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In an assuming suburb in North-West London can be found the fabulous RAF Museum London (though to Hush-Kit it will always be Hendon). As well as a wealth of A-listers including Spitfires, an English Electric Lightning and a Vulcan, it is home to world-class machines often criminally overlooked by more casual visitors. Hush-Kit asked Dr Peter Johnston, Head of Collections & Research at the museum, to share his favourite overlooked aeroplanes.

(Hush-Kit would like to thank Ajay Srivastava for his help in creating this article)

10. Bristol Beaufighter TF.X

The Beaufighter strike fighter, with its formidable armament, operated with distinction in North West Europe. Unlike the more famous Mosquito multi-role combat aircraft, it was also able to translate its success to different theatres, gaining a considerable reputation in the Mediterranean and the Far East. Operated by both the British and Australian air forces in the Far East it quickly became known to the Japanese as the ‘Whispering Death.’

This is a long way from the Beaufighter’s origins as a domestic night fighter. The prototype flew on 17 July 1939 and the first production Beaufighters were delivered to the Royal Air Force in the following April. The type was the first high performance night fighter equipped with airborne interception radar and successfully operated against the German night raids in the winter of 1940-1941. Later the Beaufighter was introduced into Coastal Command as a strike fighter. Its original formidable gun armament was retained but rockets and torpedoes were added giving it an even greater fire power.

5,562 Beaufighters had been produced by the time the last one was delivered in September 1945 and fifty-two operational Royal Air Force squadrons had been equipped with the type.

After its withdrawal from operational use many Beaufighters were converted to target tug duties and in fact the last flight of the type in Royal Air Force service took place on 17 May 1960 when a TT10 made a final target towing flight from Seletar.

9. Hawker Hart II

First flown in July 1928, the Hart day bomber was one of the most advanced aircraft of its time with exceptional capability. Although designed as a bomber it had a performance superior to any fighter aircraft then in existence.

Over four-hundred Harts were built for the Royal Air Force and seven home-based regular bomber squadrons were equipped as well as eleven auxiliary and reserve units. Less than two years after its introduction into service at home, Harts were being used by overseas squadrons in the Middle East and India.

With such an exceptional basic design Sydney Camm and the Hawker team were able to develop later versions. The Audax, Demon, Hardy, Hind and the Hector all show clearly how important the Hart influence was on a whole era of British aircraft design. A number of these later types saw limited operational use in World War Two. So advanced was the performance of the Hart bomber and its derivatives that the Royal Air Force’s training aircraft were incapable of providing adequate experience to the Service’s pilots. A trainer version of the Hart was therefore designed in 1932.

Ultimately, the Hart was one of a series of similar Hawker aircraft which were the mainstay of the Royal Air Force during the 1930s, which is perhaps why it is overlooked. As an interwar aircraft, it also suffers from serving in a period that is too often overlooked in favour of the conlficts that bracketed it, particularly the Second World War given the famous Hawker aircraft that fought there. Yet the Hart, and its variants, were instrumental in enabling the Royal Air Force to operate effectively in some of the most inhospitable parts of the world.

8. Consolidated B–24 Liberator

Although often overshadowed by the B-17 Flying Fortress, the B-24 Liberator was built in greater numbers than any other US military aircraft and served with distinction in both war and peace.

The first B-24 Liberator made its maiden flight on 29 December 1939. It had been designed by the Consolidated Aircraft Corporation to rival and improve on the Boeing B-17, the type proved an outstanding success, with 18,500 aircraft being built by Consolidated, Douglas, North American and Ford between 1940 and 1945.

The RAF was the second-largest operator of Liberators. 1,900 B-24s were supplied to the Royal Air Force via purchase and through Lend Lease, with some of the earliest aircraft having originally been intended for France and the French l’Armée de l’Air in 1940 that were never developed. Others were transferred directly in theatre, bringing the RAF’s total to just over 2,000.

Liberators were used by RAF bomber squadrons in the Middle East, and from January 1944 became the principal RAF strategic bomber in the Far East. Liberators were also deployed by RAF Coastal Command, playing a key role in the war against Germany’s submarine fleet. Liberators also saw service as transports; indeed, (AL504 Commando) became the personal aircraft of Prime Minister Winston Churchill for a short time. While the Liberator is often overlooked in favour of the Lancaster and Halifax, and it’s public recognition undoubtedly suffers from the greater public attention given to the role of bombers in the strategic air offensive against Germany, it played a major role in the RAF’s war.

Liberators continued in use until December 1968 when the Indian Air Force retired its former RAF machines, and the Liberator on display in the Hangar 5 in London was presented to the Museum by the Indian Government in 1974.

7. Sepecat Jaguar GR.1

The Sepecat Jaguar was a tactical support and ground-attack aircraft, and the result of a joint Anglo-French design programme. As well as serving with RAF, it also served with the French and Indian air forces. Eight first-line RAF squadrons were equipped with the Jaguar from 1974 and was a major element in RAF Germany’s Cold-War era air capability until supplanted by the Tornado in 1985.

The biggest user of the Jaguar was RAF Germany where it was operated by five squadrons. Four squadrons were based at RAF Brüggen, the first of which, No. 14 Squadron stood up in April 1975, where Jaguars began replacing Phantoms in the strike/attack/reconnaissance role thereby releasing Phantoms to replace Lightnings in the Air Defence role; and it was to No. 14 Squadron that the Museum’s XX824 was delivered in late 1975. The fifth Squadron, No. 2 Squadron, stationed at Laarbruch operated Jaguar in the Tactical Reconnaissance role.

Of 400 Jaguars built 203 were delivered to the RAF. Jaguars of the Coltishall Strike Wing performed sterling work in the Gulf War of 1991 destroying Iraqi artillery and missile positions during Operation Desert Storm.

Jaguars were due to be used again in the skies over Iraq during the 2003 invasion, but the Turkish government forbade coalition aircraft based in Turkey from participating in the invasion and despite the recent upgrades, a Defence White Paper in 2004 brought forward the retirement of the type by two years with an out of service date of October 2007. With only five days’ notice this date was brought forward to 30th April 2007.

This rather hurried timetable meant that the Jaguar was slipped rather unnoticed into the pages of RAF history. But it had played a significant role in the RAF. For ten years from the mid-1970s it was the lead strike/attack aircraft of the RAF, and it was also the first aircraft in RAF service to be produced by an international partnership – a model which is now common in military aircraft design and production.

6. Sopwith Triplane

The world of First World War aviation is dominated by certain ideas and aircraft types. Thanks to Biggles, there is an enduring affection for the Sopwith Camel, and even for the S.E.5 of Wilks. When it comes to triplanes, few people look beyond Richthofen. Yet few realise that the Sopwith Triplane on display in Hanger 2 is both British and also played a major role in Richthofen’s rise to enduring fame.

The Sopwith Triplane prototype appeared in May 1916 and was found to be highly manoeuvrable with a phenomenal rate of climb. Both the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service ordered the type but policy changes led to the Triplane only being used by the Royal Naval Air Service fighter squadrons on the Western Front.

Several of the Royal Naval Air Squadron pilots scored many victories while flying the type and it made such a profound impression on the Germans that a specific request was made to their aircraft manufacturers to design and produce triplane fighters. Only the Fokker Dr1 was built in quantity and it gained fame as the aircraft frequently flown by Richthofen. The triplane concept had a brief life and in less than two years it had been eclipsed by the new and more powerful biplane fighters on both sides.

5. de Havilland Vampire F3

The Vampire was a first generation jet fighter which saw service in the immediate post-war period with Royal Air Force front-line fighter squadrons in the United Kingdom and Germany, followed by further service with the Royal Auxiliary Air Force.

Work on the design of the DH100 began in May 1942 and the prototype made its first flight on 20 September 1943. Originally called the Spider Crab it was re-named Vampire when ordered into production for the Royal Air Force. The first aircraft did not become available until 1945 and the Vampire did not enter service until the early summer of 1946.

The Vampire F3 was a long-range version of the basic F1, with a re-designed tail unit. On 14 July 1948 six Vampire 3s of No.54 Squadron became the first ever jet aircraft to fly across the Atlantic under their own power.

This small unsophisticated aircraft, of relatively unusual design, was viewed with great fondness by many pilots who nicknamed it the ‘aerial kiddy car.’ Unassuming – almost comical in appearance – and as part of that transition from piston to jet engine, it is often overlooked.

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4. Bristol Belvedere HC1

Before the Chinook cam the Belvedere. The Belvedere was the Royal Air Force’s first twin engined, twin rotor helicopter to enter service. It was designed to carry supplies and freight – up to 2,720kg – in support of the British Army.

During its operational service Great Britain began the slow and sometimes painful task of withdrawing from its Empire and this aircraft was involved in many of those operations in the Middle and Far East. In 1963 the Belvederes of No. 26 Squadron based in Aden (now part of Yemen) operated against rebels in then-Tanganyika, now Tanzania, and then saw service in support of the Army in the Aden Emergency of 1963-67. It’s heavy lift capability proved crucial there.

In the Far East, belvederes of No. 66 Squadron were active in support of Army operations during the Brunei revolt of 1962-66. It was in this campaign that the aircraft received their nickname (which passed to the Squadron) of ‘the Flying Long-houses’, as the indigenous people had no word for helicopter in their language.

Unfortunately, the Belvedere suffered a number of problems, including a propensity to catch fire, and for this reason its service life was cut short. It’s relative short service period of just 8 years, and its involvement in the retreat from Empire, means it is not a recognisable as a type, and as such is sometimes neglected in a visit to the museum.

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3. Lockheed Hudson IIIA

The Lockheed Hudson was a military version of the American Lockheed 14 Super Electra airliner and was ordered for the Royal Air Force in June 1938. Hudsons entered service with Coastal Command in 1939. Used extensively over United Kingdom waters on anti-submarine and general reconnaissance duties, Hudsons were also used overseas. In total, the RAF received just over 2,000 Hudsons, 800 of which were purchased, the remainder supplied under American Lend-Lease contracts.

When Hudsons reached obsolescence in the maritime role they were stripped of their armament and re-employed as transports. Some of these aircraft were used in the very hazardous task of carrying Allied agents into and out of Nazi-occupied Europe.

The Hudson can claim an impressive list of firsts including being the first Allied aircraft to shoot down an enemy while operating from the British Isles. It was also the first aircraft to capture a U-boat when U-570 surrendered to a No.269 Squadron Hudson on 27 August 1941.
A Hudson was also the first aircraft equipped to carry airborne lifeboats for air sea rescue duties.

However, it was never in the forefront of wartime publicity, and the role of Coastal Command is likewise neglected in public recognition in favour of Bomber and Fighter Command. As such, the Hudson is often overlooked by our visitors, despite its significant history.

2. Fiat CR.42 Falco

Designed by Celestino Rosatelli, the Italian Fiat CR.42 was the last single-seat biplane fighter to be manufactured by any Second World War combatant. CR.42s took part in the invasion of Southern France, where early success gave a misleading impression of its combat performance and Italian tactics, and later fought against the RAF in the Battle of Britain.

While it was the best biplane in service in 1940, the CR.42 was completely outclassed by RAF fighters in the Battle of Britain. Those that were committed suffered many losses. Its armament of two machine guns was no more than a First World War fighter and it was unable to inflict major damage on its opponents

In October 1940, this CR.42 served with the ‘Corpo Aereo Italiano’. It force-landed at Orford Ness on 11 November 1940 during an Italian air raid on Harwich. The pilot, Pietro Salvadori, was taken prisoner and his aircraft was later repaired and tested by the RAF. It is one of only two intact, original CR.42s in existence and forms part of the Museum’s ‘Fighter Four’ display, a unique collection of the four principal single-seat fighters engaged in the Battle of Britain, each a genuine survivor of that conflict.

Yet because the role of the Italians in the Battle of Britain is not generally as well known, the casual museum visitor might see the biplane and think it belongs to a different era, and overlook its remarkable history

1. Supermarine Stranraer

The Supermaine Stranraer was the final development of the Southampton flying boat to be put into production and was one of the world’s last biplane flying boats.

A production contract was placed in August 1935 for seventeen aircraft. The first joined No.228 Squadron at Pembroke Dock in early 1937. Two units were equipped with Stranraers during the early part of the Second World War. Withdrawn from operational service in March 1941, they continued to serve in a training capacity until October 1942.

Curiously, the Stranraer was built in greater numbers and had a longer service life outside the United Kingdom than with the Royal Air Force. Selected by the Royal Canadian Air Force, the type was put into production by Canadian Vickers who built forty. The Stranraer at the London site was built by Canadian Vickers at its St. Hubert, Montreal, Quebec Plant, using British equipment

Eight were in service with the Canadians at the outbreak of war. Hese aircraft were used for patrol duties both on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. They were finally retired from service in February 1945.

After retirement from service use, several Stranraers were registered for civil use. Queen Charlotte Airlines continued to use Stranraers into the 1950s, operating from Vancouver and providing a service along the pacific coast of British Columbia.

The Stranraer is the only aircraft at the RAF Museum site that has never moved, remaining in the same place since the museum first opened 50 years ago. While many visitors many be drawn to the Fighter Four from the Battle of Britain, or the Lancaster, they risk missing a key component of the Museum’s collection.

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The RAF Museum Midlands (formerly RAF Museum Cosford) in the United Kingdom has one of the greatest collections of military aircraft in the world. We asked Tom Hopkins, Curator of Aircraft and Exhibits, at the museum to choose 10 aircraft often criminally overlooked by visitors.

(Hush-Kit would like to thank Ajay Srivastava for his help)

10. Bristol M.1C

Asked to think about aviation in the First World War, and most people would probably visualise bi- or even triplanes battling in the skies over France. If we think of monoplanes at all, then the German Eindecker series probably comes to mind – the villains of the ‘Fokker Scourge’ between July 1915 and early 1916.

However, the British also operated a small number of a single monoplane type during the War. Owing to an institutional distrust of monoplanes, only 125 Bristol M.1C airframes would be ordered. The M.1C’s streamlined design, and the lower drag experienced by the absence of a second pair of wings, resulted in an impressive performance, with a top speed approaching 130 mph/ 210 km/h. A small number were deployed to Palestine, where they were reasonably effective at deterring Turkish reconnaissance flights over allied positions. The M.1C proved even more successful on the Macedonian front, where the flying ace Captain Frederick Dudley Travers scored five of his nine kills.

Despite these successes, the M.1C was never deployed operationally to France and the type was quickly withdrawn from service at the close of the War in 1918. The RAF would not see another monoplane fighter until the introduction of the Hawker Hurricane in late 1937.

As well as an impressive top speed, the M.1C also had a respectable service ceiling. A Chilean example, piloted by Dagoberto Godoy, was the first aircraft to fly over the Andes.

9. Gloster Gladiator

From an early monoplane, we turn to a late biplane. In fact, the Gloster Gladiator was the last biplane fighter to enter service with the RAF, which it did in early 1937. This was around the same time that the Germans were introducing the Messerschmitt Bf 109, two years after the Soviets introduced the Polikarpov I-16, and five years after the Americans introduced the Boeing P-26 ‘Peashooter’ monoplanes. This goes to show just how committed the Air Ministry were to biplane designs, even as they became increasingly obsolete. That said, the Gladiator did have some modern features. It was the first RAF fighter aircraft to have an enclosed cockpit, and its armament of four .303 machine guns was double that of its predecessors.

Nonetheless, by the outbreak of the Second World War, the Gladiator was very much outclassed by newer designs. Relegated to secondary theatres, it performed better against less formidable opposition. In Malta, Gladiators flown by Fleet Air Arm and RAF pilots held their own against the Italian Air Force. For a time the Gladiator was the only aircraft type defending the islands, before they could be reinforced by Hurricanes. Gladiators also served with the British in Norway, North and East Africa, Greece, Iraq, and Syria.

The last known Gladiator victory of the War went not to the British but to the Finns, when in February 1943 a Soviet Polikarpov R-5 was shot down during the Continuation War.

State -of-the-art it was not, but the Gladiator deserves recognition for being the last and most advanced biplane fighter to serve with the RAF.

8. Boulton Paul Defiant

British aerial defence planning in the 1930s was dominated by anxiety about invincible enemy bomber streams bringing the fight right up to the towns and cities of the UK. In many respects this anxiety was not unfounded. Slow, hulking Zeppelins had brought terror in the First World War – but now bombs were carried by fast and sleek aircraft. Creative solutions had to be sought to address this menace, and one of the more radical ones was the concept of a turret fighter.

Early experiments had seen the Hawker Demon fitted with a hydraulically powered turret, but it was clear that something faster than this biplane was needed. So was born the Defiant. Able to push 300mph, its four-gun turret was able to operate across a very broad field of fire. This would allow a Defiant to catch up with and get itself into the best position possible to engage enemy bombers. The concept was promising, and the Navy even ordered their own turret fighter – the Blackburn Roc.

With the outbreak of War, the Defiant did score some successes but proved to be far too vulnerable to enemy fighters like the Messerschmitt Bf 109. It was quickly withdrawn to nightfighting duties, and in turn was replaced in this role from 1943 onwards.

As an aircraft type, the Defiant may have been underwhelming. But we are lucky to have an ex-307 squadron example at the RAF Museum Midlands. Not only is it the only Defiant to survive today, it was also built only a few miles from the Museum in nearby Wolverhampton.

7. Gloster Javelin

Anxiety about enemy bombers did not entirely go away with the end of the Second World War. The dawning of the nuclear age occurred with increasingly capable strategic bombers. By 1949, the Soviet Union had tested its first nuclear device and had successfully introduced the Tu-4, an unlicenced and reverse-engineered version of the B-29 Superfortress. By the early 1950s, the first Soviet jet bombers were entering service.

The British needed an aircraft that could fly fast and high enough to counter these new threats, around the clock and in all weathers. The Javelin’s huge and distinctive delta wing accommodated fuel, four ADEN canon and up to four Firestreak missiles. An extra crewmember sat behind the pilot to operate the navigation and radar equipment. Although untested in combat, the Javelin would have been more than capable of outpacing the first generations of Soviet Bombers when it entered service in 1956.  

Despite its striking appearance and adequate capabilities, the Javelin had a relatively short service life. By 1968 the last examples were replaced in the interceptor role by the poster-boy of Cold War RAF interceptors – the English Electric Lightning. The Javelin may have been less popular with air show crowds than its supersonic successor, but it nevertheless formed an important part of the UK’s air defences for over a decade.

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6. Canadair Sabre

One fighter of the 1950s had an even shorter service life with the RAF than the Javelin. The Canadair Sabre was a Canadian-built version of the American F-86 Sabre, provided to the British with American funding from late 1952. The context to this procurement was the appearance of the MiG-15 in the Korean War (1950-53), which had given the West a bit of a shock. The MiGs certainly outperformed the Meteors operated by the Royal Australian Air Force in Korea, and earlier American jets like the F-80 Shooting Star. The USAF rushed their F-86s Sabres into the War, where they proved a more formidable opponent to the Soviet jet.

Back in the UK, the RAF’s fighter strength was formed mostly of Meteors and Vampires. Newer types, such as the Hunter and the (ultimately far less successful) Swift would not start to be introduced until 1954. In part, the Sabre was procured as a stop-gap measure to ensure that the RAF had a fighter able to tackle an increasingly sophisticated Soviet Air Force in Europe. As soon as the more modern British-designed fighters came online, the Sabres were returned to US ownership. They were then gifted by the Americans to the Italians and (in the wake of the Tito-Stalin split) to Yugoslavia. This process was completed by 1958.

That short service life is probably one of the reasons why we think of Sabres with the silver finish of the USAF rather than the green and grey of the RAF.

5. Avro Lincoln

Ask someone to think about British bombers, and it is likely they will come up with two key groups – the three four-engined ‘heavies’ of the Second World War (Stirling/ Halifax/ Lancaster), or the three V-bombers of the Cold War (Valiant/ Victor / Vulcan). What is less obvious in the public consciousness is what came in between these two groups.

The Avro Lincoln was a development of the Lancaster. It was longer, had a wider wingspan, a higher top speed, a higher service ceiling, and a longer range. It was an all-round improvement on the Lancaster, but its introduction into service right at the very close of the Second World War meant that it played no combat role in that conflict. Perhaps that is why the Lincoln is largely forgotten amongst its immediate predecessors, but as a type they nonetheless played an important role in the RAF.

The Lincoln saw service during the Mau Mau rebellion (1952–1960) and the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960). It was also exported to Argentina, and produced in Australia for the RAAF. In total, over 600 airframes were built – not an inconsiderable number for a large aircraft that came online during a period of acute defence cuts. Replaced by the Canberra and the V-Bombers, the Lincoln nonetheless remained in service with the RAF until 1963, being last used in the signals development role.

4. Avro York

Just as the Lincoln was derived from the Lancaster, so was the Avro York. As a specialised transport aircraft, the York had a very similar tail (with just one extra fin) and wings to the Lancaster. It had the same configuration of four Rolls Royce Merlin engines mounted in nacelles under forward of the wings’ leading edges. Many of the components found in the York were identical to those found in the Lancaster. The real difference between the two was to be found in the York’s square-sectioned fuselage. This may have made for a boxy and ungainly appearance, but it gave the York around double the internal capacity of the Lancaster – an important consideration when it comes to humping freight and people over long distances!

Unlike the Lincoln, the York was introduced to service before the end of the War. However, with priority given to building bombers, production of the York proceeded at a slow pace, before accelerating in the post-war climate.

With the RAF, the York is most famous for its role in transporting Winston Churchill (amongst other VIPs) all over the World, as well as flying as a blockade runner during the Berlin Air Lift. While an important aircraft to the RAF in terms of logistics, the York will probably never win any prizes for beauty.

3. Short Belfast

Any discussion of transport aircraft in RAF service cannot leave out the mighty Short Belfast. With a wingspan approaching 160ft, and an empty weight of nearly 60 tonnes, the Belfast is by some definitions the largest airframe in the RAF Museum’s collection. At its very best performance, it could fly over 350mph and had a ferry range of over 6000 miles. It was capable of carrying cargo including a single tank, or up to four Westland Whirlwind helicopters, or up to 150 fully-equipped troops. When it was introduced in 1966, it was the largest aircraft to be operated by the RAF had yet operated.

For such impressive statistics, its perhaps surprising to hear that only ten Belfasts were ever completed. Shorts had proposed a number of derivatives for the civilian market, but no orders were forthcoming. The RAF retired the Belfast in 1976 after just ten years’ service, before selling of their second-hand airframes to various civil operators. One was flying in Australia as recently as 2004. One suspects the success of Lockheed’s C-130 Hercules came at the expense of the Belfast. Ironically, the RAF would later charter the services of these civilian Belfasts for jobs which were just too big for the Hercules to manage.

2. Douglas Thor

Now this is strictly a missile and not an aircraft, but it is a pretty big one. Standing at 65ft (19.82m), the Douglas Thor makes for an impressive sight in the Museum’s National Cold War Exhibition. As an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) with a range of 1500 miles, the Thor formed part of the UK’s nuclear arsenal between 1959 and 1963. 60 missiles were operational, spread across 20 bases in Eastern England.

It is safe to say that the Thor has been relatively forgotten in the face of the V-Bombers, and later submarine-based Polaris and Trident ballistic missile systems. This is partly due to their relatively short service life of just four years, straddling some of the most dangerous periods of the Cold War. And maybe it is partly because the Thor just was not very good.

Unlike many American ballistic missile systems, the Thors were not kept underground in protected silos, but entirely above ground. Before being launched, they would need to be raised into position and fueled – a process that took around 15 minutes. If they were fuelled and not launched, the liquid oxygen present in the propellent would freeze certain components, and it would be some hours before the missile could be used again. In the face of an incoming ‘four-minute warning’ of impending nuclear attack, one wonders how much use the Thor would have been.

1. Fairchild Argus

The unimposing Fairchild Argus is the smallest aircraft on our list. It might appear to be just a civilian sporting aircraft in camouflage colours, and to an extent that is exactly what it is. The Argus was a commercially successful light aircraft that was produced from 1932. The USAAF showed an interest in acquiring the type for communications and light transport work and placed a contract, but under the Lend-Lease Act, these were transferred to the UK.

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As well as being operated by the RAF, the Argus served with the Air Transport Auxiliary (ATA). The ATA was a civilian organisation, tasked with ferrying new aircraft from factories to airfields, and damaged aircraft from airfields to maintenance units. While an ATA pilot could expect to fly all sorts of aircraft types in use with the RAF, the service also needed a fleet of dedicated taxi aircraft to move crews in between jobs – and the Argus was just the right fit.

The history of the Second World War is about production and logistics just as much as it is about incredible machines and individual acts of bravery. Without the ATA and its Argus fleet, the RAF simply could not have operated on the scale that it did. The Argus might not have the glamour of the  Spitfire, Hurricane, Mosquito or Lancaster, but in its own way it made a massive impact on the British war effort.

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Paul Tremelling flew the ultimate Sea Harrier, the formidable FA2, with Britain’s Royal Navy. This Cold War naval fighter was equipped with some of the most capable weapons and sensors in the world, and proved a dangerous opponent to those who underestimated the tenacious little jump-jet. As Paul explains, the Sea Harrier could also bite pilots who didn’t handle it with due care. Deadly, unique and characterful, those who flew the Sea Harrier inevitably fell in love with it. Here Paul shares ten fascinating reasons why he loved flying what was affectionately known as the ‘SHAR’.

“…if you flew a Sea Harrier in the speed band of 30-120 knots, with sideslip  – the jet had a little treat for you. It flipped over and you died.”

10. The boat

I know, it’s a ship. I said it just to annoy the people who get annoyed by that sort of thing. Going to the ship is special. It’s a heart-warming experience finding a slate grey bit of the UK bobbing around on the sea. Especially when your fuel plan allows you for not much more that ‘find ship and land’ at the end of a tactical rough and tumble. The only issue with a ship being our base was that absolutely everything became harder. It moved, in the sense of not being where it was supposed to be 100% of the time. It moved, in the sense of it would actually be pitching, heaving and rolling (and yawing) when you were trying to land on it. But it was home and it made us (almost) unique. It’s probably impossible to be almost unique. Being in the ship made things harder. It was harder to move between briefing rooms, it was harder to make phone calls to coordinate with other assets. It was harder to find your immersion suit. But it was also the most exciting form of ‘fast jet’ aviation available to a British pilot and it made you good at what you did. It put you in a variety of corners and offered you a simple choice – cope or be gone. There were plenty of differences to operating ashore that seem obvious but you did need to learn them. Things like having your ejection seat live whenever you were in the aeroplane. This wasn’t a thing at an airfield because the chances of you falling off an airfield and into the sea whilst strapped to a jet are minimal or nil. If you pitch up at an airfield either before or after your allotted landing time it is doubtful that you’ll have messed up the entire day for everyone who works there – that’s possible on a ship! There is also the much misunderstood notion of being amongst a platform’s primary outputs. This should not result in arrogance. This should result in humility and a desire to get things right. If a whole ship’s company is there to put you into the battlespace (repeat – amongst other key tasks) you had better not screw it up!

9. The AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile

The Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile was, and remains, your best bet for coming home alive if you happen to get into an air-to-air engagement with someone else. It is on the one hand the weapon that sets the standard for all others and, because anyone who was sensible bought them, it is also the currency medium-range weapon of the free world. The Sea Harrier got it a little before everyone else and it was perfectly integrated into the machine. It seemed to have a holy marriage with the Blue Vixen and could be used to bring pain to the enemy in any weather by day or night. It is the AIM-120 and Blue Vixen combination that took the Falkland era FRS Mk 1 which was a simple jet with moveable nozzles – to the FA2 standard which was a decent air defender. The real joy of the Sea Harrier setup was that most aircraft at the time were used to enormous amounts of energy being needed to guide weapons onto them. This allowed them to use their warning receivers to detect weapons being launched at them. Not the Blue Vixen and AMRAAM combo. Sadly [or happily] never used in combat by the UK.

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8. The corners

There would be no real point in mastering a jet which didn’t need to be mastered in the first place. Part of being the pilot of a British machine was to acknowledge and overcome its shortcomings (one day we’ll invent something foible-free) or to avoid them altogether. The Sea Harrier had a couple of corners one had to avoid. It might sound a little far-fetched – but if you flew a Sea Harrier in the speed band of 30-120 knots, with sideslip, i.e. not going straight forward and with a raised angle of attack – the jet had a little treat for you. It flipped over and you died. Full stop; unless you were very quick at getting rid of one of those three conditions. You could fly around all day with two out of the three and be safe as houses – but all three brought doom, and quickly. Similarly, if you wanted a relaxing day at the office you knew how much fuel and water could be on board for the jet to hover and you never attempted to see what happened above those weights. Simple answer – a crash. The jet was actually quite good at telling you whether or not you could hover as the power the engine was developing as you passed 100 knots decelerating could give you an accurate estimation of that needed to hover. The last thing to be avoided at all cost was to go anywhere near the ramp without first having done the calculations to determine minimum and maximum deck run. If you tried to go from less than the minimum then you crashed. If you went from beyond the maximum it caused the nose wheel to collapse and, well, you crashed. Knowing and avoiding these corners was, in many ways, what being a Sea Harrier pilot was all about – bending this fabulous machine to your will!

7. The ramp

Let’s be honest, few people understand VSTOL, fewer people understand VIFF, fewer still understand the ramp. Think of it as a ballistic throw that allows you to accelerate on a runway that isn’t there. There were a couple of things to get right going off the ramp. As we mentioned above there was a maximum and minimum deck run that needed to be calculated on every launch. This would depend on aircraft weight, air temperature/pressure and individual engine performance. It would result in the two distances – and the nozzle setting to be used, snatched in by the left hand at ramp exit and also the tailplane setting. If you had a very short run the ramp looked like a wall in front of you. The minimum deck run was 200 feet. Any shorter and the engine would not spool up in time as you launched.

On the boat, the technique was relatively simple and once all other procedures had been followed and the launch was ordered by the ship and one had been shown a green flag – it really was just a case of waiting. Waiting for the ramp to be going down through the far horizon before a smart slam to full power. By holding the brakes it was possible to momentarily delay travel to check that the engine appeared to be fine, before the aircraft skidded and it was time to release the brakes and go! The pilot pointed at the centre of the ramp, which by this time would be going back up and snatched in nozzle as jet parted company with ship. At night this took you from dim light to abyss in a heartbeat. A pretty cool way of defeating gravity. Whilst we’re on the subject – night approaches to the ship in a VSTOL fighter, without any night vision aid – is about as high end as it gets.

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This wasn’t just any old club. This was a club that was forged in a pretty gnarly furnace called combat. It was a club whose everyday business was single-seat flying from aircraft carriers. It had a heritage that harked back to one of the modern world’s most decisive air power results – the besting of everything that Argentina could throw at the Task Force. Sure, there are modern and accurate examinations of the war that throw new light on the efficacy of the Argentine attack – and yes the main attribute of the Sea Harrier itself was that it was there. But the Royal Navy and RAF aircrew who fought in the Falklands conflict and the maintenance personnel who gave them jet after serviceable jet – set a tone and an expectation that the community carried forward for its whole service life. This did lend itself to some of the training becoming a little bit of a rite of passage – but who would want to join a club that didn’t have some form of barrier to entry? Who would let sub-standard applicants into a club they cherished? Perhaps club is the wrong term, perhaps ‘community’ is a better one. Whatever we decide it doesn’t really matter – what mattered was that one way or another you were thought of as being connected to some amazing aviators, maintainers and other squadron personnel – who gave a land-based air force and its maritime sister service a kicking the world will never forget. 5000 miles away from home, operating from two smallish aircraft carriers. Every day as a Sea Harrier pilot is your job was to be a worthy successor to them.

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6. Vectoring in Forward Flight (VIFFing)

 If V/STOL (see below) was about using the nozzles to take off and land efficiently, Vectoring In Forward Flight was the science/ art of using them to increase the combat effectiveness of the aircraft. Combat effectiveness is really only made up of two things. Lethality and survivability. In air-to-air combat it’s all about getting a weapon off at your adversary, from a position that it will actually work – whilst denying him/ her the chance to do the same. VIFF is, on the face of it, quite simple and is about moving the nozzles, whilst in flight, to point the thrust somewhere other than straight back. The nozzles could be used to bring the nose to bear when aerodynamic forces had already given their all. They could also be used to tighten turns towards an enemy and deny them a shot opportunity by giving them a massive closure problem to deal with. One could slow down rapidly with one big movement of the nozzles or use them in small ‘bites’ to gain a little advantage at a time. Again the nozzles were controlled using the simple lever on the left-hand side of the cockpit. If jet combat is quite a trial on the body, eyesight, inner ear and various other human bits and pieces – the injection of vectored thrust adds a further degree of brutality. What usually happened with nozzles was that people used them in a cycle. An application of nozzle would give you an advantage in a fight, for example using them fully forward to kill your speed and getting an adversary to overtake – straight into your missile envelope. This momentary success would result in a couple of months of nozzle-use in every fight. Some of these would give the user no advantage whatsoever as they bled energy off the jet, so had to be used judiciously. At some point the evil forces of over-use and complacency would coalesce and – in exactly the same situation as they proved so useful before – the nozzles would bite you, and hard. Nozzles had to be used sensibly and had a couple of handling instructions such as ‘Ease off the back stick before applying’. If this advice wasn’t heeded the jet would flick and start tumbling through the air. This was termed a departure from controlled flight. A good departure was a little eye-watering and would put you off nozzle use for a little bit. But then a day would come when a little VIFF was required – it would go well and the cycle could start again.  

5. Vertical/ Short Take-Off Landing

V/STOL. It has to be acknowledged that V/STOL never killed any bad guys – and was at least partially responsible for a few accidents along the way. The trick with Vertical/ Short Take Off and Landing was to maintain a healthy balance between familiarity and skill fade. To never allow fear or complacency to creep in. Thus the Sea harrier driver could take off vertical, almost vertically, using a short take-off technique – all of which used the nozzles; or indeed just do without them and take off like a normal aeroplane using aft stick at the correct speed. The number of different take-off techniques was matched by a similarly broad means of landing. All the way from the heart-pounding Conventional Landing which tended to be very fast – to the vertical landing we always used at the boat. A good example of which had a firm, but not teeth-chattering arrival at the far end. All these techniques relied upon the elegantly simple nozzle lever which deflected the nozzles from straight back, to 19 degrees forward. Somewhere at the heart of these was the ability to hover. To sit on a stack of air and, whilst monitoring thrust and precious little fuel, delight in having bucked a major law of physics using the amazing Pegasus engine. Like the Blue Vixen another masterpiece of engineering. At home in the hover, comfortable at 500 knots, able to cope with savage accelerations and decelerations if the Blue Vixen was the brains of the show – the Pegasus was a Harrier’s beating heart.

4. The Blue Vixen radar

British engineering has had a patchy history. One of the undoubted highlights, if not the zenith of our achievements is the Blue Vixen as fielded by the Sea Harrier FA2. It is quite hard to summarise briefly so I will use one word: Superb. The radar was easy to use, the switches were intuitive and the display simple. We used to compare it to US systems which I have since used – and I learned that it was streets ahead of them. It had a high enough power output to form tracks on adversaries at decent ranges – but was sufficiently subtle to go unnoticed too. As one of the first radars that didn’t need to illuminate a target to guide a missile onto its prey – this caught out quite a few exercise foes. The radar had an extraordinary capacity for showing multiple tracks at once and really only needed a single mode for an entire intercept which made it simple but effective. In slightly geeky radar speak it used the correct emissions to get the best results depending on whether it was looking up or down. It could be used in the visual arena to cue a Sidewinder onto a target when ‘in close and personal’; it could be used for a ‘self-talk down’ to the boat; it could be used to tighten up the bombing solution or to upgrade the gunsight. Fabulous system.

3. Multirole

Everything in aviation is a compromise. Even the machines that don’t look like compromises are at some level – maybe in capability, possibly in the development budget. The Sea Harrier could make a fist of most roles including attack, reconnaissance and air defence. The nomenclature has changed over time but the essence of the missions hasn’t. The motto of the Sea Harrier headquarters Squadron, 899 Naval Air Squadron was Strike and Defend for good reason. For a significant part of its history, the Sea Harrier possessed the UK’s most potent air-to-air weapon in AMRAAM and its most potent anti-shipping weapon in Sea Eagle. It could also drop dumb bombs, with a weapon aiming system which was actually pretty accurate and the jet could be armed with cannon. It couldn’t do many of these roles at once – but few platforms throughout history have been able to. Almost forgot – it did have a decent, if basic reconnaissance camera – used in the Falklands, the Balkans and in Sierra Leone. The multi-role nature of the jet was reflected in the training, meaning that you had to stay up to speed on numerous roles and weapons. In peacetime there are few sorties as rewarding as fighting through an air threat, to deliver air-to-surface stores before doing the same again to get back to the boat.

2. Single-Seat Cockpit

Flying a single-seat fast jet is hard work – but also one of unbounded joy. There are a couple of ways of complicating already complex tasks. One of the best is to subdivide them further and assign them to different people whilst accepting that the two lists are interwoven and that any breakdown is sub-optimal. The obvious antidote to this poisoned line of reasoning is to equip a suitably able and trained person with all the tools they need to do the role on their own. In the aviation world, this results in the single-seat cockpit. The Sea Harrier had a superb integrated weapon system and all the information that the driver needed was readily available. It allowed one person of the requisite ability to fight the aircraft across its entire flight envelope and range of roles. What could possibly be better than being in complete charge of one’s own destiny when blasting off the front of the carrier (or getting back to it)? Yes, teamwork between jets was critical but teamwork between the self-sufficient was incredibly rewarding.

1. The club

This wasn’t just any old club. This was a club that was forged in a pretty gnarly furnace called combat. It was a club whose everyday business was single-seat flying from aircraft carriers. It had a heritage that harked back to one of the modern world’s most decisive airpower results – the besting of everything that Argentina could throw at the Task Force. Sure, there are modern and accurate examinations of the war that throw new light on the efficacy of the Argentine attack – and yes the main attribute of the Sea Harrier itself was that it was there. But the Royal Navy and RAF aircrew who fought in the Falklands conflict and the maintenance personnel who gave them jet after serviceable jet – set a tone and an expectation that the community carried forward for its whole service life. This did lend itself to some of the training becoming a little bit of a rite of passage – but who would want to join a club that didn’t have some form of barrier to entry? Who would let sub-standard applicants into a club they cherished? Perhaps ‘club’ is the wrong term, perhaps ‘community’ is a better one. Whatever we decide it doesn’t really matter – what mattered was that one way or another you were thought of as being connected to some amazing aviators, maintainers and other squadron personnel – who gave a land-based air force and its maritime sister service a kicking the world will never forget. 5000 miles away from home, operating from two smallish aircraft carriers. Every day as a Sea Harrier pilot it was your job to be a worthy successor to them.

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Here we go! It is here.

Patriotic British amateur aircraft maker Keith Pluck has built and flown a replica of the famous World War II fighter aircraft, made from upcycled material from top hats worn by wartime leader Winston Churchill. The aircraft took its first flight today from Margate Airport.

The Spitfire first flew in 1936 and went on to defend Britain from Nazi invasion and win the War.

In celebration of this aircraft, Margate-based aero engineer Keith Pluck has created an exact replica – but one with a difference: most of its structure is made of a composite created from top hats, cigar butts and other miscellaneous items sourced from the Winston Churchill Collection. According to Pluck, “It is an absolute honour to fly the Tophat Spitfire, you can literally smell Churchill’s ghost in the cockpit.”

Pluck’s intends the aircraft to raise awareness of the part hatmakers had in the making of Britain.

Tophat Spitfire facts

The Spitfire’s composite laminate structure contains materials that include:

5 of Churchill’s trademark top hats

Winston’s Zumba leotard

498 cigar butts

3 pairs of Churchill’s ‘long johns’

Churchill’s first Tamagotchi 

The former Prime Minister’s Pieminister loyalty card

The Existential Worries of a Developing Air Superiority Fighter in a Undeveloping Nation

I AM a sick plane. . . . I am a spiteful plane. An attractive plane. I think that my port inlet hurts. But actually, I don’t know a damn thing about my developmental ills. I am not even sure what it is that hurts, my nozzle petals feel more unstealthy by the day. I am not in radar-absorbent treatment and never have been, although I respect both aerodynamicists and propulsion experts. Besides, I am supercruising in the extreme; well, at least to the extent of respecting overland noise limitations. (I am sufficiently educated not to supercruise, but I do) No, sir, I refuse to see an engineer simply out of spite. Now, that is something that you probably will fail to understand. Well, I understand it…

…I have been living like this for a long time-about twenty years since the Defence Ministry selected Sukhoi over Mikoyan as the winner of the PAK FA competition and the lead design bureau of the new aircraft. Now I am twenty-two…

When defence journalists came to my desk at MAKS seeking information, I gnashed my leading-edge vortex controllers  at them, and gloated insatiably whenever I succeeded in distressing them. I almost always succeeded. Most of them were timid folk: naturally freeloaders in search of funky lanyards and some sandwiches. But there were also some sharper fellows, and among these I particularly detested a certain critic in the pay of MiG RAC. He absolutely refused to submit to accepting that I was actually low observable and clattered revoltingly about my endless engine failures. I battled him over that contract for a year and a half. And finally, I got the best of him. He stopped clattering. This, however, happened long ago, when I was still a swept forward wing testbed with nothing to lose but that empire that may me…

…You might be imagining, gentlemen, that I am trying to amuse you, to make you laugh? Wrong again. I am not at all the jolly aerobatic airshow aircraft you think I am, or may perhaps think I am. But then, if, irritated by all this prattle & Whitney (and I feel it already, I feel you are irritated), you’ll take it into your heads to ask me what I am, I’ll answer you: I am a certain collegiate aggressor.

I am told that the Moscow climate is becoming bad for me, that my endless woes means it’s too expensive to produce me in numbers. I know all that, I know it better than all those wise, experienced defence analysts and head-shakers. But I stay on in Moscow, I shall not leave Moscow! I shall not leave because. . . . Ah, but what difference does it make whether I leave or don’t leave.

• Based on Notes from the Underground written in 1864 by Fyodor Dostoevsky

Russia’s savage aggression against Ukraine has revealed much about the state of Russia’s combat air capabilities. We asked Guy Plopsky to take a deeper look.

Which Russian Aerospace Forces combat aircraft have been used in this campaign, which have been most active, and what have they been doing?

There may be a lot we don’t know simply because it doesn’t get reported and/or captured on film, but available information suggests that the Russian Aerospace Forces’ (VKS) army aviation has been quite active. Attack helicopters being employed include Mi-35Ms, Mi-28Ns, Ka-52s, and one or more variants of the older Mi-24. The Ka-52 in particular seems to be among the most active Russian combat aircraft types in this war so far. Ka-52s appear to be flying close air support (CAS), air interdiction, armed reconnaissance, and armed escort sorties. They appear to typically operate in flights of 2-4 aircraft.

As for VKS operational-tactical aviation, Su-25s (including Su-25SM and Su-25SM3 versions) in particular seem to be among the most active. They appear to typically operate in flights of two, flying CAS, air interdiction and likely also armed reconnaissance sorties. Some of the other aircraft types known to be taking part in the campaign include the Su-35S and Su-34. Su-35Ss are being employed for suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) missions. They are likely flying other counterair missions too (for example, fighter sweeps), and possibly also air interdiction and/or other missions. Missions performed by the Su-34 during the war likely include air interdiction and possibly also offensive counterair (SEAD/attack of counter-air targets on the ground) and/or other missions (for example, attack of critical infrastructure assets). Tragically, hospitals and other healthcare facilities have been included in this ‘critical infrastructure’ targeting. The Russians are also known to target other civilian targets. It is not clear which specific VKS assets were used to target various civilian targets.

As for VKS long-range aviation, to the best of my knowledge, there are no videos documenting the use of bombers in the campaign; however, Tu-95MS and/or Tu-160 bombers have no doubt been employed to launch cruise missiles, likely against both military targets (for example, counterair targets on the ground) and critical infrastructure assets.

The VKS is also employing Inokhodets medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) and Forpost-R tactical armed unmanned aerial systems (UASs). These systems, too, seem to be more active than they were earlier in the war. They appear to be used for air interdiction and armed reconnaissance.      

Does Russia use smart munitions to the same extent as the US/NATO?

In short, no. Not even close. According to figures published in the Vozdushno-Kosmicehskaya Oborona (Aerospace Defense) journal, only 3% of the total munitions employed by Russian aircraft during the First Chechen War were guided. The figures for the Second Chechen War and the August 2008 Russo-Georgian War are even lower – a meager 1.5% and 0.5%, respectively. For comparison, nearly 70% of the total weapons employed by NATO/Coalition air and naval platforms during Operation Deliberate Force (1995)/Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003) were guided, and, in 2011, NATO struck targets in Libya exclusively with precision-guided weapons. The figure for Russian operations in Syria is not known; however, when air strikes commenced in late September 2015, the vast majority of munitions employed were unguided. To this day, guided weapons continue to account for a tiny portion of the total munitions employed by the VKS and the Russian Navy in Syria since September 2015. This may explain the Russian Defense Ministry’s continued reluctance to publish an official figure. No such official figure is available for Russian operations against Ukraine either. The total number of missiles launched by the VKS, Russian Navy and Ground Forces against Ukraine surpasses that of other Russian military operations; however, VKS operational-tactical and army aviation appear to be employing predominantly unguided munitions.

Generally speaking, how do the Russian aerospace forces’ precision-strike capabilities compare to those of the US/NATO?

On the whole, despite extensive modernization efforts, the gap in precision-strike capabilities between the VKS and leading Western air forces remains very large. In particular, the VKS’ ability to prosecute fixed hard and buried targets, mobile targets and moving targets is far more limited, especially in a contested environment and/or during night and adverse weather conditions. There are numerous interrelated factors as to why there remains a very large gap in precision-strike capabilities. They include, inter alia:

Inferior target acquisition, targeting and information exchange capabilities of Russian combat aircraft:

The VKS still operates a large number of Soviet-era platforms, many of which received various upgrades (including installation of more modern navigation, targeting and other equipment, and, in most cases, integration of additional precision-guided weapons); however, the large majority of these upgraded platforms still lack modern data link and sensor systems, and can only employ a limited variety of guided weapons (some can only use older types of guided weapons). Both non-upgraded and some of the upgraded platforms also lack glass cockpits. Put together, these and other factors translate into markedly inferior situational awareness, high aircrew workload and limited/very limited precision targeting capabilities. Apart from these platforms, the VKS also operates some more extensively modernized older platforms and a large number of newer platforms equipped with more modern avionics and mission systems; however, their precision-strike capabilities, too, are more limited than those of modern US/NATO fixed and rotary-wing combat aircraft. Notably, their built-in sensor systems are less capable than many advanced Western built-in systems and targeting pods, and they lack the sensor fusion capabilities of modern Western platforms.

Very few stealth platforms:

The VKS has thus far taken delivery of a very small number of production version Su-57 fighters and has yet to equip a single operational squadron with the type. As for the PAK DA bomber programme, Russia has yet to roll out a prototype and it remains to be seen whether the VKS will even begin to take delivery of production version aircraft by the end of the decade. The VKS’ stealth aircraft fleet will remain both quantitatively and, in many respects, qualitatively markedly inferior to that of the US/NATO in the foreseeable decades.

Absence of certain types of precision-guided weapons:

There are several types of precision-guided weapons that are neither in service with the VKS nor known to be in development for it. These include precision-guided missiles and bombs that are “network-enabled” and/or equipped with tri-mode seekers for enhanced tactical flexibility. Another example are heavy penetrator bombs for defeating hard and buried targets (the heaviest precision-guided “bunker buster” bombs available to the VKS are 1,500 kg-class weapons).

Very few modern combat support platforms:

At present, the VKS operates a relatively small fleet of manned combat support platforms such as airborne early warning and control (AEW&C), electronic warfare (EW) and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft for supporting precision-strike and other missions. This fleet comprises both older platforms, some of which have undergone modernization (for example, A-50 AEW&C aircraft that were upgraded to the A-50U standard), and newer platforms. The latter in particular are available in very limited numbers; for example, the VKS’ fleet of Il-22PP EW aircraft and Tu-214R ISR aircraft is tiny. Furthermore, the VKS has no high-altitude ISR platform.

Very few unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs):

There are two types of UCAVs currently available to the VKS. Both are relatively basic designs (part of the Inokhodets and Forpost-R armed UASs), and both are available in small numbers. Heavier/more advanced UCAVs are still not ready. Notably, prototypes of the S-70 stealth UCAV are currently undergoing testing and it remains to be seen whether the VKS will begin taking delivery of production version aircraft before the late 2020s.

The above list of factors is by no means exhaustive.

It must be emphasized that the VKS’ capabilities will greatly expand over the next decade as it continues to field modern manned and unmanned combat and combat support assets and precision-guided weapons. Notably, by the early 2030s, the large majority of the VKS’ force of fixed and rotary-wing combat aircraft will have at least a limited night and adverse weather precision-strike capability. That said, large capability gaps in C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance), EW, target acquisition and targeting, stealth, precision-guided weapons and other relevant areas will remain between the VKS and leading Western air forces.

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You mentioned inferior targeting acquisition and targeting capabilities – can you give a few brief examples?

Sure. To illustrate this point, consider several very brief examples pertaining to the five most prevalent tactical fixed-wing aircraft types in service with the VKS that possess a precision-strike capability: the Su-24M, Su-25SM, Su-30SM, Su-34 and Su-35S.

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The Su-30SM and Su-35S are equipped with the OLS-30 and OLS-35 optical-locator station, respectively. Located to starboard of the aircraft centerline ahead of the cockpit, these built-in systems are in many respects significantly inferior to advanced western targeting pods. Take for instance the OLS-35; due to its position and its comparatively small field of regard, the system provides only limited lower hemisphere coverage. This significantly constrains the Su-35S’ tactical flexibility when employing it for surface (ground and sea) target acquisition and laser designation, among other purposes. The same is true for the Su-30SM when employing its OLS-30 for surface target acquisition (as for laser designation, there is conflicting information on whether the OLS-30 includes a laser designator or not, meaning the Su-30SM may not have the ability to independently employ laser-guided missiles).

The Su-34 – primarily an air-to-surface platform – is equipped with the ventral LTPS “Platan” laser/TV targeting system whose retractable housing can be seen located between the inlets, just aft of the forward landing gear bay. Platan provides greater – though still limited – lower hemisphere coverage. Additional information about the system is very scarce, but Platan is likely equipped with a low-light-level television (LLLTV) device; it is not believed to have a forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensor, A standard feature on advanced western targeting pods, FLIR sensors offer superior night and adverse weather capability. Platan’s functionality is inferior to that of advanced targeting pods due to other reasons too, including, for example, lower sensor resolution and the absence of a laser-lead guidance capability (the latter greatly facilitates effective engagement of moving targets using laser-guided weapons that lack the ability to compute the lead required to strike a target that is on the move).

Besides their respective aforementioned systems, the Su-30SM, Su-34 and Su-35S are, among other things, also equipped with relatively modern passive electronically scanned array (PESA) radar systems. While the synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) mapping, ground moving target indication and tracking (GMTI/GMTT), and other air-to-surface capabilities of these radar systems are presumably somewhat – if not considerably – superior to those of their respective export-oriented variants, they are markedly inferior in many respects to those of advanced active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar systems installed in many western fighter aircraft.

The Su-24M is an older platform, equipped with the dated PNS-24M targeting/navigation system (which includes a radar system and the ventral LTPS “Kaira-24” laser/TV targeting system, among other things) and an archaic stores management system. The only guided weapons that the Su-24M can employ are older laser and TV-guided weapons and anti-radiation missiles. Practically speaking, laser and TV-guided weapons are only suitable for clear/limited adverse weather conditions. Moreover, the TV-guided bombs and missiles that the Su-24M can employ lack a night capability. So too does its Kaira-24 system, meaning that the Su-24M is unable to independently engage targets at night with laser-guided weapons. This is a huge limitation, especially given that the Su-24M is unable to employ satellite-aided bombs and missiles, which are day/night and adverse weather capable weapons (the Su-30SM, by the way, may not be able to use them either). As for unguided bombs, the Su-24M can employ them during night and adverse weather conditions. Notably, the integration of the SVP-24 specialized computing subsystem on many Su-24Ms has enabled them to employ unguided bombs with greater precision than before; however, given that unguided bombs are inherently less precise, the Su-24M’s inability to use modern, night and adverse weather capable precision-guided weapons – especially stand-off weapons – remains a huge limitation.

As for the Su-25SM, it is equipped with a Klen-PS laser rangefinder/designator system, but lacks both a radar and an electro-optical (EO) targeting system, and the only guided weapons it is able to employ are several types of dated laser-guided missiles. Put together, this means that, practically speaking, the Su-25SM lacks a night and/or adverse weather organic precision-strike capability, and possesses only a limited daytime organic precision-strike capability against stationary targets. Needless to say, this is a major disadvantage for a CAS/ground attack platform. For comparison, though not equipped with a radar either, the U.S. Air Force’s (USAF) A-10C can carry an advanced targeting pod and can employ a wide range of modern precision-guided weapons. It is a far more versatile platform, possessing a day/night and adverse weather organic precision-strike capability (including against moving targets in limited adverse weather conditions).

To be fair, unlike the baseline Su-25, the Su-25SM is equipped with the satellite-aided PrNK-25SM targeting/navigation system that enables employment of unguided bombs against stationary targets during day/night and adverse weather conditions without visual acquisition of the targets by the pilot. However, because it involves the use of unguided bombs, this bombing method is inherently less precise. Furthermore, it requires the Su-25SM to rely on non-organic assets to provide accurate target coordinates prior to and/or during a mission.

How useful are medium and heavy bombers for this campaign?

VKS bomber/strike aircraft are typically catagorized as follows:

Strategic bombers (Tu-95MS and Tu-160), long-range bombers (Tu-22M3) and operational-tactical bombers (Su-24M, Su-34).

In the conventional strike role, the Tu-95MS and Tu-160 (including the Tu-160M1 version) can strike stationary ground targets with known coordinates in day/night and adverse weather conditions using Kh-555 and Kh-101 long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). The latter is a more capable weapon that can currently be employed by some Tu-95MSs and some (if not all) Tu-160s. Technically speaking, Tu-95MSs are not bombers; they are purely strategic missiles carriers because they cannot employ bombs of any kind (not even unguided bombs). As for Tu-160s, they are not known to currently carry any weapons other than ALCMs either. Given that Ukraine fields air defense systems, the ability to launch ALCMs from well outside the range of air defenses makes the Tu-95MS and Tu-160 useful. Aside from that, however, the Tu-95MS and Tu-160 are of no other use in such a campaign given that they are non-stealthy platforms, lack modern data-link, radar, EO targeting and self-protection systems, and are (seemingly) unable to employ other weapons. Moreover, it’s not clear whether the Kh-555 and/or Kh-101 have a hardened target defeat capability. If not, this further limits the utility of the Tu-95MS and Tu-160.  

As for the Tu-22M3, There is no indication of its employment in the campaign to date. The Tu-22M3’s conventional armament is known to currently include only anti-ship variant(s) of the Kh-22 air-to-surface missile and various unguided bombs. In other words, the Tu-22M3 has no conventional stand-off strike capability against ground targets. Moreover, like the Tu-95MS and Tu-160, it is both non-stealthy and lacks modern systems. Given the threat posed by Ukrainian air defenses, the apparent absence of Tu-22M3s in this war so far comes as no surprise.

Like the Tu-22M3, there is no indication that Russia is using the Su-24M in the campaign so far (though it is known to be employing the Su-24MR reconnaissance variant). This, too, is not surprising given that the VKS operates a relatively large fleet of Su-34s, which are superior to the Su-24M and are meant to eventually replace it. As I noted earlier, the Su-34 is being used in the campaign, and, despite its limitations (some of which are mentioned above), it is nevertheless a capable combat aircraft that can be employed for many air-to-surface tasks, making it among the most useful platforms in this war.   

How many Russian aircraft have been lost?

To date, Russia has lost well over 40 manned aircraft. This number includes at least 11 fixed-wing aircraft that were shot down: 6 Su-25s (including two or more SMs and one or more SM3s) and 4 Su-34s belonging to the VKS, and one Russian Navy Su-30SM. Another VKS Su-25 was damaged by a man-portable air defense system (MANPADS), but managed to make it back to base. VKS rotary-wing losses have been particularly heavy. At least 3 transport and 11 attack helicopters were shot down. The latter include 7 Mi-24 and Mi-35Ms, 3 Ka-52s and one Mi-28N. At least two more Ka-52s are known to have carried out a forced landing in Ukrainian territory after being hit and were subsequently abandoned by their crews. At least another 15 Russian helicopters were destroyed on the ground by Ukrainian attacks on Kershon Air Base. The Russians have also lost a number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the heaviest of these being a UAV that is part of the Forpost tactical UAS.

What has been the biggest surprise for you in the application of Russian air power?

The biggest surprise was the apparent limited use of tactical fixed-wing aircraft early on in the campaign (first 5 days or following the opening wave of attacks). As I noted in an earlier interview with The Aviationist, “[o]ne explanation is that the Russians probably overestimated their own capabilities and underestimated the Ukrainians. They may have believed that their ground forces would be able to seize key objectives swiftly, and that the extensive use of operational-tactical aviation would therefore not be necessary. This is supported by the fact that the opening phase of missile-aviation and artillery attacks that preceded the ground offensive was quite short. Many analysts expected it to be much longer and more intense.” The Russians may have also limited the number of tactical fixed-wing aircraft sorties in the first days of the campaign due to fears of suffering excessive losses. Another possible contributing factor or explanation for the apparent limited activity of tactical fixed-wing aircraft in late February is that the Russians were simply unprepared to conduct sorties in larger numbers.

How is Ukraine different from the Syria campaign?

Firstly, the scope of the Ukraine campaign is different. It involves a larger and more diverse target set and likely a higher average daily sortie rate. Secondly, the terrain in Ukraine is different and generally more challenging for target location and identification, especially for Russian tactical fixed-wing aircraft (this is less of an issue for Russian UAVs and more modern attack helicopters). Weather conditions may also prove to be generally less favorable than in Syria. Lastly, unlike the Syria campaign, the Ukraine campaign involves an attack on a state with combat aircraft and an integrated air defense system (IADS).

Which recent wars will have influenced how Russian airpower is applied, and what are the specifics of these changes?

A good question – this is a very large topic and there are many specifics about the use of Russian air power in Ukraine that are not known, so I will make several quick points:

Russian air operations in Ukraine appear to have drawn on some lessons from the Russo-Georgian war. Notably, whereas Russian Tu-22Ms and Su-24Ms were employed to attack Georgian targets in 2008, there is – as mentioned earlier – no indication of them being employed against Ukraine to date. During the war with Georgia, a single Tu-22M3 and Su-24M were shot down by Georgian air defenses. The Russians likely therefore view these two dated aircraft types as too risky to employ at this stage of the war in Ukraine, especially given the various other, more modern capabilities presently available to the Russian military that render the Tu-22M3 and Su-24M redundant in many respects. That said, the VKS is interestingly employing a number of other dated aircraft types in this war. Most notably, the baseline Su-25 and the Mi-24P. In both cases, the VKS has much more capable alternatives available (which are also being employed in the campaign). Given the huge difference in combat potential between a Su-25 and a Su-25SM3 or a Mi-24P and a Mi-35M/Mi-28N/Ka-52, it’s not entirely clear why these dated platforms are being employed in a contested environment.

Another important Russian lesson from the Russo-Georgian war and from other foreign military operations is the importance of UASs. During the 2008 war, the Russian military made very limited use of Pchela-1T UAVs and was grossly disappointed with its performance, especially when compared to the UASs available to Georgia. Since then, the Russian military has been fielding various UAS, though its capabilities in this field are still limited, with more advanced/heavier systems still not ready. The two most advanced Russian UASs known to currently be employed in Ukraine are the aforementioned Inokhodets and Forpost-R (both of these armed UASs have also seen use in Syria). While these systems are leaps ahead of what the Russian military had available in 2008, they are in many respects inferior to the Bayraktar TB2 MALE UCAV operated by Ukraine.

As for other aspects of the campaign, the initial missile-aviation strikes against Ukraine appear to have been a Russian attempt at executing something akin to the opening phases of US-led military operations against Iraq and Serbia. In reality, however, Russia’s opening phase was very different. The Pentagon estimates that the Russian military launched only about 100 missiles of various types during the opening attack. Even though the actual number is likely higher, this is a relatively small number given the scale of Russia’s military operation and the large number of potential aimpoints (I discuss Russia’s use of missiles in greater detail here). Furthermore, it seems that the Russians did not effectively exploit the mixed success of their initial and subsequent missile strikes by following them up with large numbers of fixed-wing aircraft strike sorties using shorter range/direct attack weapons. They were also seemingly slow to re-attack when necessary. In short, Russia’s opening phases were conducted rather poorly, yielding very mixed results.

Russia’s campaign in Ukraine appears to highlight major deficiencies in the Russian military’s offensive and defensive counterair capabilities. Russian offensive counterair efforts failed to neutralize the Ukrainian Air Force on the ground. Moreover, Russian fighters and ground-based air defenses were unable to prevent attacks by Ukrainian manned and unmanned aircraft on Russian ground forces. Ukraine’s TB2 UCAVs, in particular, are proving a challenge. As for the VKS’ SEAD capabilities, despite Russia’s own experience in the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, and despite studying US and allied SEAD efforts during various military operations, the VKS’ SEAD capabilities remain lackluster (equipment and especially training). As I mentioned elsewhere, VKS “exercises appear to exhibit little in the way of complex scenarios involving SEAD packages supporting strike packages.” Given that Ukraine fields highly mobile air defense systems, the lack of a robust SEAD capability has proven to be a major issue.

As a final general remark, it’s important to keep in mind that while this war has highlighted many deficiencies in the Russian military’s capabilities, there are some capabilities that are not being employed to the fullest. Also, the Russian military is likely drawing many lessons from this war. Which of these lessons will be applied and how remains to be seen.

Guy Plopsky is the author of a number of articles on air power and Russian military affairs. He holds an MA in International Affairs and Strategic Studies from Tamkang University Taiwan.

Wing Commander (rtd) and Typhoon combat veteran Mike Sutton OBE gives his views on the use of air power in Russia’s attempted invasion of Ukraine.

What has most caught your attention regarding how airpower has been employed in the current Russia-Ukraine War?

It is clear that Russian air power has played a relatively limited role in Ukraine, but we can only speculate as to why. Most analysis seems to suggest that Putin wanted a quick strike using a relatively small number of land forces, and he wasn’t expecting the levels of military resistance that has been encountered. There are several potential explanations as to why his apparently well-equipped, modern air force has played less of a role than might be expected. It’s possible that they are less well versed in complex, integrated operations than the West believed, and potentially lacking in precision-guided weapons. It’s also possible that there are concerns about the surface to air missile threat, both from the Ukrainian forces, but also with their own systems and the risk of fratricide. It is also possible that Putin has simply attempted to hold something in reserve. The utility of Ukrainian UAVs has also been interesting. Common wisdom suggests that without defensive systems these drones would be immediately vulnerable to Russian SAMs, and yet they have achieved considerable success. This highlights the role that relatively ‘low risk’ and inexpensive systems can play in a modern conflict

What are your thoughts on a potential No Fly Zone over Ukraine?

The term No Fly Zone is just a soundbite, and it’s important to define what is meant by that concept. The sort of NFZ that commentators are currently advocating is not a ‘light touch’ policing style intervention. It is an air war: pitching western air forces directly against the Russian Air Force. Placing the West eyeball to eyeball against Russian Forces has three ramifications:

First, the West would look to the US to provide the bulk of combat aircraft to enforce a NFZ. It is unlikely that the US would risk its aircraft without first conducting a comprehensive destruction of the Russian air defences (surface to air missiles, radars and command centres). This would mean directly striking Russian forces. An added complexity to this is that many of these systems have very long ranges and can be launched from Russian soil. In order to protect Ukrainian airspace, policy makers would therefore have to decide whether to strike cross-border. It should also be remembered that NFZ need to be enforced: Western and Russian Air Forces would quickly be engaged in a shooting war.

Second, if the NFZ was established and the West had fighters flying over Russian tanks, vehicles and artillery, there would be almost immediate calls to employ that air power in the strike role as well. And, in some ways it would be strange to limit the use of combat aircraft to only attacking Russian aircraft, when it is the ground forces that are causing the most damage. In either case Putin would not make a distinction between the loss of his aircraft, tanks, SAMs or artillery – it will be seen as an attack on his forces by the West. This would leave Putin feeling very threatened and would pose a risk to his core strategic interest – security. In these circumstances the risk of escalation would be significant.

Third, and perhaps most importantly from a strategic perspective, a direct military intervention would play directly to Putin’s narrative. He has long maintained that the West poses a direct military threat to Russia, and this turn of events would legitimise that paranoia, enabling him to justify his own military action

How should the West respond?

This is really a political question, not a military one. In its simplest form, the West is currently trying to influence Putin, to enable a cessation of the fighting. A good strategy does much more than just react, trying to counter like-with-like. It attempts to coerce and make it untenable for the belligerent to continue with a course of action. This requires an understanding that actions might be perceived differently than they were intended, due to an alternative world view. What some assume as benign, could be interpreted by others as a threat. For example, we think of liberal democracy as enlightened, the leaders of Russia and China see it as a menace. Any military action needs to be considered in terms of not just the effect it will have, but how it will be perceived.

Most importantly the Western response needs to avoid conflict escalation. How this is achieved is a political calculation, but there are some military options available. Putin has shot his bolt, and most analysts consider that the Russian performance has been less coordinated and effective than anticipated, particularly in the face of stiff resistance. Although of little comfort to Ukraine, in some ways NATO can draw confidence about the strength and capabilities of its own military resources from this.

Putin’s military approach has been largely conventional, using tanks, artillery and fighters to bombard Ukrainian cities. This approach has been seen before with the indiscriminate Russian bombing of Aleppo, and previously in Grozny and Georgia. With its advance now slowed in the face of fierce resistance, Russia appears to be doubling down on its strategy of bombardment. Russia is unlikely to throw its hands up quickly or easily, and a frustrated Putin makes the situation potentially more volatile. This means that the response from the West has to be considered and insightful in order to manage the risk of escalation.

The West does not need to follow suit and try to counter like-with-like. An asymmetric response avoids direct confrontation, through the use of military aid and support, the provision of anti-armour weapons, surface-to-air missiles and UAVs provides the Ukrainians with the means to fight. This is an extension of the policy of support that has been provided to the Ukrainian army since the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014. International pressure for safe corridors or protected zones should be re-doubled, potentially with the offer of humanitarian airlift support – both to get people out, and resupplies of food and medicine in. The latter would need deconfliction and coordination with the Russians, which seems a very tall order given the current level of brutality and devastation they are invoking on Ukraine.

– Mike Sutton is the author of Typhoon 

(Penguin Michael Joseph, £20) which is out now

You should be ashamed of yourselves, and by ‘you’ I mean you. You should be ashamed of yourself for not sharing with me the utter grand madness of 1940s French airliners.

The following are utterly magnifique and I’m thrilled to have the chance to share them with you. Normally I save the best to last, but I am so head-over-heels with the SE.200 Amphitrite, we will start there.

Sud-Est SE.200 Amphitrite ‘L’oie de l’épinette’ (1942)

Flying boats opened up the world in the 1930s. Who needed airports if you could land on water? There weren’t many large airports, so flying boats – in all their grand glamour – led the aeroplane travel revolution. Now air travel routes from linking North America, Europe, South America, Africa and Asia were possible.

In the 1930s the French air ministry was tantalised by the possibilities of international travel and identified a need for a transatlantic flying boat airliner to serve Air France. The requirement specified a 6,000 km (3,700 mi) range – and being the 1930s – room for only 20 lucky passengers (and 500 kg of cargo, probably mostly consisting of Pâté en Croûte, Pastis and mistresses’ underwear).

The aircraft manufacturer Lioré et Olivier set about creating a large handsome six-engined aeroplane, the LeO H-49, powered by six of the then-new Gnome-Rhône 14R-26 1600-horsepower radial aero-engine. With the unfortunately timed nationalisation of the French aviation industry, the aircraft became a Sud-Est concern. The hugely impressive flying boat was named ‘Amphitrite’ after the sea goddess and wife of Poseidon from Greek mythology. Before the huge machine could be flown, Germany invaded France – but work continued at Marignane in southern France. The first aircraft, named Rochambeau, flew on 11 December 1942, and what a machine it was.

The German occupiers were impressed by the aircraft and seized it, taking it to Lake Constance in Germany for assessment. It was here that it was destroyed by RAF Mosquitoes. Four other airframes survived for a short time at Marignane, but one was wrecked by a USAAF raid that also severely damaged the other three.

Sadly, 2022 would see another beautiful six-engined giant aeroplane destroyed from the air with the destruction of the world’s biggest aircraft, the Ukrainian An-225.

Sud-Ouest Bretagne (1945) Brittany and her turbo-Cannes

In the mid to late 1940s, transport aircraft looked like fat sausages (or saucisses in this case). Britain had the banger-esque Vickers Valletta, the US the chubby-wiener that was the C-46 and the French the quaintly porky Bretagne. Conceived in glamourous Cannes on the French Riviera, the Bretagne was operated as an airliner in France and French colonies, as well as in Iran. The coolest thing about this lovable machine is the optional booster jets (two Turbomeca Palas rated at a rather cute 1.47 kN – 330 lbf) under the outer wings. It was also used as a testbed for the Nene jet-engine which made it look like three sausages flying in formation.

SNCASE SE.161 Languedoc ‘The Languishing Languedoc‘ (1939)

Despite a rather appealing appearance – and the fact it was the first post-war French aircraft to fly* – the Languedoc cannot be considered a success. Of a total of 100 built, 11 crashed and a further 7 were damaged beyond economic repair. The bulk of these incidents took place in a period of only four years. It was initially powered by four Gnome-Rhône 14Ns rotary engines, which had a short time between overhaul and were unreliable. A poor view from the cockpit, landing gear issues and other issues dogged the aeroplane, and passengers endured cold and noisy trips in the Languedoc. It was greatly inferior to international competitors, notably the far more modern Vickers Viscount. The Languedoc is best remembered today as the mothership of René Leduc’s experimental ramjet aircraft.

*(or rather return to flight as it had first flown in 1939)

Breguet Br 761 ‘Deux-Ponts’ ‘Eurovision Score’ (1949)

American engines and French airframe design has generally been a very harmonious combination, and the superb Br 761 was a shining example. This design was a double-decker, following the form set by the Latécoère 521 and the Sud-Est SE.200 Amphitrite, a slew of British and US flying boats and more directly, the American Boeing 377 Stratocruiser, and as such anticipated today’s Airbus A380. One significant reason to go taller rather than longer is hangar space. The two decks had room for over 100 passengers: 59 passengers on the top deck, and 48 on the lower deck. Like the A380, it enjoyed a fabulous safety record and a short production run.

S.N.C.A.S.O. SO-93/ Sud-Ouest Corse (1947) ‘Two Corse Sausage Lunch’

Another aircraft from ‘generation friendly sausage’, the Sud-Ouest Corse (Corsica) identified as a mail plane. It was also a pocket-sized airliner with room for 13 passengers. Created with Air France in mind, it failed to meet their needs and the national airline turned its nose up at the Corse. Still, this lovable mediocrity found a home in the French navy and in smaller numbers with the air force. It even enjoyed a short career with Air Services of India.

Latécoère 631 ‘The Constance Lakebed Gardener’

A great big schnozz that even Gérard Depardieu would envy and mighty six-engines identify the gloriously characterful and incredibly impressive 631. It was the largest flying boat ever built, necessitating the considerable grunt of six Wright R-2600 Twin Cyclones. It endured a rather too eventual career: of the eleven aircraft built, five were written off in accidents and one was destroyed in the same RAF attack on Lake Constance that wiped out the Amphitrite. The 631 was the rival of the Amphitrite, designed and built for the same Direction Générale de l’Aviation Civile requirement for a 40-passenger airliner with a range of 4,000 kilometres.

Nord 2100 Norazur (1947)

French aerospace engineers had a post-war flirtation with the pusher configuration, creating the pleasingly bananas SNCASO SO.8000 Narval, cute SECAN Courlis and somewhat eccentric Potez 75. The Norazur was not a bad design, but there were many cheaper aircraft types available to fill the light transport and training role.

Bréguet 500 Colmar (1945) ‘Girlfriend in a Colmar’

The four-engined Bréguet 482 heavy bomber would have been very fast: its projected cruise speed of 329mph was a whole 129mph faster than that of the British Lancaster; its top speed of 350mph was 70mph faster than the equivalent figure for the Lanc, and almost as quick as the best fighters of the time. Plans for the 482 were scuppered by the German occupation, but a twin-engined airliner derivative made sense. Inheriting its sleek good looks from the cancelled 482 bomber, the 500 Colmar first flew in 1945, after gestating in occupied France. It was planned that it would carry up to six passengers in the forward cabin and 17 in the rear. With a glut of rivals and France’s post-war woes, it was decided not to put the aircraft into production, but a single example did serve in the French air force for two years as an extremely classy VIP transport.

Breguet Br 892S ‘Mercure‘ (1949)

If you see a photograph of an unfamiliar World War II fighter the story of the project’s demise will have been caused by one of the following three causes: 1. Invasion/occupation/war’s end 2. A dodgy or undeveloped engine 2. The presence of good-enough rivals. If, on the other hand, you see a photograph of an unfamiliar medium-sized transport aircraft from the late 1940s, the story is even simpler: too many cheap C-47s/DC-3s in circulation rendering the effort uneconomical. The military airlifter variant, the Mars, was spurned by the French Air Force in favour of the rather more exciting Nord Noratlas.

SNCASE Armagnac Armagnac whine (1949)

The elegant Armagnac was very big and very heavy. Even with the grunt of four Wasp Majors, the most powerful piston-engines to ever enter production, the Armagnac was underpowered. Plans to equip the aircraft with the Allison T40 (powerplant to a trio of cancelled or rapidly curtailed US projects) were abandoned. Though it had a disappointing range performance, the Armagnac, with its wide-body configuration was a taste of the future.