraft ever to fly.
8. Obsene Climbrate
The Rainbow’s astonishing climb rate of 5,000 feet per minute made it a better climber than most of the ultimate piston-engined fighters, including the Tigercat and even the Supermarine Spiteful.
7. Obscene Power
13,000 horsepower is a hell of a lot of power. To put this in perspective, the B-17 Flying Fortress had 4800 horsepower, meaning the Rainbow had 2.7 times more. The four-engined Rainbow had a superior power-to-weight ratio to the rival XF-11, boasting 0.128 to the XF-11’s 0.103. Like the rival Hughes XF-11, the XF-12 utilised the Pratt & Whitney R-4360 radial engine.
Instead of the usual two rows of nine cylinders like most large radial engines, the 4360 was unusual in having four rows of seven cylinders. Though this configuration presented cooling issues for the aft cylinders, it did bless the engine with a comparatively small frontal area for such a powerful engine.
6. Range
The second prototype flew coast-to-coast in the USA. The aircraft could fly more than 4,000 miles on internal fuel.
5. High altitude
The Rainbow could reach 40,000 feet, around 8,000 feet higher than the B-29. In tests it had exceeded 44,000 feet.
4. Extra power
The Rainbow featured a radical turbo supercharger arrangement, where spent exhaust gases were channelled through a narrow oval jet pipe, providing an extra 300 horsepower of power.
3. The flying darkroom
Much photographic intelligence is extremely time-sensitive. The Rainbow featured an onboard darkroom and intelligence specialists, meaning on landing, the aircraft had interpreted intelligence ready to be shared, a forerunner of today’s real-time data linking of visual footage.
2. Streamlining
Design leadership from Republic’s Alex Kartveli, creator of the superb P-47 Thunderbolt, emphasised streamlining almost unprecedentedly for the XF-12. The B-29 had redefined the modern aeroplane; the Rainbow, flying four years later, took many of these ideas even further. The attention to detail was incredible, producing what may have been the aerodynamically cleanest four-prop aircraft ever flown. Like the Mustang before it, it was an ultra ‘hygienic’ design. Every proturbence that could be eliminated, was, in a fanatical quest for the least drag.
As an example, cooling air for the oil coolers and intercoolers came from neat inlets in the wing leading edge. These were extremely efficient, and once used, the now heated air was routed through flush exhausts, angled backwards, at the underside of the nacelle, generating some handy extra horsepower.
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1. Civil options
An airliner variant, the 46-seat RC-2, was planned to kick open the civil market door. The RC-2 would have been a superb airliner, the best in its class and far superior to the offerings of Lockheed and Douglas. Unlike the Rainbow, the RC-2 was to have only one turbo-supercharger per nacelle (as opposed to two), making the heavier aircraft marginally slower. Despite this, it would still have been able to fly 3,450 miles at 400mph at 40,000 feet. American Airlines was the planned launch customer, with an initial order for twenty.
Was the worst MiG-23 so terrible?
MiG-23MS, the worst MiG-23?
In Hush-Kit’s video (see end of article) on the 10 worst Soviet aircraft, the MiG-23MS was lambasted as a piece of shit. Today, I’m NOT going to complain about how crappy the MiG-23MS was. Instead, I will tell you two things which it did better than the MiG-23M and MiG-23MF.
1. Internal fuel capacity
The MiG-23MS had the largest internal fuel capacity of any MiG-23 fighter variant. Since it didn’t have the heavy and voluminous Sapfir-23D-III radar of the MiG-23M, a part of the avionics bay behind the cockpit could be used for more fuel. The extra space was used to install fuel tank № 1a, and tank № 1 was larger, same as on the MiG-23BN. This meant that the MiG-23MS had 5400 litres of usable internal fuel (again, same as on the MiG-23BN). Total internal fuel was 5626 litres. For comparison, the MiG-23M and MF had 4700 litres of usable internal fuel (4910-4928 L of total internal fuel). The MiG-23ML had an even smaller internal capacity, since it doesn’t have fuel tank № 4 either. Just 4300 L usable internal fuel volume, 4440-4458 L of total volume. The worst was the MiG-23UB, with 4240 L total internal fuel volume.
Note: if you want to calculate weights, standard Soviet fuel density at 15° C considered was 0.830 kg/L for the T-1 kerosene, and 0.785 kg/L for TS-1.
2: Empty aircraft weight
Since the MiG-23MS swapped the MiG-23M’s Sapfir-23D-III (or MiG-23MF’s Sapfir-23E) for the MiG-21’s RP-22SM “Jaybird” radar (just like the MiG-23S). This resulted in a noticeable weight reduction. I’ve never managed to find out how much an empty MiG-23MS weighs, but I can look at the radar weights and take a guess. The MiG-23M/MF radar weighs 564.5/641 kg. The MiG-21BIS radar (RP-22SMA) weighs 196.3 kg.
Now we can’t just subtract the difference between the two, because I don’t know if any ballast weight was necessary. If not, then that would mean at most 368.2/444.7 kg difference between the MS and M/MF. Considering also the lack of TP-23 IRST, my guess about 58 kg (that’s how much the TP-23M, изд. 26Ш1, of the MiG-23ML weighs).
So at most, a 426.2/502.7 kg weight difference, for reference an empty MiG-23M/MF should weigh about 10845-10890 kg. An empty MiG-23ML/MLD-export should weigh 10150 kg to 10230 kg (some give 10310 kg).
But can we find any confirmation for these from former MiG-23 pilots?
But can we find any confirmation from former MiG-23 pilots? The following pilot’s impressions are the only that I’ve found that confirm these features of the MiG-23MS:
Of course, none of this means to insinuate that the MiG-23MS was a good fighter. It had poor weapons (R-3S, R-3R & R-13M at best), structural problems limiting the maximum load factor, crude flight controls, poor roll-yaw stability at high AoA (all of these giving hard-wing Phantom levels of manoeuverability at best), bad visibility out of the cockpit… really, its only redeeming features were high speed & supersonic acceleration.
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Top 10 jet fighters ranked by claimed kills
Judged on the number of aerial victories, the shooting down of crewed aircraft, what are the top 10 jet fighters? This question is often avoided as the research involved is seemingly impossible, but we’re willing to have a go. As you’d imagine, there’s a bucketload of provisos (see below) but the top 10 is almost definitely correct in terms of the aircraft types featured, the top five even more so. Of course, claims are often dubious and prone to propaganda deformations and genuine mistaken assessments. This is to be expected, and should not stop us carrying out this interesting survey. The figures, like war itself, are sometimes dirty and cannot be regarded as 100% accurate. Regarding the veracity of the claims, I’ve made the best possible efforts with the numbers, but I’d be delighted to be corrected—but only with corrections that come with reliable sources, please. Notably, there is a large cluster of jet fighters with a kill number in the twenties including the Sea Harrier (likely the highest British entry), the Mirage F1, MiG-23 and F-105.
Away from the coldness of figures alone, we must also take a minute to consider the human lives lost in air combat.
Let us take a look at the ten most (proven) effective fighter aircraft in history:
10. Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-17
Number of kills: 67+
9. General Dynamics F-16
Number of kills: Circa 76
8. McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle
Number of kills: 105
7. Grumman F-14 Tomcat
Number of kills: 135
6. Dassault Mirage III/V, Nesher
Number of kills: 200-400
NOTE: the number of Israeli claims seems extremely high, hence the large range of numbers given.
5. Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21
Photo: Deutsches Museum
Circa 240-300
4. McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II
Number of kills: 306+
3. Messerschmitt Me 262
Number: 542
2. North American F-86 Sabre
Number: 792+
- Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15
claimed 1,106 aircraft
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NOTES
Mirage F1 circa 24
Hawker Hunter 22
MiG-23 25 (tie with F-5) – with 6 verified
F-105 29
The smashed screen that crashed an empire
I love writing for this site and I put a ton of time into it. I keep it free for all as I think that’s a positive thing to put into the world. Last night I accidentally smashed my laptop, an expensive mistake that pauses operations on this site (I can do simple posts like this from my phone but real posts require a laptop). If you enjoy this site and are feeling generous, you will see donation buttons at the bottom and top of this screen. Please do consider helping me get back on the case.
Much appreciated,
Hush-Kit
Is one or two engines better in a fighter?
The debate on single versus twin engines for fighter aircraft continues. Paul Stoddart* follows Gen Chuck Horner and David Baker, PhD into the ring.
The choice of engine is a fundamental design driver for any aircraft – both the type and the number. One or two engines and one or two seats are fundamental choices for fighter aircraft. However, while a second seat can be spliced into even smaller designs, the number of engines is fixed (the metamorphosis of the twin F-5 into the cancelled single-engined F-20 is an exception).
After decades of study and experience, the debate on one versus two engines continues. General Charles Horner, USAF, offered his views in the October ’98 issue of Air Forces Monthly, with Dr David Baker adding to the debate in the June ’99 issue of Air International.
![Thrust vector nozzles (TVC) of Sukhoi Su-30SM Flanker-C jet engines [3862 × 2575] : r/WarplanePorn](https://i0.wp.com/i.imgur.com/Phhlu9o.jpg?w=830&ssl=1)
General Horner emphasised the increasing reliability of engines and the lower cost of single-engine designs. Dr Baker balanced that approach by highlighting the unique performance advantages of twin-engine layouts. Two engines have a safety advantage over singles, but they are not major advantages, and the price paid for them is high. Indeed, General Horner argued convincingly that even with its likely higher lifetime losses due to engine failure, the single-engine fighter fleet would still work out cheaper. But will the superior aerodynamic performance of the twin help it gain air supremacy? If so, the extra cost will be money well spent – there is nothing more expensive than a second-rate fighter. Of course, there is more to air supremacy than manoeuvrability. Radar and missile performance are crucial, effective command and control is a force enhancer, and signature control is increasingly important.
Over the next few decades in the West, we may well see the service entry of the twin-engined GCAP, FCAS and whatever the US goes for. The current twin-engined designs are the F-15, Super Hornet, Rafale, Typhoon and F-22; the F-35, F-16 and Gripen represent the single-engine design school.
When a new aircraft is chosen, the engine number will be one of several fascinating design drivers. While a second seat can be spliced into even the smaller designs (Gripen and F-16) engine number is almost invariably fixed (F-20 weirdness aside). Cost and survivability are leading factors in the engine number debate, but there are two other issues: availability and commonality. Specifically, which engine types are available for use, and which do you already use? These points largely arise from the cost question but should be examined in their own right.
It is beyond argument that twin-engined fighters cost more to buy and support than their single-engine equivalents. The twin-engine proponents claim improved survivability in peace and wartime flying, justifying the extra expense. A commonly quoted statistic is that the extra engine buys around 15% lower attrition in combat. General Horner quoted the loss rates for US fighter aircraft from the ’50s to the ’90s (presumably peacetime losses). He correctly emphasised the major improvement for both types but then stated that the difference has narrowed significantly. The difference in raw numbers has fallen from a high of 5 in the ’60s to one in the ’90s. However, the proportional difference, i.e. the relative likelihood of losing an aircraft, should also be considered. In that respect, a twin was little better in the ’50s than a single, suffering 90% of the latter’s loss rate. However, for the following four decades to the late 1990s, the twins had an average loss rate of 64% of the single.
As the General pointed out, the lower lifetime cost of the single-engine fighter can more than offset its higher lifetime loss rate. There are, however, three counterarguments. Firstly, many nations buy fighters in small numbers and use them for long periods, two decades or more. The lower loss rate of the twin will better sustain fleet size, whereas the single could decline into ineffectiveness. Readers may remember the period in the mid-90s when the USAF lost five F-16s in quick succession owing to engine failure. The failure, resulting from a manufacturing defect, was not in itself catastrophic and a twin could have got home on its remaining engine. Although the USAF could absorb such losses, most nations could not.
The twin-engined option, being a larger aircraft, will have more potential for upgrade of new weapons and systems. Thirdly, when second-hand aircraft are procured, the extra purchase cost of the twin-engined fleet versus the single option is unlikely to be a showstopper, and the higher lifetime cost may be acceptable given the preceding two arguments. Incidentally, the General’s second experience of engine loss involved a contained failure of a turbine blade in an F-15. He shut down that engine and recovered on the remaining unit. Had that happened in an F-16 the aircraft would almost certainly have been lost. Coincidentally, at the time of writing, the Taiwan Air Force had just grounded its F-16A/B fleet for the second time within a few months. An F-16 was lost in August with an apparent engine problem; this followed three other engine-related accidents since March 98. Issues with the P&W F100 turbofan previously caused the grounding of the US and Israeli Air Force F-16 fleets.
Sometimes, we use two engines because we have no choice. Airframes are designed around engines, but aircraft start as a collection of performance requirements. The speed, range and so forth that the customer wants are distilled into a number of engine parameters with thrust remaining a priority for fighters. If there is an engine that meets those targets in a solo installation then, on cost grounds, it will probably win. If not, then the huge cost of engine development will likely be prohibitive and will rule out the single option. A twin-engine selection could well be the only choice. The F-22 has two 35,000 lb (wet thrust) P&W F119 engines. There is no 70,000 lb class alternative in the military engine class. Both the Lockheed and Boeing JSF contenders use a single engine – a derivative of the F119 is sufficiently powerful and is the obvious choice for these projects where low cost is a crucial design goal.
Similarly, the Saab Gripen needs 12,250 lb dry and 18,100 lb wet thrust to achieve its performance requirement; a single RM12 (F404 –GE-400) makes sense. Puzzlingly, the AIDC A-1 Ching-Kuo uses two TFE1042-70 turbofans to provide similar thrust and roughly equal performance to the Gripen. Perhaps the specification emphasises survivability (or there is some export limitation).
There is a strong argument that air forces should choose a high-low mix of aircraft. The more capable fighters are costly and can only be procured in small numbers, whereas the cheaper aircraft will lack certain capabilities. Buying some of each should provide sufficient force size and capability to produce a truly effective fleet. If both types use the same engine, then large savings in maintenance, training, facilities and spares will accrue. Generally, the high-end fighter will be larger than its low-end partner. If both use a single engine then, to achieve reasonable performance, those engines must be of different types, and the duplication of support effort will be expensive. The best example of the common engine, high-low mix is the F-15 and F-16, both of which use the P&W F100. The later F-22 and JSF do not share a common engine, the Pratt & Whitney F135 of the F-35 being a distinct development from the F119 it is based on.
Saab’s Gripen E-series has adopted the F414-GE-39E turbofan, suggesting a good high-low mix, partnering it with the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. The Russian MoD would ideally would like a future force of Su-57Ms twins and single-engined Su-75s both powered by the AL-51F-1. Interestingly, the Azerbaijani Air Forces will be operating the twin MiG-29 and the single JF-17 (with similar closely related engines) at least for a while simultaneously. The JF-17C Block 3 will be fitted with more capable equipment, giving the unusual situation of the high-low and low-medium mix.
An extension of this idea of community may be that a next-generation European ‘Loyal Wingman ‘-like the project would benefit from engine commonality with either Typhoon, Rafale or Gripen E, or perhaps more expensively, engine commonality with the next generation. Fitting a larger UCAV with an existing generation engine (such as the EJ200) may be a good move, as well as insurance against a cancelled ‘high’.
Paul Stoddart served as an engineer officer in the Royal Air Force for eight years. He now works for the Defence Evaluation & Research Agency (DERA). This article is his personal view on the subject and does not necessarily reflect RAF, Ministry of Defence or DERA policy.
NOTE: *The original article has been updated to reflect its date of 1998. I just found it sitting in the WordPress drafts folder many years after Paul sent it to me.